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The paradox of the preface

David C. Makinson

Analysis 25 (6):205-207 (1965) Copy BIBT_EX

Abstract

By means of an example, shows the possibility of beliefs that are separately rational whilst together inconsistent.

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Categories

Degrees of Belief in Philosophy of Probability

Probabilistic Puzzles, Misc in Philosophy of Probability

Keywords

rationality, consistency, conjunction

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DOI

10.1093/analys/25.6.205

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Citations of this work

The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.

Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.

The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.

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