Naše izhodišče je Kantovo razločevanje med slovnično obliko sodbe in njeno logično obliko. Logična poanta v podporo trditvi, da so sodbe okusa estetske, je pripomba, da sodbe okusa ne povezujejo predstave s pojmom. Sodba okusa sama še ne postulira soglasja vsakogar, temveč to lahko stori le logična obča sodba, ker lahko navede razloge. Pri tem se po analogiji opiramo na Kantovo razločevanje med sodbami zaznavanja in sodbami izkustva iz Prolegomen. Teza, da sodbe okusa niso podvržene dokazu, je povezana s Kantovim (...) pojmovanjem, da lepota ugaja takoj, neposredno, da odkritje nečesa lepega zahteva neposredno izkustvo predmeta. Po Kantu je dojemati smotrno urejeno stavbo nekaj popolnoma drugega kakor zavedati se te predstave s senzacijo ugajanja. V tem primeru povezujemo predstavo v celoti s subjektom, in sicer z njegovim življenjskim občutjem, ki ga imenujemo občutje ugodja in neugodja. Sodbe okusa so torej podvrsta estetski sodb; fenomenološko jih opazimo preko našega zavedanja občutja ugodja ali neugodja, ko zaznavamo predmet. To, da je predstava predmeta neposredno povezana z ugodjem, bi dalo zgolj empirično sodbo. Zdi se, da Kant navaja ta izkustvena dejstva kot evidenco za svojo trditev, da so sodbe okusa estetske. Sklep, h kateremu nas napeljuje, je, da je sodba okusa estetska, to je, da je o stanju subjekta, ki zaznavno ali čutno dojema predmet. Ta analiza sodbe okusa kot estetske tvori tezo o antinomiji okusa. Skupaj z analizo sodbe okusa kot nezainteresirane sodbe je ustvarjeno nasprotje, ki zahteva transcendentalno dedukcijo okusa. Torej ima trditev, da je sodba okusa estetska, osrednji pomen v nadaljnji argumentaciji Kritike presodne moči. (shrink)

Horgan believes that the truth of the statement “Beethoven’s fifth symphony has four movements” does not require that there be some “dedicated object” answering to the term “Beethoven’s fifth simphony”. To the contrary, the relevant language/world correspondence relation is less direct than this. Especially appropriate is the behavior by Beethoven that we would call “composing his fifth symphony”. Our objections go along two directions: (1) is the process ontology (a) really a right kind of ontology for artworks (symphonies, novels) and, (...) (b) more important, is this kind of ontology compatible with Parmenidian approach to ontology? The answer to (a) is negative. With reference to point (1b) we might say that Parmenides was a typical staunch advocate of substance metaphysics rather than process metaphysics. Traditionally, substances are individuated by their properties, namely, there are assumed two sorts of properties: primary and secondary. Primary properties describe the substance as it is in and by itself; secondary properties underlie the impact of substances upon others and the responses they elicit from them. (2) The claim that it is most unlikely to suppose that we can have some kind of cognitive contact “with an entity which has no spatio-temporal location and does not causally interact with anything” does not hold. We underpin the claim that there is some cognitive access to entity such as Beethoven’s fifth symphony with Bender’s theory of realization relation between musical work and performance. (shrink)

There is widespread view among numerous aestheticians that aesthetic and value properties are response-dependent. According to some philosophers the dependence has a rich and multilayered structure: value qualities (e.g. beauty) depend on our response to aesthetic properties (e.g. harmonious), which in turn depend on our response to a pattern of primary and secondary qualities (shapes and colors). Secondary qualities are themselves response-dependent. The basic dependence relation is thus iterated. The resulting structure is one of iterated response-dependence. The integral part of (...) such a position is a relational view, best captured by the response-dispositional analysis: My states of being appeared to magnificently in front of a painting manifests the disposition of painting to induce such experience in the normal viewer.There are two main objections against the dispositional analysis: (1) argument from circularity and (2) argument from introducing two kinds of quality, one categorical, for experiential states, and one dispositional for objects. In this paper we will suggest the arguments against second objection. (shrink)

The paper deals with the topic of empty terms as considered in chapter six of Devitt’s book Designation. Devitt’s proposal is that a statement about fiction is (usually) implicitly preceded by a fiction operator roughly paraphrasable by “it is pretended that” or “in fiction”. The causal chain that forms the network for a fictitious name are not d(esignational)-chains, for they are not grounded in an object. Nevertheless, although the fictitious name does not designate, we could say that it stands in (...) some other referential relationship to the world: it ‘F(ictionally)-designates’. It seem that we could then state truth conditions of a F-sentence using F-designation: the F-operator direct us to look not for the designatum of name but for its F-designatum. The name (for example, “Napoleon” in War and Peace), though nonempty, is just like a fictitious name. In proposing that nonempty names in fiction refer to real items, I argue against the view that “Napoleon” in the War and Peace designates the famous general, Napoleon, and F-designates parts of War and Peace. The referent of F-designation is Napoleon, famous general, too. At the end of the paper I claim that Devitt, if he wants to remain a modal fictionalist, has to renounce the view of one-world metaphysics. (shrink)

Uanset hvilket begreb man i metafysisk øjemed måtte gøre sig om viljens frihed, så er dog denne viljes fremtrædelser, de menneskelige handlinger, lige så vel som enhver anden tildragelse i naturen, bestemt gennem almene naturlove.

Papers presented at the International Seminar on Construction of Knowledge, held at Vidya Bhawan Society, Udaipur during 16-18 April 2004.

Herausgegeben von D.Friedrich Theodor Rink. Königsberg, 1804 bey Goebbels und Unzer.

Članek obravnava odnos med propozicionalnim vedenjem in podobo. Na začetku podamo pregled treh teorij, ki se ukvarjajo s tem predmetom: Pylyshynovo, Paiviojevo in Kosslynovo. Kot najbolj sprejemljivo za naš namen sprejmemo Kossly-novo ter zavrnemo drugi dve, ker se ne ujemata z dejstvi. Prispodabljanje je eden od bistvenih delov našega duševnega življenja ter se ga ne da povsem reducirati na propozicionalno znanje. V procesu oblikovanja in razumevanja metafore sta navzoči tako propozicionalno znanje kot prispodabljanje. Naša sklepna ugotovitev je, da pojma »zdeti (...) se kot« v primeru metafore ne moremo uporabljati, saj je že sam metaforičen. Za pravilno obravnavo metafore potrebujemo pojme, ki sami niso obremenjeni z metaforičnimi sestavinami. (shrink)

Izhodišče razprave je teza Sydneyja Shoemakerja, da običajno domnevajo kot očitno dejstvo, »da si v introspekciji nismo predstavljeni kot telesne bitnosti«. Vendar navkljub temu utemeljujejo introspekcijo na modelu čutnega zaznavanja. V osrednjem delu teksta preučujemo, kakšnim zahtevam mora zadostiti introspekcija, da bi ustrezala stereotipu čutnega zaznavanja. Ugotavljamo, skupaj s Shoemakerjem, da introspekcija ne zadovoljuje stereotip čutnega zaznavanja. V zadnjem delu prispevka poskušamo ugotoviti, ali tudi Descartesov pojem introspekcije sloni na modelu čutnega zaznavanja. Naš odgovor je negativen. Dokazujemo, da je treba (...) razlikovati med pojmoma conscientia in sensus internus. Pravi kandidat za introspekcijo je zgolj pojem conscientia. Pojem introspekcije, ki ga pripisujejo Descartesu, je pravzaprav mit. Z natanèno analizo Descartesovih tekstov pokažemo, da Descartesovemu pojmu introspekcije ne moremo pripisati niti lastnosti epistemološke transparentnosti niti lastnosti nezmotljivosti. (shrink)

V članku obravnavamo Husserlovo teorijo podobe in jo primerjamo z Ingardnovo. Najprej pokažem, da je Husserlov pristop, ki podobo razdeli na tri sloje, smiseln in razumen. Ingarden Husserlovo teorijo podobe zgolj prevzame in ji ne doda kakih svojih bistvenih prvin. Na koncu članka opozarjam na bistveno pomanjkljivost tako Husserlove kot Ingardnove analize.The paper considers Husserl's conception of image and then compares it with the view as was developed by Ingarden. I point, from the very beginning, to the reasonabless of Husserl's (...) approach which looks on an image as basically threelayered item. Ingarden adopts Husserl's conception of image without any key improvements. At the end of the paper I disclose what is, in my opinion, the main shortcoming of both phenomenologists, namely that there is essential hiatus between painting as physical bearer and painting as object of aesthetic experience. (shrink)