Did he jump or was he pushed?

Artificial Intelligence and Law 17 (2):79-99 (2009)
In this paper, we present a particular role for abductive reasoning in law by applying it in the context of an argumentation scheme for practical reasoning. We present a particular scheme, based on an established scheme for practical reasoning, that can be used to reason abductively about how an agent might have acted to reach a particular scenario, and the motivations for doing so. Plausibility here depends on a satisfactory explanation of why this particular agent followed these motivations in the particular situation. The scheme is given a formal grounding in terms of action-based alternating transition systems and we illustrate the approach with a running legal example.
Keywords Argumentation schemes  Abductive reasoning  Practical reasoning
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DOI 10.1007/s10506-009-9074-z
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Daniel C. Dennett (1971). Intentional Systems. Journal of Philosophy 68 (February):87-106.

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