Decision Theory

Edited by Rachael Briggs (Australian National University, Stanford University)
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  1. Savage's Response to Allais as Broomean Reasoning.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - manuscript
    Leonard Savage famously contravened his own theory when first confronting the Allais Paradox, but then convinced himself that he had made an error. We examine the formal structure of Savage’s ‘error-correcting’ reasoning in the light of (i) behavioural economists’ claims to identify the latent preferences of individuals who violate conventional rationality requirements and (ii) John Broome’s critique of arguments which presuppose that rationality requirements can be achieved through reasoning. We argue that Savage’s reasoning is not vulnerable to Broome’s critique, but (...)
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  2. I Knew I Shouldn’T Do It; But I Did It: Davidson on Causal Strength and Weakness of Will.Rafael Martins - 2019 - Investigação Filosófica 10 (2):05-20.
    Reasons for action is a widely employed methodology in practical philosophy, and especially in moral philosophy. Reasons are facts that explain and justify actions. But, conceptually, if reasons were causes, incontinent actions would be impossible. When an agent ranks an evaluation about what to do as his best judgement, it entails that he has a reason for acting as that judgement prescribes. But when an agent acts incontinently, he acts in accordance to an intention that is not aligned with his (...)
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  3. How Thin Rational Choice Theory Explains Choices.Roberto Fumagalli - forthcoming - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
    The critics of rational choice theory (RCT) frequently build on the contrast between so-called thick and thin applications of RCT to argue that thin RCT lacks the potential to explain the choices of real-world agents. In this paper, I draw on often-cited RCT applications in several decision sciences to demonstrate that despite this prominent critique there are at least two different senses in which thin RCT can explain real-world agents’ choices. I then defend this thesis against the most influential objections (...)
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  4. Richard Bradley, "Decision Theory with a Human Face.". [REVIEW]William John Peden - 2020 - Philosophy in Review 40 (1):4-6.
    A non-expert who struggles to make good decisions and who turns to decision theory for help, might be more than a little surprised by what they find. If they read a standard treatment of the subject, they will find that they are assumed to be logically omniscient: they know all the logical facts about the propositions whose truth they have considered. Their beliefs are also assumed to be logically closed: if they believe each of a set of propositions S, then (...)
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  5. Incomplete Preference and Indeterminate Comparative Probability.Yang Liu - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axaa009.
    The notion of comparative probability defined in Bayesian subjectivist theory stems from an intuitive idea that, for a given pair of events, one event may be considered “more probable” than the other. Yet it is conceivable that there are cases where it is indeterminate as to which event is more probable, due to, e.g., lack of robust statistical information. We take that these cases involve indeterminate comparative probabilities. This paper provides a Savage-style decision-theoretic foundation for indeterminate comparative probabilities.
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  6. Utilitarianism with and Without Expected Utility.David McCarthy, Kalle Mikkola & Joaquin Teruji Thomas - 2016 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 87:77-113.
    We give two social aggregation theorems under conditions of risk, one for constant population cases, the other an extension to variable populations. Intra and interpersonal welfare comparisons are encoded in a single ‘individual preorder’. The theorems give axioms that uniquely determine a social preorder in terms of this individual preorder. The social preorders described by these theorems have features that may be considered characteristic of Harsanyi-style utilitarianism, such as indifference to ex ante and ex post equality. However, the theorems are (...)
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  7. Being Rational and Being Right.Juan Comesaña - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
  8. Життєвий цикл соціально-економічних систем.Sergii Sardak - 2016 - Маркетинг І Менеджмент Інновацій 1:157-169.
    У статті розглянуто ознаки системи, особливості соціально-економічних систем та системного підходу. Враховано вплив аксіоматики, закономірностей та законів на розвиток систем. Досліджено циклічні закономірності у різнорівневих соціально-економічних системах. Визначено проблемно-дискусійні питання та спільні системні ознаки циклічності. Ідентифіковано структуру життєвого циклу соціально-економічної системи із визначенням загальних та конкретних складових елементів повторюваних змін за позасистемними та системними показниками.
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  9. A Broomean Model of Rationality and Reasoning.Franz Dietrich, Antonios Staras & Robert Sugden - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (11):585-614.
    John Broome has developed an account of rationality and reasoning which gives philosophical foundations for choice theory and the psychology of rational agents. We formalize his account into a model that differs from ordinary choice-theoretic models through focusing on psychology and the reasoning process. Within that model, we ask Broome’s central question of whether reasoning can make us more rational: whether it allows us to acquire transitive preferences, consistent beliefs, non-akratic intentions, and so on. We identify three structural types of (...)
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  10. Why Be Random?Thomas Icard - forthcoming - Mind:fzz065.
    When does it make sense to act randomly? A persuasive argument from Bayesian decision theory legitimizes randomization essentially only in tie-breaking situations. Rational behaviour in humans, non-human animals, and artificial agents, however, often seems indeterminate, even random. Moreover, rationales for randomized acts have been offered in a number of disciplines, including game theory, experimental design, and machine learning. A common way of accommodating some of these observations is by appeal to a decision-maker’s bounded computational resources. Making this suggestion both precise (...)
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  11. Normative Decision Theory.Edward Elliott - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):755-772.
    A review of some major topics of debate in normative decision theory from circa 2007 to 2019. Topics discussed include the ongoing debate between causal and evidential decision theory, decision instability, risk-weighted expected utility theory, decision-making with incomplete preferences, and decision-making with imprecise credences.
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  12. Between Heteronomy and Authonomy. The Presage of Intention.Elisa Grimi - 2017 - Dialegesthai. Rivista Telematica di Filosofia 19 (Special Issue, Moral Heteronomy.).
  13. “Cheating Death in Damascus” Solution to the Fermi Paradox.Alexey Turchin & Roman Yampolskiy - manuscript
    One of the possible solutions of the Fermi paradox is that all civilizations go extinct because they hit some Late Great Filter. Such a universal Late Great Filter must be an unpredictable event that all civilizations unexpectedly encounter, even if they try to escape extinction. This is similar to the “Death in Damascus” paradox from decision theory. However, this unpredictable Late Great Filter could be escaped by choosing a random strategy for humanity’s future development. However, if all civilizations act randomly, (...)
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  14. Decision Theory (and a Little of That Human Touch). [REVIEW]Timothy Luke Williamson - 2019 - Metascience 28 (2):265-268.
    Review of Richard Bradley's Decision Theory with a Human Face.
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  15. Deception (Under Uncertainty) as a Kind of Manipulation.Vladimir Krstić & Chantelle Saville - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):830-835.
    In his 2018 AJP paper, Shlomo Cohen hints that deception could be a distinct subset of manipulation. We pursue this thought further, but by arguing that Cohen’s accounts of deception and manipulation are incorrect. Deception under uncertainty need not involve adding false premises to the victim’s reasoning but it must involve manipulating her response, and cases of manipulation that do not interfere with the victim’s reasoning, but rather utilize it, also exist. Therefore, deception under uncertainty must be constituted by covert (...)
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  16. Decision Theory with a Human Face. [REVIEW]David Strohmaier - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):432-435.
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  17. A Counterexample to Three Imprecise Decision Theories.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - Theoria 85 (1):18-30.
    There is currently much discussion about how decision making should proceed when an agent's degrees of belief are imprecise; represented by a set of probability functions. I show that decision rules recently discussed by Sarah Moss, Susanna Rinard and Rohan Sud all suffer from the same defect: they all struggle to rationalize diachronic ambiguity aversion. Since ambiguity aversion is among the motivations for imprecise credence, this suggests that the search for an adequate imprecise decision rule is not yet over.
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  18. An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Ethics 129 (2):309-343.
    I present a new argument for the repugnant conclusion. The core of the argument is a risky, intrapersonal analogue of the mere addition paradox. The argument is important for three reasons. First, some solutions to Parfit’s original puzzle do not obviously generalize to the intrapersonal puzzle in a plausible way. Second, it raises independently important questions about how to make decisions under uncertainty for the sake of people whose existence might depend on what we do. And, third, it suggests various (...)
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  19. On the Limits of the Precautionary Principle.H. Orri Stefansson - 2019 - Risk Analysis 39 (6):1204-1222.
    The Precautionary Principle (PP) is an influential principle of risk management. It has been widely introduced into environmental legislation, and it plays an important role in most international environmental agreements. Yet, there is little consensus on precisely how to understand and formulate the principle. In this paper I prove some impossibility results for two plausible formulations of the PP as a decision-rule. These results illustrate the difficulty in making the PP consistent with the acceptance of any trade-offs between catastrophic risks (...)
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  20. A Simpler and More Realistic Subjective Decision Theory.Haim Gaifman & Yang Liu - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4205--4241.
    In his classic book “the Foundations of Statistics” Savage developed a formal system of rational decision making. The system is based on (i) a set of possible states of the world, (ii) a set of consequences, (iii) a set of acts, which are functions from states to consequences, and (iv) a preference relation over the acts, which represents the preferences of an idealized rational agent. The goal and the culmination of the enterprise is a representation theorem: Any preference relation that (...)
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  21. Ramsey and Joyce on Deliberation and Prediction.Yang Liu & Huw Price - forthcoming - Synthese:1-22.
    Can an agent deliberating about an action A hold a meaningful credence that she will do A? 'No', say some authors, for 'Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction' (DCOP). Others disagree, but we argue here that such disagreements are often terminological. We explain why DCOP holds in a Ramseyian operationalist model of credence, but show that it is trivial to extend this model so that DCOP fails. We then discuss a model due to Joyce, and show that Joyce's rejection of DCOP rests (...)
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  22. Making Uncertainties Explicit: The Jeffreyan Value-Free Ideal and its Limits.David M. Frank - 2017 - In Kevin C. Elliott & Ted Richards (eds.), Exploring Inductive Risk. New York, NY, USA:
    According to Richard Jeffrey’s value-free ideal, scientists should avoid making value judgments about inductive risks by offering explicit representations of scientific uncertainty to decision-makers, who can use these to make decisions according to their own values. Some philosophers have responded by arguing that higher-order inductive risks arise in the process of producing representations of uncertainty. This chapter explores this line of argument and its limits, arguing that the Jeffreyan value-free ideal is achievable in contexts where methodological decisions introduce minimal higher-order (...)
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  23. Side Effects and the Structure of Deliberation.Grant Rozeboom - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (2):1-19.
    There is a puzzle about the very possibility of foreseen but unintended side effects, and solving this puzzle requires us to revise our basic picture of the structure of practical deliberation. The puzzle is that, while it seems that we can rationally foresee, but not intend, bringing about foreseen side effects, it also seems that we rationally must decide to bring about foreseen side effects and that we intend to do whatever we decide to do. I propose solving this puzzle (...)
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  24. Combining Probability with Qualitative Degree-of-Certainty Metrics in Assessment.Casey Helgeson, Richard Bradley & Brian Hill - 2018 - Climatic Change 149:517-525.
    Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) employ an evolving framework of calibrated language for assessing and communicating degrees of certainty in findings. A persistent challenge for this framework has been ambiguity in the relationship between multiple degree-of-certainty metrics. We aim to clarify the relationship between the likelihood and confidence metrics used in the Fifth Assessment Report (2013), with benefits for mathematical consistency among multiple findings and for usability in downstream modeling and decision analysis. We discuss how our (...)
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  25. Toward an Ethics of Decision. [REVIEW]Eduardo Cadava - 1994 - Diacritics 24 (4):4.
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  26. Surreal Decisions.Eddy Keming Chen & Daniel Rubio - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):54-74.
    Although expected utility theory has proven a fruitful and elegant theory in the finite realm, attempts to generalize it to infinite values have resulted in many paradoxes. In this paper, we argue that the use of John Conway's surreal numbers shall provide a firm mathematical foundation for transfinite decision theory. To that end, we prove a surreal representation theorem and show that our surreal decision theory respects dominance reasoning even in the case of infinite values. We then bring our theory (...)
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  27. Heart of DARCness.Yang Liu & Huw Price - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):136-150.
    There is a long-standing disagreement in the philosophy of probability and Bayesian decision theory about whether an agent can hold a meaningful credence about an upcoming action, while she deliberates about what to do. Can she believe that it is, say, 70% probable that she will do A, while she chooses whether to do A? No, say some philosophers, for Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction (DCOP), but others disagree. In this paper, we propose a valid core for DCOP, and identify terminological (...)
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  28. Inferring Probability Comparisons.Matthew Harrison-Trainor, Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas Icard - forthcoming - Mathematical Social Sciences.
    The problem of inferring probability comparisons between events from an initial set of comparisons arises in several contexts, ranging from decision theory to artificial intelligence to formal semantics. In this paper, we treat the problem as follows: beginning with a binary relation ≥ on events that does not preclude a probabilistic interpretation, in the sense that ≥ has extensions that are probabilistically representable, we characterize the extension ≥+ of ≥ that is exactly the intersection of all probabilistically representable extensions of (...)
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  29. Decision-Making in a Planning Agency.Allen H. Barton - 1963 - Social Sciences Information 2 (4):57-76.
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  30. Decision-Making in a Planning Agency.Allen H. Barton - 1963 - Social Sciences Information 2 (4):57-76.
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  31. Time-Slice Epistemology and Action Under Indeterminacy.Sarah Moss - 2015 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 172--94.
    This paper defines and defends time-slice epistemology, according to which there are no essentially diachronic norms of rationality. First I motivate and distinguish two notions of time-slice epistemology. Then I defend time-slice theories of action under indeterminacy, i.e. theories about how you should act when the outcome of your decision depends on some indeterminate claim. I raise objections to a theory of action under indeterminacy recently defended by Robbie Williams, and I propose some alternative theories in its place. Throughout this (...)
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  32. An Offer You Can't Refuse: Systematically Exploiting Utility-Maximisers with Malicious Gambles.Chalmers Adam - unknown
    Decision theory aims to provide mathematical analysis of which choice one should rationally make in a given situation. Our current decision theory norms have been very successful, however, several problems have proven vexing for standard decision theory. In this paper, I show that these problems all share a similar structure and identify a class of problems which decision theory overvalues. I demonstrate that agents who follow current standard decision theory can be exploited and have their preferences reordered if offered decision (...)
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  33. Epistemology as General Systems Theory: An Approach to the Design of Complex Decision-Making Experiments.Ian I. Mitroff & Francisco Sagasti - 1973 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 3 (2):117-134.
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  34. Decision Making; an Experimental Approach.R. Duncan Luce - 1959 - Journal of Philosophy 56 (4):173-177.
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  35. Review of Non-Bayesian Decision Theory. Beliefs and Desires as Reasons for Action. [REVIEW]Mikaël Cozic - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (1):53-59.
  36. Ordering and Independence: Edward F. McClennen.Edward F. McClennen - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):298-308.
  37. No Revolution Necessary: Neural Mechanisms for Economics: Carl F. Craver and Anna Alexandrova.Carl F. Craver - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (3):381-406.
    We argue that neuroeconomics should be a mechanistic science. We defend this view as preferable both to a revolutionary perspective, according to which classical economics is eliminated in favour of neuroeconomics, and to a classical economic perspective, according to which economics is insulated from facts about psychology and neuroscience. We argue that, like other mechanistic sciences, neuroeconomics will earn its keep to the extent that it either reconfigures how economists think about decision-making or how neuroscientists think about brain mechanisms underlying (...)
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  38. The Utility of Multiple Utility: A Comment on Brennan: Mark A. Lutz.Mark A. Lutz - 1993 - Economics and Philosophy 9 (1):145-154.
  39. De Finetti on Risk Aversion: Joseph B. Kadane and Gaia Bellone.Joseph B. Kadane - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):153-159.
    According to Mark Rubinstein ‘In 1952, anticipating Kenneth Arrow and John Pratt by over a decade, he [de Finetti] formulated the notion of absolute risk aversion, used it in connection with risk premia for small bets, and discussed the special case of constant absolute risk aversion.’ The purpose of this note is to ascertain the extent to which this is true, and at the same time, to correct certain minor errors that appear in de Finetti's work.
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  40. Is Individual Choice Less Problematic Than Collective Choice?: Gregory S. Kavka.Gregory S. Kavka - 1991 - Economics and Philosophy 7 (2):143-165.
    It is commonplace to suppose that the theory of individual rational choice is considerably less problematic than the theory of collective rational choice. In particular, it is often assumed by philosophers, economists, and other social scientists that an individual's choices among outcomes accurately reflect that individual's underlying preferences or values. Further, it is now well known that if an individual's choices among outcomes satisfy certain plausible axioms of rationality or consistency, that individual's choice-behavior can be interpreted as maximizing expected utility (...)
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  41. Ethical Dilemmas Associated with Consumer Boycotts.Monroe Friedman - 2001 - Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (2):232-240.
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  42. Decision Theory and Information Propagation in Quantum Physics.Alan Forrester - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (4):815-831.
    In recent papers, Zurek [(2005). Probabilities from entanglement, Born's rule pk=|ψk|2 from entanglement. Physical Review A, 71, 052105] has objected to the decision-theoretic approach of Deutsch [(1999) Quantum theory of probability and decisions. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A, 455, 3129–3137] and Wallace [(2003). Everettian rationality: defending Deutsch's approach to probability in the Everett interpretation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34, 415–438] to deriving the Born rule for quantum probabilities on the grounds that it courts (...)
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  43. Knowing about Future Decisions.John Canfield - 1962 - Analysis 22 (6):127.
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  44. Desirability Characterisations.J. C. Gosling - 1969 - Critica 3 (9):3-25.
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  45. C. I. Lewis’s Theory of Meaning and Theory of Value. [REVIEW]B. R. S. - 1978 - Review of Metaphysics 32 (1):158-158.
    This examination of C. I. Lewis’s theory of meaning and theory of value argues that while Lewis’s own statement of the connection between them is inadequate, a way can be shown which allows for a connection between the two. The amount of space devoted to this endeavor is even briefer than the length of the book indicates, for the last nineteen pages consist of an appendix on Quine’s theory of meaning, and there are numbered but blank pages between chapters. The (...)
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  46. The Philosophy of Money. [REVIEW]N. T. H. - 1979 - Review of Metaphysics 33 (1):204-205.
    At last an English edition of Georg Simmel’s Philosophie des Geldes has appeared. Simmel first published this work in Germany in 1900. A second and enlarged edition was published in 1907. The Philosophy of Money is the first complete English translation of the second edition.
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  47. Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory. [REVIEW]A. F. M. - 1980 - Review of Metaphysics 34 (1):141-142.
    These two books jointly constitute volume 13 of the University of Western Ontario Series in the Philosophy of Science and consist of papers resulting from a workshop held at that university in the spring of 1975. Contributors to the first volume include such notables as Richard C. Jeffrey, Isaac Levi, and R. Duncan Luce. As an introduction to the papers, the editors’ preface is a statement of the goals of the original conference distributed to the invited participants. Twelve of the (...)
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  48. Rationality and Intransitive Preference: Foundations for The Modern View.Paul Anand - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 22:5-15.
    “Radical The paper provides a survey of arguments for claims that rational agents should have transitive preferences and argues that they are not valid. The presentation is based on a chapter for the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice.
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  49. Game Theory and Common-Sense Morality.Jacob Moreh - 1994 - Social Science Information 33 (1):93-115.
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  50. Using Decision Trees and Soft Labeling to Filter Mislabeled Data.Xinchuan Zeng & Tony Martinez - 2008 - Journal of Intelligent Systems 17 (4):331-354.
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