Subjective Realism: A Possible-Worlds Interpretation of the Anti-Relativist Arguments in Plato’s Theaetetus

Apeiron 56 (1):75-104 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper argues for a possible-worlds interpretation of the arguments marshalled by Socrates against Protagoras in Plato’s Theaetetus. Specifically, it reads Protagoras’ position as implying a limited form of modal realism, and evaluates both the self-refutation sequence at 170a–71d and the Future Argument at 177c–9c on the basis of this reading. It emerges that Socrates’ project is only partly successful: while the three main arguments of the self-refutation sequence force Protagoras into ever more awkward and metaphysically top-heavy positions, and the Future Argument is psychologically compelling, these arguments do not force a collapse of the relativist position. Protagoras can still defend himself, though the cost is high.

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2023-01-11

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic.David Lewis - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):113-126.
The identity of indiscernibles.Max Black - 1952 - Mind 61 (242):153-164.
The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.
``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.

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