On physicalistic models of non-physical terms

Philosophy of Science 7 (2):151-158 (1940)
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Abstract

Some of the objections most frequently raised against the thesis of physicalism can be summarized as follows: The notions of the biological and social sciences, as e. g. organic whole and Gestalt, means and ends, leadership and hierarchical order, the entire structure and meaning of these scientific systems, are of a type essentially different from those of physics. Consequently they can not be expressed by means of the mathematical language used by physics, and it is “logically impossible” to reduce these sciences to physics.

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