Filtered Belief Revision: Syntax and Semantics

Journal of Logic, Language and Information 31 (4):645-675 (2022)
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Abstract

In an earlier paper [Rational choice and AGM belief revision, _Artificial Intelligence_, 2009] a correspondence was established between the set-theoretic structures of revealed-preference theory (developed in economics) and the syntactic belief revision functions of the AGM theory (developed in philosophy and computer science). In this paper we extend the re-interpretation of those structures in terms of one-shot belief revision by relating them to the trichotomous attitude towards information studied in Garapa (Rev Symb Logic, 1–21, 2020) where information may be either (1) fully accepted or (2) rejected or (3) taken seriously but not fully accepted. We begin by introducing the syntactic notion of _filtered belief revision_ and providing a characterization of it in terms of a mixture of both AGM revision and contraction. We then establish a correspondence between the proposed notion of filtered belief revision and the above-mentioned set-theoretic structures, interpreted as semantic _partial_ belief revision structures. We also provide an interpretation of the trichotomous attitude towards information in terms of the degree of implausibility of the information.

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Giacomo Bonanno
University of California, Davis

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