Journal of Applied Philosophy 23 (1):109–126 (2006)

This paper examines the moral case for a right to religious accommodation, which requires that religious conduct be free of any serious burdens placed on it by the state. Two different types of normative argument for this right are outlined and rejected. The first appeals to religion as a ‘basic good’, and the second to religion as an ‘intense preference’. In place of these, I suggest that a third type of argument has greater prospects of success. Religious accommodation is justified on the grounds that religious conduct is a ‘derivative good’— that is, it derives its value from its being necessary for something else, namely, the integrity of the religious person
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-5930.2006.00323.x
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Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.Richard J. Arneson - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):77 - 93.

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Religion in the Law: The Disaggregation Approach.Cécile Laborde - 2015 - Law and Philosophy 34 (6):581-600.
Why Tolerate Conscience?François Boucher & Cécile Laborde - 2016 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 10 (3):493-514.

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