Free will and indeterminism: Robert Kane's libertarianism

Drawing on Aristotle’s notion of “ultimate responsibility,” Robert Kane argues that to be exercising a free will an agent must have taken some character forming decisions for which there were no sufficient conditions or decisive reasons.1 That is, an agent whose will is free not only had the ability to develop other dispositions, but could have exercised that ability without being irrational. To say it again, a person has a free will just in case her character is the product of decisions that she could have rationally avoided making. That one’s character is the product of such decisions entails ultimate responsibility for its manifestations, engendering a free will
Keywords Free Will  Indeterminism  Libertarianism  Metaphysics  Aristotle  Kane, Robert
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DOI 10.5840/jpr20053042
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