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  1. The Site of Affect in Husserl's Phenomenology: Sensations and the Constitution of the Lived Body.Alia Al-Saji - 2000 - Philosophy Today 44 (Supplement):51-59.
  2. On the Temperature-Senses.Sydney Alrutz - 1898 - Mind 7 (25):141-144.
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  3. On the Temperature-Senses.Sydney Alrutz - 1897 - Mind 6 (23):445-448.
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  4. Vesey on Bodily Sensations.David M. Armstrong - 1964 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):247-248.
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  5. Vesey on Sensations of Heat.David M. Armstrong - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (December):359-362.
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  6. Bodily Sensations.David M. Armstrong - 1962 - Routledge.
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  7. The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory.Luca Barlassina & Albert Newen - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):637-678.
    In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates (...)
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  8. Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism.Ned Block - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. pp. 137-142.
    Representationism 1, as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational content, where that representational content can itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Representationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. I will argue that Michael Tye's heroic attempt at a representationist theory of pain, although ingenious and enlightening, does not adequately come to terms with the root of this difference.
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  9. Disembodying 'Bodily' Sensations.Richard Combes - 1991 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 107 (2):107-131.
  10. Sensations and Bodily Position: A Conclusive Argument?David A. Conway - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (September):353-354.
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  11. Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One's Own Body.Frederique de Vignemont - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
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  12. Das Gefühl des Lebendigseins Als Einfache Form Phänomenalen Bewusstseins. Ein Aristotelischer Theorieansatz.Eva-Maria Engelen - 2012 - In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter.
    This paper works out which conceptual and theoretical preconditions have to be met, among others, in order for a living creature to be able to have a feeling of being alive beyond the mere capacity for sensation. For the emergence of such a feeling, which can be equated with a rudimentary phenomenal consciousness (1.), it is not enough for the organism to be alive (2. a.). Rather it has to be able to conceive its body as a unit and to (...)
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  13. Everyday Thinking About Bodily Sensations.Todd Ganson & Dorit Ganson - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):523-534.
    In the opening section of this paper we spell out an account of our na ve view of bodily sensations that is of historical and philosophical significance. This account of our shared view of bodily sensations captures common ground between Descartes, who endorses an error theory regarding our everyday thinking about bodily sensations, and Berkeley, who is more sympathetic with common sense. In the second part of the paper we develop an alternative to this account and discuss what is at (...)
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  14. If It Itches, Scratch!Richard J. Hall - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):525 – 535.
    Many bodily sensations are connected quite closely with specific actions: itches with scratching, for example, and hunger with eating. Indeed, these connections have the feel of conceptual connections. With the exception of D. M. Armstrong, philosophers have largely neglected this aspect of bodily sensations. In this paper, I propose a theory of bodily sensations that explains these connections. The theory ascribes intentional content to bodily sensations but not, strictly speaking, representational content. Rather, the content of these sensations is an imperative: (...)
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  15. The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency.Terry Horgan & John Tienson - unknown
    For the last 20 years or so, philosophers of mind have been using the term ‘qualia’, which is frequently glossed as standing for the “what-it-is-like” of experience. The examples of what-it-is-like that are typically given are feelings of pain or itches, and color and sound sensations. This suggests an identification of the experiential what-it-islike with such states. More recently, philosophers have begun speaking of the “phenomenology“ of experience, which they have also glossed as “what-it-is-like”. Many say, for example, that any (...)
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  16. Reply to Wyller.John Hyman - 2006 - Philosophy 81 (317):531-534.
    In my article ‘Pains and Places’ ), I argue, first, that sensations, such as aches and pains, are generally in the places where we say they are; and second, that sensations are states or modes of the sensitive parts of the bodies of sentient animals. Here I reply to Trus Wyller’s criticism of my views, in his article ‘The Place of Pain in Life’ ), and I comment on Kant’s claim, in his Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, that ‘I am as (...)
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  17. Self-Consciousness and Immunity.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):78-99.
    Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, we (...)
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  18. Mental Ownership and Higher Order Thought.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):496-501.
    Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental ownership is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’. In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue of a higher-order thought (HOT), then the (...)
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  19. On Sensations of Ownership.Jan Pieter Maes - manuscript
    In this paper I will argue that Bermúdez’ attempt (2015, Bodily ownership, bodily awareness and knowledge without observation. Analysis 75: 37-45) to use an argument he finds in Anscombe (1962, On sensations of position. Analysis 22: 55-8) to argue against the inflationary account of the experience of bodily ownership he finds in de Vignemont (2013, The mark of bodily ownership. Analysis 73: 643-51) fails.
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  20. Unmixing the Intellect: Aristotle on the Cognitive Powers and Bodily Organs.Joseph M. Magee - 2003 - Greenwood Press.
    Analyzes Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect and sensation.
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  21. Bilder des Todes und Formen der Lebendigkeit. DasGefühl des Lebendigseins zwischen Empfindung und symbolischer Artikulation.Sabine Marienberg - 2012 - In Sabine Marienberg & Jörg Fingerhut (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter. pp. 8--311.
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  22. Bodily Sensation.M. Martin - unknown
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  23. The Sense of Touch: From Tactility to Tactual Probing.Filip Mattens - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    Because philosophical reflections on touch usually start from our ability to perceive properties of objects, they tend to overlook features of touch that are crucial to correct understanding of tactual perception. This paper brings out these features and uses them to develop a general reconception of the sense of touch. I start by taking a fresh look at our ability to feel, in order to reveal its vital role. This sheds a different light on the skin's perceptual potential. While it (...)
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  24. Review of 'Cuerpo vivido'. [REVIEW]María G. Navarro - 2012 - Revista de Hispanismo Filosófico 17:283-286.
    Agustín Serrano de Haro edita y presenta en el volumen colectivo Cuerpo vivido una selección de textos memorables en torno a lo que en 1925 fue denominado programáticamente por Ortega y Gasset una “topografía de nuestra intimidad”. La reflexión fenomenológica acerca del intracuerpo fue un tema que ha preocupado y preocupa de manera notoria a los filósofos cuyos trabajos reúne este colectivo: Ortega y Gasset, José Gaos, Joaquín Xirau, Leopoldo-Eulogio Palacios y Agustín Serrano de Haro. Pese a ello, tal vez (...)
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  25. Margolis and Vesey on the Location of Sensations.William A. Nunn - 1971 - Mind 80 (320):583-588.
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  26. Is Unpleasantness Intrinsic to Unpleasant Experiences?Stuart Rachels - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 99 (2):187-210.
    Unpleasant experiences include backaches, moments of nausea, moments of nervousness, phantom pains, and so on. What does their unpleasantness consist in? The unpleasantness of an experience has been thought to consist in: (1) its representing bodily damage; (2) its inclining the subject to fight its continuation; (3) the subject's disliking it; (4) features intrinsic to it. I offer compelling objections to (1) and (2) and less compelling objections to (3). I defend (4) against five challenging objections and offer two reasons (...)
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  27. Bodily Sensation and Tactile Perception.Louise Richardson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):134-154.
  28. Sensations and Kinaesthetic Knowledge.Merrill Ring - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives, No. NO 1485:111-168.
    When Wittgenstein said psychology contains conceptual confusions and experimental results, one item he had in mind was the psycho-physiological theory of kinaesthesis, which offers an account of how we know limb movement and position. The aim of this essay is to develop and evaluate the objections to that theory which have been produced by Wittgenstein, Melden and Anscombe. That project involves specifying clearly what is involved in the theory, resolving various disagreements between the critics, showing the pattern of the objections, (...)
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  29. Kinaesthetic Sensations Revisited.Howard L. Rolston - 1965 - Journal of Philosophy 62 (February):96-100.
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  30. An Approach to Understanding Fetal Pain and Consciousness. Simonvanrysewyk - 2013
  31. The Perception of Heat.C. Strang - 1960 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:239-252.
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  32. Timing Disownership Experiences in the Rubber Hand Illusion.Lane Timothy - 2017 - Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications 2 (4):1-14.
    Some investigators of the rubber hand illusion (RHI) have suggested that when standard RHI induction procedures are employed, if the rubber hand is experienced by participants as owned, their corresponding biological hands are experienced as disowned. Others have demurred: drawing upon a variety of experimental data and conceptual considerations, they infer that experience of the RHI might include the experience of a supernumerary limb, but that experienced disownership of biological hands does not occur. Indeed, some investigators even categorically deny that (...)
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  33. Reid's Discovery of the Sense of Balance.David Vender - 2010 - Journal of Scottish Thought 3:23 - 40.
    The sense of balance remains a Cinderella among our senses. Although the vestibular apparatus and the apprehension of motion, equilibrium and orientation which it serves has now been studied extensively and descriptions abound in textbooks on perceptual psychology, its key role in our agency remains neglected in philosophical accounts of perception. Popularly received wisdom on the senses also largely ignores balance and it has recently even been called 'the lost sense'. -/- Recognition for the discovery of this sense should probably (...)
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  34. Review: Armstrong on Bodily Sensations. [REVIEW]G. N. A. Vesey - 1964 - Philosophy 39 (148):177 - 181.
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  35. Margolis on the Location of Bodily Sensations.Godfrey N. A. Vesey - 1967 - Analysis 27 (April):174-176.
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  36. Armstrong on Bodily Sensations. [REVIEW]Godfrey N. A. Vesey - 1964 - Philosophy 39 (April):177-181.
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  37. Bodily Sensations.Godfrey N. A. Vesey - 1964 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (August):232-247.
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  38. Armstrong on Sensations of Heat.Godfrey N. A. Vesey - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (August):250-254.
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  39. The Location of Bodily Sensations.Godfrey N. A. Vesey - 1961 - Mind 70 (January):25-35.
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