Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58 (1999)
I assess Robert Kane's view that global Frankfurt-type cases don't show that freedom to do otherwise is never required for moral responsibility. I first adumbrate Kane's indeterminist account of free will.This will help us grasp Kane's notion of ultimate responsibility, and his claim that in a global Frankfurt-type case, the counterfactual intervener could not control all of the relevant agent's actions in the Frankfurt manner, and some of those actions would be such that the agent could have done otherwise. Appealing to considerations of responsibility and luck, I then show that the global cases survive Kane's objections.
|Keywords||Free Will Indeterminism Metaphysics Moral Responsibility Frankfurt, H Kane, R|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control.John Martin Fischer - 1994 - Blackwell.
The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Farewell to the Luck (and Mind) Argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.
Kane's Libertarian Theory and Luck: A Reply to Griffith.John Lemos - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):357-367.
The Luck Argument Against Event-Causal Libertarianism: It is Here to Stay.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):375-385.
Cross-World Luck at the Time of Decision is a Problem for Compatibilists as Well.Mirja Pérez de Calleja - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):112-125.
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