Journal of Philosophical Research 30:341-355 (2005)
Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons.1 That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop other dispositions, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. To say it again, a person has a free will just in case her character is the product of decisions that she could have rationally avoided making. That one’s character is the product of such decisions entails ultimate responsibility for its manifestations, engendering a free will
|Keywords||Free Will Indeterminism Libertarianism Metaphysics Aristotle Kane, Robert|
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Kane's Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith.John Lemos - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):357-367.
Self-Forming Acts and the Grounds of Responsibility.John Lemos - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):135-146.
Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will.John Lemos - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.
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