Risk Attitudes and Social Choice

Ethics 130 (4):485-513 (2020)
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Abstract

How should we choose on behalf of groups of agents who violate expected utility theory by being risk averse or risk seeking? Unfortunately, we sometimes have to choose either acts that everyone disprefers or acts that are sure to turn out worse than another act. This observation is particularly troubling for risk-expected utility theorists: neither option sits comfortably with their view.

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Simon Blessenohl
University of Southern California (PhD)

References found in this work

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.
Contractualism and Social Risk.Johann Frick - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (3):175-223.

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