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Might desires be beliefs about normative reasons?
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Might Desires Be Beliefs About Normative Reasons?Alex Gregory - 2017 - In Julien Deonna & Federico Lauria (eds.), The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press. pp. 201-217.
Are Desires Beliefs about Normative Reasons?Avery Archer - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (3):236-251.
Humeanism, Psychologism, and the Normative Story.Wayne A. Davis - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):460-467.
Desires, reasons, and causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
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Desire-As-Belief and Evidence Sensitivity.Kael McCormack - 2023 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 38 (2):155-172.
Normative Reasons are not Good Bases: a Reply to Gregory.Euan K. H. Metz - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):723-731.
A Humean explanation of acting on normative reasons.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1269-1292.
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