In Reflections on the Foundations of Statistics: Essays in Honor of Teddy Seidenfeld (forthcoming)

Jean Baccelli
Oxford University
Consider a subjective expected utility preference relation. It is usually held that the representations which this relation admits differ only in one respect, namely, the possible scales for the measurement of utility. In this paper, I discuss the fact that there are, metaphorically speaking, two additional dimensions along which infinitely many more admissible representations can be found. The first additional dimension is that of state-dependence. The second—and, in this context, much lesser-known—additional dimension is that of act-dependence. The simplest implication of their usually neglected existence is that the standard axiomatizations of subjective expected utility fail to provide the measurement of subjective probability with satisfactory behavioral foundations.
Keywords subjective expected utility  state-dependence  act-dependence  moral hazard  uniqueness  Savage  Seidenfeld
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References found in this work BETA

The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1978 - In A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. D. Reidel. pp. 233--261.
Do Bets Reveal Beliefs?Jean Baccelli - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3393-3419.
De Finetti Was Right: Probability Does Not Exist.Robert F. Nau - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):89-124.

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