A representation theorem for a decision theory with conditionals

Synthese 116 (2):187-229 (1998)
Abstract
This paper investigates the role of conditionals in hypothetical reasoning and rational decision making. Its main result is a proof of a representation theorem for preferences defined on sets of sentences (and, in particular, conditional sentences), where an agent’s preference for one sentence over another is understood to be a preference for receiving the news conveyed by the former. The theorem shows that a rational preference ordering of conditional sentences determines probability and desirability representations of the agent’s degrees of belief and desire that satisfy, in the case of non-conditional sentences, the axioms of Jeffrey’s decision theory and, in the case of conditional sentences, Adams’ expression for the probabilities of conditionals. Furthermore, the probability representation is shown to be unique and the desirability representation unique up to positive linear transformation.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1005030124500
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,106
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Counterfactual Desirability.Richard Bradley & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (2):485-533.
A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (3):233-263,.
Conditionals in Causal Decision Theory.John Cantwell - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):661-679.
Desirability of Conditionals.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1967-1981.
Logic with Numbers.Colin Howson - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):491-512.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Why We Still Need the Logic of Decision.James M. Joyce - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):13.
Adams Conditionals and Non-Monotonic Probabilities.Richard Bradley - 2006 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81.
Conditional Desirability.Richard Bradley - 1999 - Theory and Decision 47 (1):23-55.
A Unified Bayesian Decision Theory.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Theory and Decision 63 (3):233-263,.
Conditionals and the Logic of Decision.Richard Bradley - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):32.
A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs.Pacheco Pires Cesaltina - 2002 - Theory and Decision 53 (2):137-152.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

67 ( #78,708 of 2,171,799 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #326,702 of 2,171,799 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums