Political Ethics

Michael Walzer’s use of John Stuart Mill’s A Few Words on Non-Intervention (1859) helped to inaugurate it as a canonical text of international theory. However, Walzer’s use of the text was highly selective because he viewed the first half as a historically parochial discussion of British foreign policy, and his interest in the second was restricted to the passages in which Mill proposes principles of international morality to govern foreign military interventions to protect third parties. As a result, theorists tend (...) to see those canonized passages as if through a glass darkly. Attention to the detail and context of Mill’s first-half critique of Lord Palmerston’s opposition to the Suez Canal project reveals that his discussion of purely protective intervention is embedded in a broader exploration of the limits of self-defence, including the moral permissibility of preventive military force and the use of protective interventions for defensive purposes. Moreover, reading the text holistically facilitates a refutation of some objections directed at it by Michael Doyle to the effect that Mill’s conception of self-defence incorporates elements of aggression which makes it extremely dangerous when adapted for application to the contemporary world. (shrink)

Der Beitrag widmet sich den Themen ‚digitale Teilhabe‘ und ‚digitale Spaltung‘. Er analysiert die Bedeutung und mögliche Ausprägungen dieser Phänomene und erörtert ihre Auswirkungen auf die Verwirklichung einer gerechten Gesellschaft. Ziel ist es, die moralischen und sozialen Implikationen digitaler Ungleichheiten zu beleuchten und die Relevanz eines inklusiven digitalen Raums und seiner technischen Grundlagen zu betonen. Um die digitale Spaltung in der Gesellschaft zu verringern und allen Menschen eine gleichberechtigte digitale Teilhabe zu ermöglichen, ist es zentral, politische und gesellschaftliche Initiativen zu (...) unterstützen, die einen allgemeinen Zugang zu digitalen Technologien und Ressourcen für ihre vollständige Nutzung sicherstellen. Ebenso essenziell ist es, die negativen Auswirkungen von Exklusionsprozessen wie Zensur durch voreingenommenes Content-Management oder die Diskriminierung von Minderheiten durch Cybermobbing in Online-Communities zu berücksichtigen und zu bekämpfen. (shrink)

I first point out that we tend to use democracy as a vague general concept that includes various types of constitutional arrangements. I suggest that it would be beneficial to differentiate between these more carefully. I discuss some points made earlier, especially by Michael Oakeshott and Bernard Crick. Due to their long careers, their work reflects long-term change in conceptions of democracy. The huge corporate power and superpower mentality are discussed together with the question of the possibility for real representative, (...) parliamentary systems in the contemporary world. I additionally lean especially on Sheldon S. Wolin’s work. I emphasize that the early critique of behaviourism connects the three theorists profoundly. They also share a historico-philosophical style of writing without the fear of commenting on contemporary developments. I also examine some of today’s surveillance and manipulation techniques posing a threat to ‘democracy’. With help from the crucial case of Julian Assange, and his illegal imprisonment, I ask if late-modern ‘democracies’ already have crossed such boundaries that even the minimal criteria of democracy are fading. I try to bring some coherence to the named topic of the conceptual and practical mess around democracy and suggest some possible approaches for future studies. (shrink)

Political persuasion can express moral respect. In this article, however, I rely on two psychological assumptions to argue that political persuasion is generally prima facie disrespectful: (1) that we maintain our political beliefs largely for non-epistemic, personal reasons and (2) that our political beliefs are connected to our epistemic esteem. Given those assumptions, a persuader can either ignore the relevant personal reasons, explicitly address them, or implicitly address them. Ignoring those reasons, I argue, constitutes prima facie insensitivity. Explicitly addressing them (...) constitutes a form of prima facie incivility. Finally, implicitly addressing them covertly treats those personal reasons as psychological puppet strings, constituting prima facie objectionable manipulation. This prima facie insensitivity, incivility, and manipulation are each prima facie failures of respect, either for the persuadee’s rationality or for their agency. Political persuasion can sometimes be all-things-considered justified, but these moral hazards can produce reasonable guilt, resentment, and blowback. (shrink)

Why does the ruling class in all countries of the world today act so weirdly and sometimes irresponsibly? Maybe because they are all bored. They don’t know what to do with themselves, or even what to do with their power. The deepest cause of the modern crisis is the lack of new ideas. First of all, ideas that justify your life and death. These ideas are called meanings of life, final values, final goals, final goods, human life's ends, reasons to (...) live, etc. Philosophers and psychologists pick out from five to twenty known final values that cannot be reduced to one another. The existing final values are not but the final values system itself is outdated and has not been updated for a long time. To get out of the existential crisis, we need to look for new final values. New final values mean new ethical standards, new philosophies, new religions, new ideologies, new social institutions, etc. The more final values we know, the richer our culture is, the freer we are and the more expanded (more flexible, sophisticated, etc.) our consciousness is. (shrink)

I distinguish two types of ethical efforts. One of them can be called ideological efforts in morality, which begins with the quest for truth. Once in possession of the truth, people can make moral laws and apply them to a society, demanding that all members of the society abide by them. The other may be called sentimental education, which depicts the formation of morality as being based on sentiments in this way: people live in an intimate relationship to foster a (...) sentiment of trust, develop their propriety sense in regard to a certain relationship, and formulate it as a moral law. In the context of global ethics, I hold that the fundamental momentum in morality is driven by sentimental education, while ideological efforts in morality can only play a complementary role. (shrink)

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls sets out his normative conception of global justice. The book remains a foundational text for scholars in the field. In recent years, however, new issues have arisen in the global justice literature, which Rawls did not consider. Moreover, his view has been rejected by many. So, as we move forward, does Rawls’ The Law of Peoples deserve to retain this foundational status? I argue that we have two weighty reasons to afford it this (...) status. As we consider the future directions of global justice, we should do so by returning to The Law of Peoples. (shrink)

With an eye on the future of global ethics, I argue that social-media technologies are not morally neutral tools but are, for all intents and purposes, a kind of agent. They nudge us to do things that are bad for us. Moreover, I argue that we have a duty to quit using social-media platforms, not just on account of possible duties to preserve our own well-being but because users are akin to test subjects on whom developers are testing new nudges, (...) and we ought to deprive them of their test subjects. (shrink)

A retired manager and university teacher reflects on global ethics, on the purpose of life, and on the challenges facing global ethics in a contemporary world where there is no certainty about shared belief or shared values. The future lies, he concludes, with process and with a deeper understanding of one another.

In cases in which we must choose between either (i) preventing a woman from remaining unwillingly pregnant or (ii) preventing a fetus from being killed, we should prevent the fetus from being killed. But this suggests that in typical cases abortion is wrong: typical abortions involve preventing a woman from remaining unwillingly pregnant over preventing a fetus from being killed. And so abortion is typically wrong—and this holds whether or not fetuses are persons.

El objetivo de este artículo es realizar una historización del sistema sanitario de Neuquén, concretamente atendiendo a los programas de salud aplicados en esta provincia desde su surgimiento hasta el año 2020. En este marco, en primer lugar, me enfocaré en los lineamientos políticos que definieron las bases ideológicas de las políticas públicas llevadas a cabo en la atención sanitaria neuquina, y, en segundo lugar, examinaré las variables estadísticas publicadas por el sistema de salud provincial referidas a las condiciones materiales (...) de atención médica de la población en general, y de las mujeres indígenas mapuce en particular. Para efectuar dicho abordaje, analizaré específicamente la localidad de Las Coloradas. -/- . (shrink)

This paper shows ways to develop, integrate, and transform Kant’s and Arendt’s theories on political evil into a unified Karendtian theory. Given the deep influence Kant had on Arendt’s thinking, the deep philosophical compatibility between their projects is not surprising. But the results of drawing on the resources left by both is exciting and groundbreaking with regard to both political evil in general and the challenges of modernity and totalitarianism in particular.

A uniform carbon tax with equal per capita dividends is usually advocated as a cost-effective way of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions without increasing, and in many cases even reducing, economic inequality, in particular because of the positive balance between the carbon taxes paid by the worse off and the carbon dividends they receive back. In this article, I argue that a uniform carbon tax reform is unjust regardless of how the revenue is used, because it does not discourage the (...) rich from indulging in wasteful emissions. This is at odds with a normative account of the distribution of the GHG budget that I define as emissions limitarianism, which is a climate derivative of economic limitarianism. Emissions limitarianism holds that, under low GHG budget conditions, emissions permits should not be used to achieve functionings that over-consume the GHG budget without producing significant welfare gains relative to the achievement of alternative functionings. Accordingly, I argue that a uniform carbon tax should be complemented by a limitarian carbon tax, which restricts the capabilities of the rich to achieve wasteful emission-generating functionings. The article adopts a methodological multi-level perspective on capabilities as a measure of welfare, distinguishing between basic, secondary and tertiary capabilities. (shrink)

Many have argued that certain statues or monuments are objectionable, and thus ought to be removed. Even if their arguments are compelling, a major obstacle is the apparent historical value of those commemorations. Preservation in some form seems to be the best way to respect the value of commemorations as connections to the past or opportunities to learn important historical lessons. Against this, I argue that we have exaggerated the historical value of objectionable commemorations. Sometimes commemorations connect to biased or (...) distorted versions of history, if not mere myths. We can also learn historical lessons through what I call repudiatory honouring: the honouring of certain victims or resistors that can only make sense if the oppressor(s) or target(s) of resistance are deemed unjust, where no part of the original objectionable commemorations is preserved. This type of commemorative practice can even help to overcome some of the obstacles objectionable commemorations pose against properly connecting to the past. (shrink)

Democracy faces threats from an emerging right-wing movement in democratic governments around the world. This may be even more prevalent in the United States because there is an evil that uses rhetorical tropes to undermine the anchor institutions of democracy: press, courts, universities, and Congress. This evil has a personification--former President Donald Trump. All the rhetorical critiques of Trump, that he is a demagogue, an authoritarian, a serial liar, a populist on steroids, fail to take into account the evil that (...) is fomented by his angry and vengeful rhetoric. Pictures of evil in Scripture, philosophy, and rhetoric bear a striking resemblance to Trump. It is not enough to say that he is dangerous to democracy. Kennedy claims that he is the evil seed in democracy that is even now sprouting new versions of the Trump rhetoric as each acolyte attempts to outrage the next. Good and Evil in the Garden of Democracy screams at the evil, fights against the evil, and then attempts to sing the songs of goodness and democracy from poets, prophets, and rhapsodes. For the health of democracy these words have been written. (shrink)

This book discusses the equating of human lives with the material and argues that pricing lives lies at the core of the political. Indeed, as in Plato or Hobbes as well as in the Weberian ethics of responsibility, measurement is considered to be one of the central features of the political. This book argues that this measure relies primarily on two goods: human lives and interests. It also argues that the material equivalence to lives is twofold. Such equivalence is a (...) double equation, as we pay for lives and we pay with lives. This double equation is constitutive of the measurement upon which the political equilibrium of a society depends and, as such, is constitutive of the political. The book adopts two approaches: one explanatory and the other normative. First, its purpose is to explain the nexus between existential goods and material goods and includes a thorough analysis of several case studies drawn from contemporary politics both domestic and international. Second, it discusses normatively the material valuation of human lives and the human value of material goods. The book relies upon interdisciplinary thinking as the material equivalent to lives is not only extremely relevant for political theory and philosophy, it is of great relevance for law. Great works of literature such as Shakespeare's plays are also excellent political illustrations of the importance of pricing lives we can learn from. Value attribution is an important question in the social sciences, notably in sociology, history and international relations. (shrink)

Nachdruck der Vorlesungsreihe aus dem Jahr 1916.

When discussing the extinction of humanity, there does not seem to be any clear agreement about what ‘humanity’ really means. One aim of this paper is to show that it is a more slippery concept than it might at first seem. A second aim is to show the relationship between what constitutes or defines humanity and what gives it value. Often, whether and how we ought to prevent human extinction depends on what we take humanity to mean, which in turn (...) depends on what we value about humans. Finally, I will offer a definition of humanity that I argue offers a plausible account of when we might say humanity has gone extinct, and reflects what we value about humans, and relatedly, what many actually care about in terms of why we should be preserved. (shrink)

Preocuparea pentru funcția de marketing a topurilor universitare îi face pe manageri să ignore modul neglijent în care ele sunt concepute, deoarece adesea „clasamentele servesc în mod strategic celor care, doritori să reformeze sistemul universitar din țara lor, le folosesc în mod oportunist pentru a justifica politici deja decise”. Ei nu numai că sunt pregătiți să accepte schimbările dramatice în clasamente (care, de cele mai multe ori dovedesc de fapt inadecvarea instrumentelor de evaluare), dar se străduiesc din răsputeri să îmbunătățească (...) artificial propria poziție, angajând, spre exemplu, personalități științifice cu un CV impresionant. Iar obsesia clasamentelor, una dintre sursele importante ale corupției intelectuale în mediul academic, nu apare de la sine. Este strâns legată de comercializarea intensivă a cunoașterii și de reducerea finanțării publice a universităților. „Importanța acordată brusc clasamentelor universităților” - susține Gingras, adăugând exemple concrete de abordări cinice ale unor manageri care, înțelegând erorile sistemice, consimt să participe la acreditarea lor - „este de asemenea un efect al discursurilor pe tema internaționalizării «pieței universitare» și a căutării unei clientele străine lucrative care să compenseze veniturile scăzute ce provin de la guvern și descreșterea numărului de studenți locali. Numeroși conducători ai universităților care pleacă în delegație în China sau în India par a identifica acolo o «piață» potențial lucrativă care nu ar trebui lăsată numai pe mâinile universităților americane, australiene sau britanice.” Există, de altfel, un sistem foarte complex de stimuli care îi determină pe membrii comunității academice să accepte denaturarea treptată a valorilor fundamentale de care depinde prestigiul intelectual, validând-o. Astfel, pentru a folosi metafora aceluiași autor, foarte mulți văd că hainele noi ale universităților sunt de fapt imaginare, dar puțini ar dori să o spună. (shrink)

Adaptive preferences have been extensively studied in decision theory and feminist political theory, but not in experimental philosophy. In feminist contexts, the term is used to discuss cases in which women seem to accept abusive treatment and other conditions of oppression. According to one class of theories, women who accept abusive behavior are cognitively deficient: irrational, lacking autonomy, or not acting in accordance with their identity. Other theories deny this, saying that under certain conditions, accepting abuse can be a sound (...) response, given available alternatives. We survey lay opinions about a case in which a woman endures domestic violence and find that people often attribute adaptive attitudes and tend to see them as rational, free, and reflective of identity. We also examine lay normative judgments, including options about the right course of action, and the locus of blame, finding, for example, some tendency to blame the victim in such cases. Such attitudes are impacts by gender and political orientation. We also manipulated the cultural setting of our vignette, but found no impact. (shrink)

Is it morally permissible to spy on allied countries? What type of otherwise criminal acts may covert intelligence agents commit in order to keep their cover? Is it permissible to subject children of high-value targets to covert surveillance? In this article, I ask whether democratically elected politicians ought to rely on advice from ethics committees in answering moral choices in secret policy. I argue that ethics committees should not advise politicians on how they ought to conclude secret moral choices. Instead, (...) we can mandate ethics committees to provide advice aimed at improving the moral reasoning behind moral decisions in secret policy. Such advice, I argue, may add value to the decision process independently of whether it increases the chances of reaching morally correct conclusions. (shrink)

How can we make progress on the question of whether debate can do harm, and if it can, whether that’s a sufficient reason to suppress particular debates, or to adopt a ‘no debate!’ approach to particular topics ourselves? Obviously we’ll need to get clear on the key ingredients of the claim, which are what we’re counting as debate, and what we’re willing to countenance as harm. But we’ll also need to think about what exactly the harms are thought to be, (...) of debating any one of these controversial topics, and what, if anything, might be more important than avoiding those harms. I want to think about both the general question, which is whether the idea that debate can do harm makes sense and is sometimes true; and the more specific question, which is whether specific contemporary topics in which one side takes a ‘no debate!’ position or for which there is public support for not debating the topic, do in fact risk harm sufficient to justifying #nodebate tactics. (shrink)

In the face of conflict, power can be defined as ‘the ability to get one’s needs met [1].’ Power requires not just an ability to do or act by strength and force, but also requires an inherent want and need for a commodity. Yet it is self-explanatory that a desire for power isn’t temporary, but perpetual, with those whose needs are satisfied always yearning for more. This can lead to longer term conflict, suggesting the gradient of power enrooted within society, (...) is the sole perpetrator towards worldwide violence; yet is it possible to completely eradicate violence from society, when individuals, parties and states will never stop their crave for greater power? (shrink)

The concept of voluntariness permeates the ethics and politics of migration and is commonly used to distinguish refugees from migrants. Yet, neither the precise nature and conditions of voluntariness nor its ethical significance for migrant rights and state obligations has received enough attention. The articles in this collection move the debate forward by demonstrating the complex ethical judgments involved in delineating voluntary from forced migration and in drawing out its political and institutional implications. In addition to highlighting the interplay between (...) the voluntary and nonvoluntary elements of migration over time and across different sites of the migration journey, they provide a nuanced account of the various conditions of voluntariness and they challenge common ideas about its normative political consequences. (shrink)

This review essay contrasts two of the most notable recent contributions to literature on space and society: Daniel Deudney's Dark Skies (2020) and Brian Patrick Green's Space Ethics (2022). The Green volume is a course textbook, geared to giving students an overview of some of the key ethical issues concerning space and how the arguments on these matters are shaping up. Its aim is to provide an overview rather than a specific line of argument. Deudney's text, by contrast, is an (...) example of a book proposing space skepticism. It argues that we should relinquish many of our current ambitions for space expansion on the grounds that they will increase the already significant degree of extinction-level risk that we face. The essay marks the distinction between these texts by contrasting normal- and special-domain approaches. Normal-domain approaches seek to extend familiar ethico-political issues into the discussion about space expansion without regarding space expansion as the road to utopia or extinction. Special-domain approaches hold to some such optimistic or pessimistic view. The essay goes on to highlight the way in which Green's text would benefit from more social critique, along the lines of Deudney. Ultimately, the normal-domain approach presupposed by Green and rejected by Deudney is upheld. (shrink)

The trend toward the “humanization” of international law reflects a greater emphasis on individuals rather than simply states as objects of concern. The advance of human rights law (HRL) has been an important impetus for this trend. Some observers suggest that humanization can be furthered even more by applying HRL rather than international humanitarian law (IHL) to hostilities between states and nonstate armed groups, unless a state explicitly declares that it is engaged in an armed conflict. This essay argues, however, (...) that a court should not defer to a state's characterization of hostilities, but should base its analysis on whether hostilities meet the criteria for an armed conflict. Applying HRL to hostilities that effectively are an armed conflict but not acknowledged as such risks diluting the legitimacy and normative force of HRL. On the one hand, if a court applies conventional stringent HRL standards, this body of law may be seen as unrealistic and is likely to be ignored. On the other hand, a court that adapts HRL standards to armed conflict may need to take a consequentialist approach at odds with HRL's deontological foundations. Clearly differentiating between HRL and IHL may thus best promote the humanization of warfare. (shrink)

The claims of those who are compelled to migrate are, in general, taken to be more urgent and pressing than the claims of those who were not forced to do so. This article does not defend the moral relevance of voluntarism to the morality of migration, but instead seeks to demonstrate two complexities that must be included in any plausible account of that moral relevance. The first is that the decision to start the migration journey is distinct from the decision (...) to stop that journey, through resettlement; the latter may involve voluntary choice, without that voluntarism impugning the involuntary nature of the former. The second is that the migration decision of the individual might be voluntary, even while that individual's family or social network might be compelled to insist upon some particular individual member's migration. That is, the fact that any particular person might be free to refuse migration does not contradict the fact that the group in question does not have the effective freedom to avoid the migration of some group members. Once these two complexities are understood, I argue, the moral relevance of voluntarism in the ethics of migration becomes more complex and nuanced than is generally understood. (shrink)

A key question in the theory of migration and in public debates on immigration policies is when migration can be said to be voluntary and when, conversely, it should be seen as nonvoluntary. In a previous article, we tried to answer this crucial question by providing a list of conditions we view as sufficient for migration to be considered nonvoluntary. According to our account, one condition that makes migration nonvoluntary is when people migrate because they lack acceptable alternatives to doing (...) so. In this article, we take the opportunity to further explore and clarify this crucial condition. More specifically, we focus on two main sets of questions. First, we ask whether migration is always voluntary when it serves goals that are voluntarily chosen, and whether those who decide to migrate voluntarily but only have the option of choosing among a limited set of dangerous, harmful, or illegal means for doing so, can be said to be forced to choose those means. Second, we ask whether what counts as “nonacceptable” alternatives should also include cases in which people could have their needs and fundamental rights met, but at the cost of betraying their moral principles or conceptions of the good. (shrink)

Climate change challenges the means of subsistence for many, particularly in the Global South. To respond to the challenges of climate change, countries increasingly resort to resettling those most affected by land erosion, heat, drought, floods, and the like. In this article, I investigate to what extent resettlement can compensate for the harm that climate-induced migration brings. The first harm I identify is that to individual autonomy. I argue that climate change changes the options of those affected by it to (...) the point that the decision to migrate can no longer count as a voluntary one. In some cases, I argue, the conditions of climate change coerce individuals. Second, I suggest that climate-induced migration severs the ties to territory, explaining the constitutive nature of such ties for accounts of individual autonomy. Third, I argue that severing ties with a traditional and historical territory challenges the capacity to imagine a future for individuals. I conclude that resettlement, even if actively planned and chosen, possibly providing gains in individual well-being and human flourishing, nevertheless harms individual autonomy interests. (shrink)

Events in recent years have underscored the dependence of the liberal international order (LIO) on the domestic fate of liberalism in countries like the United States—where, according to critics such as Mark Lilla and Francis Fukuyama, liberals have imperiled themselves through an unwise embrace of identity politics. These critics argue that identity politics undermines solidarity and empowers the illiberal right, and that it should be rejected in favor of a unifying creedal nationalism based on common liberal values. This analysis, I (...) argue, overlooks the fact that “common” creedal values have expanded in American history when their meanings were being controversially reinterpreted from identity-based perspectives. If American liberalism is to emerge from its current crisis, it will need to incorporate the claims of identity into a sense of national belonging that can resist the authoritarian, ethnoracial nationalism promoted by the LIO's enemies. The likelihood that such a process will be controversial is reason for liberal critics of identity politics to consider how the claims of identity might be an asset, not an obstacle, to revitalizing liberal democracy against its challengers. (shrink)

This symposium on Monique Deveaux’s Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-Led Social Movements includes commentaries by Sally Matthews, Renante D. Pilapil, Violetta Igneski, and Wouter Peeters, with a reply from Deveaux. The book makes the case that normative thinking about poverty should engage closely with the aims, insights, and actions of poor-led organizations and social movements. Challenging conventional framings of poverty by moral philosophers, Deveaux argues that chronic poverty is centrally about the subordination and dispossession of the poor – not mere needs (...) scarcity. To exclude people living in poverty from shaping antipoverty solutions is therefore to perpetuate their social-political domination and epistemic oppression. Deveaux’s book explains what a political reframing of poverty looks like from the vantage point of several poor-led organizations and social movements, using concrete examples from across the globe, and argues for political responsibility for solidarity with those movements. (shrink)

In Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-Led Social Movements, Monique Deveaux criticizes and reframes the traditional, moral (and often individualistic) response to poverty in favor of a political and collective one that centers the role of the poor and poor-led groups in the anti-poverty agenda. I have two aims in this review, a supportive one and a more critical one. On the supportive side, I examine the advances Deveaux makes by 1) expanding the category of agents of justice; 2) putting the poor (...) at the center of an effective response to poverty; and 3) changing the emphasis from individual duties to a collective response. On the critical side, I revisit Deveaux’s critique of the traditional approach and argue that she unnecessarily shifts the moral burden away from the affluent whose complicity and capacity remain important grounds of obligation. In conclusion, I consider some remaining challenges that are (helpfully) exposed by Deveaux’s account. (shrink)

This paper raises three critical arguments against Deveaux’s work in Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-Led Social Movements. Firstly, the paper argues that a clear-cut definition as to what constitutes a legitimate poor-led social movement particularly its political goals and the means it is allowed to employ to achieve its objective is necessary. Secondly, the paper argues that the theory of recognition and its potential relevance for poor-led activism could have been presented in its strongest terms instead of giving it a reduced (...) treatment. And thirdly, contrary to Deveaux’s apparent over optimism about the poor as agents of global justice, there may be good reasons to be more ‘realistic’ about this position. (shrink)

This article engages with Monique Deveaux’s book Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-Led Social Movements. Deveaux argues that philosophers writing on poverty and global justice should be more attentive to what poor people themselves think and do in response to poverty. I support Deveaux’s general orientation but reflect on some challenges that need to be considered and negotiated to achieve Deveaux’s goals. The article begins by complicating some of the distinctions Deveaux makes, especially the distinction between organisations which act on behalf of (...) the poor and those which are led by poor people. To further complicate this distinction, the article explores debates on representation that highlight some of the complexities that arise when privileged actors seek to act in solidarity with poor-led movements. Finally, the article invites Deveaux to further elaborate on the question of the epistemic value of listening to poor people’s accounts. (shrink)

In this reply, I respond to issues raised by Matthews, Pilapil, Igneski and Peeters in their commentaries on Poverty, Solidarity, and Poor-Led Social Movements. They pose important definitional, conceptual, and normative questions and challenges. My response acknowledges that the diversity and fluidity of political activism by people in poverty complicates questions of political cooperation and solidarity – and makes the prospect of poor-led poverty abolition and social change seem dim. The normative arguments in support of centering the perspectives and aims (...) of poor-led organizations and social movements, however, do not depend on the consistency or imminent success of these movements. If political theorists are to contribute to efforts to abolish the systems that perpetuate chronic poverty, they will need to see the social-political empowerment of people living in poverty – and the dismantling of systems of structural subordination and exploitation – as the broad remedy. (shrink)

Human activities are being increasingly regulated by means of technologies. Smart borders regulating human movement are no exception. I argue that the process of digitization – including through AI, Big Data and algorithmic processing – falls short of respecting (fundamental) rights to the extent to which it ignores what I term to be the problem of indeterminacy. While adopting a data feminist approach in this paper, assuming that data is the ‘new oil’, that is power, I begin theorizing indeterminacy from (...) the imminent risks of datafication as a new instrument of oppression perpetuating injustice and widening inequality gaps. I conclude that technologies regulating human activities must stand ethical scrutiny, especially if they can and do result in (human) rights violations. Unlike the oil being extracted from the ground, data is de facto extracted from people endowed with agency, autonomy, rights and contexts – all which ought to be respected and protected. (shrink)

The Mexico-U.S. border is a space considered `smart´ due to the amount of surveillance technology used for national security purposes. The technological ecology consists of integrated fixed towers, remote video surveillance systems, mobile video surveillance systems, Predator B surveillance drones, mobile X-ray units, automated license plate readers, cell phone tracking towers, implanted motion sensors, biometric data collection, and DNA sampling (Aizeki et al. Citation2021). Whilst these instruments are usually linked to irregular border crossers, transborder commuters, who physically cross the border (...) every day, also experience the same surveillance regime. This paper discusses the technological ‘self-defense’ protocol I developed in 2019 when conducting transborder research for my doctoral thesis, which required intense border crossings across Mexico and the U.S. During the ten months of fieldwork, U.S. CBP had the capacity to search my personal device and belongings without a warrant, raising ethical concerns about data protection. As a result, the protocol developed to protect data and participants considered the ‘smart’ border as part of the methods designed that included encrypting information. In hyper-surveilled spaces, data protection represents a challenge for border researchers and the people involved in such a project. (shrink)

This symposium brings into conversation normative political theory on migration and critical border/migration studies, with a particular focus on digital border control technology. Normative theorists have long been concerned with questions about the extent and nature of control over migration that the state should exercise, and the balance of rights and duties between states and migrants. To date, however, there has been little reflection among such theorists on digital border control technology. Critical border/migration studies scholars, on the other hand, have (...) paid considerable attention to the rapid development of digital technology in the border control/mobility management space, and revealed a range of problems with the technology itself and the ways it is deployed. What has thus far been lacking, however, is sustained ethical reflection on what should be done about the use of this technology. The papers in this symposium thus seek to bring these two groups of scholars together and to prompt what we hope will be a sustained conversation on these rapidly evolving and deeply problematic practices. This introduction contextualises the issue at the heart of this symposium – the rapid expansion of digital border controls and the ethical challenges that these pose – and offers brief summaries of the contributions. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 3, December 2023, Page 359-363.

Big data, artificial intelligence, and increasingly precise biometric techniques have given state and private organizations unprecedented scope and power for the surveillance and dataveillance of migrants. In many cases, these technologies have evolved faster than our legal, political, and ethical mechanisms. This paper, drawing on current discussions of justice and non-domination, proposes a non-domination-based ethics of digital surveillance and mobility, in which the legitimacy of these technologies depends on their avoidance of the arbitrary use of power. This allows us to (...) ethically assess new technologies and justify juridical, democratic, and administrative mechanisms. (shrink)

This article delves into the ongoing consequences of UK ‘Hostile Environment’ policies, notably the Windrush Scandal and the challenges of techno-solutionism in migration governance. There is an exploration of how borders have permeated the internal boundaries of the UK and pushed private citizens and institutions to become new border agents. In this article there is a reflection on the infrastructure that has become reinforced, made visible and technologically upholds Hostile Environment policies. This article investigates the Home Office’s new case working (...) system, Atlas, to illuminate the intersection of border policies, technology and ethics. Through disentangling the political promises placed into the new case working system, this article argues the technological solutions to unjust policies are doomed to repeat and reinforce historic racialised practices. This article argues that technology projects in development, like Atlas, offer an opportunity to identify new private actors responsible for maintaining internal borders within the UK, private technology consultancy groups. Tracing the privatisation of border technology crystallises the new power dynamics introduced through technological projects developed to translate the goals of the Hostile Environment into operational technology used by the Home Office. (shrink)