Affectivity and Philosophy after Spinoza and Nietzsche: Making Knowledge the Most Powerful Affect by Stuart Pethick

Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48 (3):430-434 (2017)
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Abstract

In 1881 Nietzsche discovered that he had a precursor: Spinoza. In a letter to Franz Overbeck postmarked July 30—the eve of the experience of the eternal recurrence—he enumerated the points of doctrine that he believed he shared with Spinoza, including the denial of free will, a moral world order, and evil, and he also mentioned the task of "making knowledge the most powerful affect [die Erkenntniß zum mächtigsten Affekt zu machen]". A note of the same year reads, "Spinoza: We are only determined in our actions by desires and affects. Knowledge must be an affect in order to be a motive. I say: it must be a passion to be a motive". Nietzsche's first published reference to the "passion of...

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Keith Ansell-Pearson
University of Warwick

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