Abstract

In my dissertation, I defend the thesis that colors are mind-independent properties of objects against both historical and contemporary objections. Not only does this thesis comply with the requirements set our common-sense intuitions regarding the nature of color, but it enjoys adequate support from color science. ;In addition, I propose the thesis that the higher-order property of being a color, which is shared by red, blue, green, etc., is a response-dependent, species-specific property. Recent evidence suggests that honeybees, birds, fish, and some reptiles actually do see colors that we cannot. My proposal readily allows for such novel colors, and their possibility poses no threat to the thesis that colors are mind-independent properties of objects. ;Once these two theses are combined, they can straightforwardly account for both the unitary/binary and opponent structures of the hues. Moreover, I provide a criterion that unifies color---despite the putative disunity amongst the colors that other species see