Agency and causation

In Luca Ferrero (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Agency. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 27-36 (2022)
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Abstract

In this chapter, we examine some foundational issues at the intersection of the metaphysics of agency and the metaphysics of causation. We explore three broad issues concerning the metaphysics of causation and intentional agency. We first consider the best way to think about the relationship between exercising agency and causation. Specifically, is intentional agency best identified with a causal process or should we take intentional agency to be either the causal initiation of some outcome or the effect of a cause? Next, we consider whether it is best to understand causation as a productive relation or as mere difference-making. Finally, we consider where to locate the effective causes in agency. We consider three alternatives: events, substances, and powers manifesting in processes. In examining the alternatives, we present reasons for taking intentional agency to be a productive causal process involving constellations of manifesting reciprocal causal powers collectively generating an outcome.

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Author Profiles

Jesús H. Aguilar
Rochester Institute of Technology
Andrei Buckareff
Marist College

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