Some syntactic approaches to the handling of inconsistent knowledge bases: A comparative study part 1: The flat case

Studia Logica 58 (1):17-45 (1997)
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Abstract

This paper presents and discusses several methods for reasoning from inconsistent knowledge bases. A so-called argued consequence relation, taking into account the existence of consistent arguments in favour of a conclusion and the absence of consistent arguments in favour of its contrary, is particularly investigated. Flat knowledge bases, i.e., without any priority between their elements, are studied under different inconsistency-tolerant consequence relations, namely the so-called argumentative, free, universal, existential, cardinality-based, and paraconsistent consequence relations. The syntax-sensitivity of these consequence relations is studied. A companion paper is devoted to the case where priorities exist between the pieces of information in the knowledge base

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References found in this work

A Mathematical Theory of Evidence.Glenn Shafer - 1976 - Princeton University Press.
The Uses of Argument.Stephen E. Toulmin - 1958 - Philosophy 34 (130):244-245.
Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.

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