A thought, taken as a propositional attitude or the content of psychological predicates such as believe, wish, desire, hope, is ascribed to an entity with mental states. A thought is not only allegedly ascribed to particular non-mental things like computer, book, it is also ascribed to non-material things, linguistically in plural terms, e.g. plural pronouns (e.g. we, they), collective names or singular proper names (e.g. the United States), proper names in plural form or general terms (e.g. the Microsoft, feminists). Plural (...) terms are terms referring to groups of entities. The question is - what is it for a group to have a thought? Two main views are currently on centered stage – the literal view and the metaphorical view. This paper argues that the main argument supporting the literal view, in particular Pettit’s view, faces three main problems, namely, the problem of rule-following in propositional coawareness, the problem of an independent verifiability for group beliefs and the problem of the indexical ‘we’- thought. -/- Keywords: thoughts, collective intentionality, social ontology, group agency, group consciousness . (shrink)

The use of language in hate speech is understandably offensive. Though words do not kill, they convey an alarming message that can harm the victim. To understand how words can harm, it is necessary to understand the nature of the meaning of pejoratives or slurs that are used in hate speech. Pejoratives are undeniably offensive. However, they are puzzling as they can be used in two directions, namely, the offensive power preservation and the offensive power destruction. This paper proposes that (...) the direct reference theory of pejoratives can solve the puzzle. A characterization of pejoratives is that it has the property of immediacy. They refer directly to the object of speech. Grounding on a shared context, any descriptions are unnecessary for understanding the offensive message of pejoratives. In this sense, pejoratives have indexical content as it is context-sensitive. The kind of indexical content that pertains to pejoratives is action-oriented. However, its object of reference is empty. In discussing pejoratives that are used in hate speech, some examples of Thai slurs are shown. (shrink)

The paper argues that logical reasoning is what constitutes critical thinking because reasoning is normative, and logic provides a norm for reasoning. If a logical way of thinking is simply the same thing as reasoning, then the only limit or constraint of reasoning is the nature of the (logical) “rule” the kind of which is engaged with the practice of reasoning; rather than with either a component of social context or a com- ponent of a purely non-inferential or “immediate” perception (...) of a situation which is called sensitivity toward an object alone. However, such components are built into my analysis of what “reasoning” is. An approach to critical thinking being employed here is “an agent-based approach”. This paper also aims to pave the way for a further discussion on the limit of reasoning in a way that is relevant to the question of how critical thinking or reasoning should be taught in higher education. (shrink)

In introducing a course on critical thinking or reasoning, many emphasize the philosophical background of the idea of critical thinking, that is, the Socratic motto: “life without examination is not worth living”. It is actually right to do so, because critical thinking is basically the activity of doing philosophy. However, in manyuniversities, the course on critical thinking is taught mainly as a basic course for first year undergraduates who may not go on to major in philosophy. Beside the fact that (...) critical thinking as an activity of doing philosophy provides a good tool for arguing about any subjects, there is a political agenda in making the course a requisite one for non-philosophy students, that is, the ability to think critically is a desirable property for being a “good citizen” in a democratic society. Underlying this idea is the model of rational man in the age of Enlightenment. Putting aside the controversy over the notion of rationality, my question is what exactly is the activity called critical thinking or reasoning, and then on such understanding, what should be the right direction in teaching critical thinking. My answer is that critical thinking is an examination of thoughts because reasoning is rule-governed. However, grasping a thought requires the idea of an agency. Hence, the main aim of teaching critical thinking is not to get just a technician game kids, rather it is to reveal the possibility of being a philosophical mindfulness person. Thepaper consists of three main parts. The first part concerns the idea that critical thinking is an examination of thoughts. Thoughts are inferentially structured and are constrained by truth. This means that thought content are conceptual – reasoning is inherently logical or rule-governed. The second part considers the connection of content of thoughts, truth and thinkers. An individuation of thought content is by object of thoughts. The idea of object of thoughts involves the idea of truth which is perspectival. Therefore, to understand what truth is requires an idea of agency, the one who grasps thoughts. In the last part, I then propose that the rightdirection in teaching critical thinking is to accommodate an independent ability to see the world aright. (shrink)

This research paper aims to study analogy as a comparative thinking and to investigate whether it is justified in claiming that an analogical thought has cognitive content. Two theories in cognitive science claim that analogy has cognitive content. The first one is called the weak view of analogy in cognition, e.g. the works of Gust et al. (2008), Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Hesse (1950), Black (1955); and the second one is called the strong view of analogy in cognition, e.g. the (...) works of Hofstadter (2001), Hofstadter& Sanders (2013). According to the weak view, analogical thought is only a necessary condition of cognition. But for the strong view, analogy is both necessary and sufficient of cognition. Regardless of the differences, both theories are not justified in claiming analogical content. While the weak view cannot provide an account of the perceptual aspect of content, the strong view suffers from the lack of normative constraint for analogical content. -/- Keywords: analogy, comparative thinking, concept, cognitive content, philosophy of cognitive science . (shrink)

The thesis proposes an account of a notion of ‘practice’, which provides an understanding of how the world is made intelligible by having thought which is object-involving. The thesis investigates an ontology of practice, the nature of which is characterized in terms of object-engagement. On this account, practice provides content because a subject engages with objects in the world. My main argument is this: if the notion of practice is required in order to account for the possibility of content, then (...) we need an account of practice in which norms are immanent. The basis of my account is McDowell’s reading of Wittgenstein’s rule-following considerations. I then develop a further supporting argument that if such an account of meaning is to provide the possibility of content, then we need an account of thought which ‘directly’ engages with objects in the world. That is to say, the only sort of thought which provides such an account of meaning and thereby provides content is the neo-Fregean idea of singular thoughts, namely, the idea that thought content is individuated by particular objects in the world. To gain such a notion of content, the neo-Fregean view provides an account of thought which satisfies two basic constraints on content, namely, the objectivity constraint and the rationality constraint. The notion of practice characterized under the neo- Fregean view requires an account of demonstrative thought the content of which is derived from the way a subject engages with objects in his environment. On this basis, the notion of practice which I propose captures both aspects of what constitutes content, namely, the aspect of the object the identification of which requires the idea of engagement in thought and the aspect of the subject the characterization of which requires an idea of agency whose engagement is with objects in the world. (shrink)

Practice has been considered as a notion challenging an idea of truth which is neutral to the role of agency or an epistemic role of the subject in accounting for content of thought. Such an idea of truth is a realist notion. However, challenging such a notion does not necessarily mean to reject an idea of normativity of content, i.e. the idea that for content of thought to be possible, it requires both constraints of the world and the subject of (...) thought on content. In order to gain such an account of thought content, a notion of practice is required in the sense that provides an understanding of how the world is made intelligible by having thought which is object-involving. The paper investigates an ontology of practice, the nature of which is characterized in terms of object-engagement. That is to say, an account of the notion of practice requires an account of how norms originating from the interweaving of the world and mind are immanent in practice. On this account, practice provides content because a subject engages with objects in the world. (shrink)