Michel Bitbol
University of Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne
This paper reviews the debate between Carnap and Schrödinger about Hypothesis P (It is not only I who have perceptions and thoughts; other human beings have them too)–a hypothesis that underlies the possibility of doing science. For Schrödinger this hypothesis is not scientifically testable; for Carnap it is. But Schrödinger and Carnap concede too much to each other and miss an alternative understanding: science does not depend on an explicit hypothesis concerning what other human beings see and think; it is simply a practice of communication which anticipates or presupposes the perfect interchangeability of positions amongst the members of the linguistic community. The mentalistic vocabulary of folk-psychology, used by Carnap and Schrödinger, does not take first but last place in this perspective; because it does nothing but express after the event the confidence to which the disputants bear witness regarding a generally successful practice of communication.
Keywords Carnap  methodological solipsism  P-hypothesis  Schrödinger  science
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DOI 10.1023/B:PHEN.0000041896.22717.d6
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Quantum Physics and Reality.Bernard D’Espagnat - 2011 - Foundations of Physics 41 (11):1703-1716.

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