Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242 (2003)
Many contemporary philosophers of mind are concerned to defend a thesis called a posteriori physicalism. This thesis has two parts, one metaphysical, and the other epistemological. The metaphysical part of the thesis—the physicalist part—is the claim that the psychological nature of the actual world is wholly physical. The epistemological part of the thesis—the a posteriori part—is the claim that no a priori connection holds between psychological nature and physical nature. Despite its attractiveness, however, a familiar argument alleges that a posteriori physicalism cannot be true. This argument is sometimes called the Property Dualism Argument Against Physicalism. In this paper, I consider Stephen White’s version of the Property Dualism Argument and argue that it fails. I distinguish two ways in which the argument’s crucial notion might be understood, and I argue that on neither way of understanding it is the Property Dualism Argument compelling.
|Keywords||Dualism Metaphysics Physicalism Property Dualism Argument Philosophy of Mind Anti-physicalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Why Property Dualists Must Reject Substance Physicalism.Susan Schneider - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):61-76.
One World and the Many Sciences: A Defence of Physicalism.Andrew Melnyk - 1991 - Dissertation, Oxford University
The Property Dualism Argument Against Physicalism.Professor Andrew Botterell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242.
Physicalism Unfalsified: Chalmers' Inconclusive Argument for Dualism.Andrew Melnyk - 2001 - In Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer (eds.), Physicalism and its Discontents. Cambridge University Press. pp. 331-349.
Senses, Sensations and Brain Processes: A Criticism of the Property Dualism Argument.Leonard J. Clapp - 1997 - Southwest Philosophy Review 14 (1):139-148.
Conservation of Energy is Relevant to Physicalism.Ole Koksvik - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):573–582.
Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism?William G. Lycan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
Property Dualism and the Merits of Solutions to the Mind-Body Problem: A Reply to Strawson.Fiona Macpherson - 2006 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 10-11):72-89.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads161 ( #27,706 of 2,152,478 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #16,470 of 2,152,478 )
How can I increase my downloads?