Abstract

My focus is on the metaphysical issue of what identity consists in. That is, what it is that supposedly makes a person the same persisting entity. I start by considering whether this issue is one to specially care about. I bring in the views of Thomas Reid and Saul Kripke. I argue that if the focus is on identity simpliciter, then personal identity is not significantly different from identity of numbers, say. I do, however, argue that this does not, and should not, eliminate analyses of identity claims. And such analyses, I argue, can be useful only when done within the confines of an object's whatness, i.e., its ontology. ;In chapter two, I do an exposition and critique of Bernard Williams' view that bodily continuity is necessary for quantifying persons. Borrowing from Kripkean intuitions in Naming and Necessity, I offer on Williams' behalf a stronger argument than he gives. I show that Williams is right only on an interpretation that he will not want to accept. ;In chapter three, I consider Sydney Shoemaker's view that psychological continuity is sufficient for quantifying persons. I identify certain logical-structural problems, e.g., circularity, relative identity, identity vagueness, and defend his view against these. Contemporary critics feature prominently here. ;In chapter four, I give an exposition of my view which I call the Defeasibility thesis. This is, roughly, the view that mental continuity is indefeasibly sufficient, and bodily continuity defeasibly necessary, for identity of persons. I show, by considering cases, the defeasibility thesis to be more plausible than either Williams' or Shoemaker's. I bring out the common grounds my thesis shares with Nozick's closest-continuer view in Philosophical Explanations, but argue that we should prefer mine to his. ;In the fifth and last chapter, I return to some themes which run through the project. In particular, I consider the use of cases in philosophical discussions in general, and personal identity in particular. I reject the view that cases are really possibility claims. I argue that what they do is provide justification for our hypotheses. And this, properly understood, is not something to worry about