Defeasible Reasoning

Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518 (1987)

Abstract
There was a long tradition in philosophy according to which good reasoning had to be deductively valid. However, that tradition began to be questioned in the 1960’s, and is now thoroughly discredited. What caused its downfall was the recognition that many familiar kinds of reasoning are not deductively valid, but clearly confer justification on their conclusions. Here are some simple examples.
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DOI 10.1207/s15516709cog1104_4
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References found in this work BETA

Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - MIT Press.
Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.

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Citations of this work BETA

Mental Files.François Recanati - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Process Reliabilism's Troubles with Defeat.Bob Beddor - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159.
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.

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