Frege on Referentiality and Julius Caesar in Grundgesetze Section 10

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 60 (4):617-637 (2019)
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Abstract

This paper aims to answer the question of whether or not Frege's solution limited to value-ranges and truth-values proposed to resolve the "problem of indeterminacy of reference" in section 10 of Grundgesetze is a violation of his principle of complete determination, which states that a predicate must be defined to apply for all objects in general. Closely related to this doubt is the common allegation that Frege was unable to solve a persistent version of the Caesar problem for value-ranges. It is argued that, in Frege’s standards of reducing arithmetic to logic, his solution to the indeterminacy does not give rise to any sort of Caesar problem in the book.

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Bruno Bentzen
Zhejiang University

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References found in this work

Frege's conception of numbers as objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - [Aberdeen]: Aberdeen University Press.
The basic laws of arithmetic.Gottlob Frege - 1893 - Berkeley,: University of California Press. Edited by Montgomery Furth.
Frege's theory of numbers.Charles Parsons - 1964 - In Max Black (ed.), Philosophy in America. Ithaca: Routledge. pp. 180-203.
Frege's proof of referentiality.Øystein Linnebo - 2004 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 45 (2):73-98.

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