Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples

Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58 (1999)
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Abstract

I assess Robert Kane's view that global Frankfurt-type cases don't show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kane's indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kane's notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt-type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agent's actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing to considerations of responsibility and luck, I then show that the global cases survive Kane's objections.

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Ishtiyaque Haji
University of Calgary

Citations of this work

Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
What luck is not.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):255 – 267.
Humean compatibilism.Helen Beebee & Alfred Mele - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):201-223.

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References found in this work

The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Oxford University Press USA.

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