Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa084 (2021)

Adam Bradley
Lingnan University
Bodily pain strikes many philosophers as deeply paradoxical. The issue is that pains seem to bear both physical characteristics, such as a location in the body, and mental characteristics, such being mind-dependent. In this paper I clarify and address this alleged paradox of pain. I begin by showing how a further assumption, Objectivism, the thesis that what one feels in one’s body when one is in pain is something mind-independent, is necessary for the generation of the paradox. Consequently, the paradox can be avoided if one rejects this idea. However, doing so raises its own difficulties, for it is not obvious how anything can possess all of the features we typically associate with bodily pain. To address this puzzle and finally put the paradox of pain to rest, I develop the Embodied View, a novel metaphysical account on which pains are constitutively mind-dependent features of parts of a subject’s body.
Keywords pain  bodily sensation  philosophy of perception
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DOI 10.1093/pq/pqaa084
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References found in this work BETA

Perception: A Representative Theory.Frank Jackson - 1977 - Cambridge University Press.
How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.

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Citations of this work BETA

What is a Pain in a Body Part?Murat Aydede - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (2):143–158.
A Hole in the Box and a Pain in the Mouth.Laurenz C. Casser & Henry Ian Schiller - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (4):pqaa091.
The Bodily Theory of Pain.Erlend Winderen Finke Owesen - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.

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