Against Weatherson on How to Frame a Decision Problem

Journal of Philosophical Research 41:69-72 (2016)
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10.5840/jpr201662868

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Thomas Blackson
Arizona State University

Citations of this work

Reply to Blackson.Brian Weatherson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:73-75.

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References found in this work

Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.
A defense of stable invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.

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