Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):339-354 (2013)

Authors
Maike Albertzart
Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz
Abstract
It is widely acknowledged that moral principles are not sufficient to guide moral thought and action: they need to be supplemented by a capacity for judgement. However, why can we not rely on this capacity for moral judgement alone? Why do moral principles need to be supplemented, but are not supplanted, by judgement? So-called moral particularists argue that we can, and should, make moral decisions on a case-by-case basis without any principles. According to particularists, the person of moral judgement is a person of empathy, sensibility and virtue, rather than a person of principle. In this paper I argue that this is a false dichotomy. The person of good moral judgement is a person of principle. I propose that we think of moral principles as internalised long-term commitments that form our moral character and sensitivity, and, as such, are constitutive of moral judgement
Keywords Moral judgement  Moral principles  Moral particularism  Moral generalism
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-012-9343-x
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References found in this work BETA

Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism.Michael Ridge & Sean McKeever - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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