Religious Studies 1 (1):1-9 (2022)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
The paper aims to show that, if S5 is the logic of metaphysical necessity, then no state of affairs in any possible world constitutes any non-trivial evidence for or against the existence of the traditional God. There might well be states of affairs in some worlds describing extraordinary goods and extraordinary evils, but it is false that these states of affairs constitute any (non-trivial) evidence for or against the existence of God. The epistemological and metaphysical consequences for philosophical theology of assuming that S4 or Kσρ is the logic of metaphysical necessity are equally untenable. S4 guarantees that God does not exist if there is the slightest evidence against the existence of God. And Kσρ guarantees that God might survive the loss or acquisition of any essential property at all.
|
Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
DOI | 10.1017/s0034412522000038 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
View all 10 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
On Necessary Gratuitous Evils.Michael James Almeida - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (3):117-135.
Evidential Arguments From Evil.Richard Otte - 2000 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 48 (1):1-10.
Evil and Evidence.Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 7:1-31.
Gratuitous Evil Unmotivated: A Reply to MacGregor.Ross Inman - 2013 - Philosophia Christi 15 (2):435-445.
God and Gratuitous Evil: A Reply to Yandell: Keith Chrzan.Keith Chrzan - 1991 - Religious Studies 27 (1):99-103.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2022-04-06
Total views
44 ( #259,058 of 2,518,143 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
44 ( #19,246 of 2,518,143 )
2022-04-06
Total views
44 ( #259,058 of 2,518,143 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
44 ( #19,246 of 2,518,143 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads