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  1. More of Myself: Manipulating Interoceptive Awareness by Heightened Attention to Bodily and Narrative Aspects of the Self.Vivien Ainley, Lara Maister, Jana Brokfeld, Harry Farmer & Manos Tsakiris - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1231-1238.
    Psychology distinguishes between a bodily and a narrative self. Within neuroscience, models of the bodily self are based on exteroceptive sensorimotor processes or on the integration of interoceptive sensations. Recent research has revealed interactions between interoceptive and exteroceptive processing of self-related information, for example that mirror self-observation can improve interoceptive awareness. Using heartbeat perception, we measured the effect on interoceptive awareness of two experimental manipulations, designed to heighten attention to bodily and narrative aspects of the self. Participants gazed at a (...)
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  2. Rhythms of the Body: A Study of Sensation, Time and Intercorporeity in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl.Alia Al-Saji - 2002 - Dissertation, Emory University
    Phenomenology's relation to sensation has many facets. Sensation arises in different contexts in Edmund Husserl's work, and receives several reformulations. This causes us to inquire how the sensations that are unified within the temporal flow by time constituting consciousness, in On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, and that continue to exercise an affective pull even after having passed away, in Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis, can be related to the bodily sensations which constitute the lived body in Ideas (...)
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  3. The Site of Affect in Husserl's Phenomenology: Sensations and the Constitution of the Lived Body.Alia Al-Saji - 2000 - Philosophy Today 44 (Supplement):51-59.
  4. On the Temperature-Senses.Sydney Alrutz - 1898 - Mind 7 (25):141-144.
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  5. On the Temperature-Senses.Sydney Alrutz - 1897 - Mind 6 (23):445-448.
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  6. Bodily Sensations.D. M. Armstrong - 1964 - Philosophy 39 (148):177-181.
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  7. Bodily Sensations.D. M. Armstrong - 1963 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 18 (3):345-346.
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  8. Bodily Sensations.D. M. Armstrong - 1963 - Philosophical Quarterly 13 (53):376-377.
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  9. Vesey on Bodily Sensations.David M. Armstrong - 1964 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):247-248.
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  10. Vesey on Sensations of Heat.David M. Armstrong - 1963 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 41 (3):359-362.
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  11. Bodily Sensations.David M. Armstrong - 1962 - Routledge.
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  12. Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - 2017 - Synthese:1-32.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the Transparency Datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the Transparency Datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by (strong) representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some (...)
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  13. Is Feeling Pain the Perception of Something?Murat Aydede - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy 106 (10):531-567.
    According to the increasingly popular perceptual/representational accounts of pain (and other bodily sensations such as itches, tickles, orgasms, etc.), feeling pain in a body region is perceiving a non-mental property or some objective condition of that region, typically equated with some sort of (actual or potential) tissue damage. In what follows I argue that given a natural understanding of what sensory perception requires and how it is integrated with (dedicated) conceptual systems, these accounts are mistaken. I will also examine the (...)
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  14. Naturalism, Introspection, and Direct Realism About Pain.Murat Aydede - 2001 - Consciousness and Emotion 2 (1):29-73.
    This paper examines pain states (and other intransitive bodily sensations) from the perspective of the problems they pose for pure informational/representational approaches to naturalizing qualia. I start with a comprehensive critical and quasi-historical discussion of so-called Perceptual Theories of Pain (e.g., Armstrong, Pitcher), as these were the natural predecessors of the more modern direct realist views. I describe the theoretical backdrop (indirect realism, sense-data theories) against which the perceptual theories were developed. The conclusion drawn is that pure representationalism about pain (...)
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  15. The Location of Pains.David Bain - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (2):171-205.
    Perceptualists say that having a pain in a body part consists in perceiving the part as instantiating some property. I argue that perceptualism makes better sense of the connections between pain location and the experiences undergone by people in pain than three alternative accounts that dispense with perception. Turning to fellow perceptualists, I also reject ways in which David Armstrong and Michael Tye understand and motivate perceptualism, and I propose an alternative interpretation, one that vitiates a pair of objections—due to (...)
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  16. Private Languages and Private Theorists.David Bain - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):427 - 434.
    Simon Blackburn objects that Wittgenstein's private language argument overlooks the possibility that a private linguist can equip himself with a criterion of correctness by confirming generalizations about the patterns in which his private sensations occur. Crispin Wright responds that appropriate generalizations would be too few to be interesting. But I show that Wright's calculations are upset by his failure to appreciate both the richness of the data and the range of theories that would be available to the private linguist.
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  17. Sensation and Representation a Study of Intentionalist Accounts of the Bodily Sensations.David Bain - 2000 - Dissertation,
    There are good reasons for wanting to adopt an intentionalist account of experiences generally, an account according to which having an experience is a matter of representing the world as being some way or other—according to which, that is, such mental episodes have intrinsic, conceptual, representational content. Such an approach promises, for example, to provide a satisfying conception of experiences’ subjectivity, their phenomenal character, and their crucial role in constituting reasons for our judgements about the world. It promises this, moreover, (...)
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  18. The Role of Bodily Perception in Emotion: In Defense of an Impure Somatic Theory.Luca Barlassina & Albert Newen - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):637-678.
    In this paper, we develop an impure somatic theory of emotion, according to which emotions are constituted by the integration of bodily perceptions with representations of external objects, events, or states of affairs. We put forward our theory by contrasting it with Prinz's pure somatic theory, according to which emotions are entirely constituted by bodily perceptions. After illustrating Prinz's theory and discussing the evidence in its favor, we show that it is beset by serious problems—i.e., it gets the neural correlates (...)
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  19. The Lived Experience of Meditation.Jennifer Barnes - 2001 - Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 1 (2):1-15.
    Heuristic Phenomenology lends itself well to a relatively naïve exploration of meditative experiences. I began with an interest in knowing more about the nature of the bodily sensations that I experienced during meditation. I aimed to capture lived experiences as they emerged into consciousness, so I bracketed out my expectations, as much as possible, and meditated. I noticed that I could not tape descriptions of my experiences while in a deep meditative state because when in this state, I was not (...)
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  20. Bodily Sensations as an Obstacle for Representationism.Ned Block - 2005 - In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. pp. 137-142.
    Representationism 1, as I use the term, says that the phenomenal character of an experience just is its representational content, where that representational content can itself be understood and characterized without appeal to phenomenal character. Representationists seem to have a harder time handling pain than visual experience. I will argue that Michael Tye's heroic attempt at a representationist theory of pain, although ingenious and enlightening, does not adequately come to terms with the root of this difference.
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  21. What Do We Say When We Say How or What We Feel?Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.
    Discourse containing the verb ‘feel’, almost without exception, purports to describe inner experience. Though this much is evident, the question remains what exactly is conveyed when we talk about what and how we feel? Does discourse containing the word ‘feel’ actually succeed in describing the content and phenomenology of inner experience? If so, how does it reflect the phenomenology and content of the experience it describes? Here I offer a linguistic analysis of ‘feels’ reports and argue that a subset of (...)
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  22. Recent Studies of Bodily Effects of Fear, Rage, and Pain.W. B. Cannon - 1914 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 11 (6):162-165.
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  23. Recent Studies of Bodily Effects of Fear, Rage, and Pain.W. B. Cannon - 1914 - Journal of Philosophy 11 (6):162.
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  24. Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage.Walter B. Cannon - 1917 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (3):79-80.
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  25. The Recurrent Model of Bodily Spatial Phenomenology.Tony Cheng & Patrick Haggard - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (3-4):55-70.
    In this paper, we introduce and defend the recurrent model for understanding bodily spatial phenomenology. While Longo, Azañón and Haggard (2010) propose a bottom-up model, Bermúdez (2017) emphasizes the top-down aspect of the information processing loop. We argue that both are only half of the story. Section 1 intro- duces what the issues are. Section 2 starts by explaining why the top- down, descending direction is necessary with the illustration from the ‘body-based tactile rescaling’ paradigm (de Vignemont, Ehrsson and Haggard, (...)
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  26. "Self-Consciousness and the Body": Commentary.Jonathan Cole - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (6):50-52.
    Traditionally, what we are conscious of in self-consciousness is something non-corporeal. But anti-Cartesian philosophers argue that the self is as much corporeal as it is mental. Because we have the sense of proprioception, a kind of body awareness, we are immediately aware of ourselves as bodies in physical space. In this debate the case histories of patients who have lost their sense of proprioception are clearly relevant. These patients do retain an awareness of themselves as corporeal beings, although they hardly (...)
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  27. Disembodying 'Bodily' Sensations.Richard Combes - 1991 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 107 (2):107-131.
  28. Sensations and Bodily Position: A Conclusive Argument?David A. Conway - 1973 - Philosophical Studies 24 (September):353-354.
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  29. The Intentional Structure of Consciousness.Tim Crane - 2003 - In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. pp. 33-56.
    Newcomers to the philosophy of mind are sometimes resistant to the idea that pain is a mental state. If asked to defend their view, they might say something like this: pain is a physical state, it is a state of the body. A pain in one’s leg feels to be in the leg, not ‘in the mind’. After all, sometimes people distinguish pain which is ‘all in the mind’ from a genuine pain, sometimes because the second is ‘physical’ while the (...)
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  30. The Pain Problem.Terry Dartnall - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):95-102.
    How can a pain wake you up? You were not dreaming, nor did any bodily stimuli filter into your consciousness. You did not just wake up and realize you were in pain, as you might wake up and realize it is Saturday. You were deeply, dreamlessly asleep, and suddenly you were awake, and in pain. How is this possible? If pain exists only inasmuch as it is experienced, it seems that the pain did not exist when you were asleep, and (...)
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  31. Habeas Corpus: Poczucie Własności Swojego Ciała.de Vignemont Frederique - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3.
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
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  32. Pain and Bodily Care: Whose Body Matters?Frederique de Vignemont - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):542-560.
    Pain is unpleasant. It is something that one avoids as much as possible. One might then claim that one wants to avoid pain because one cares about one's body. On this view, individuals who do not experience pain as unpleasant and to be avoided, like patients with pain asymbolia, do not care about their body. This conception of pain has been recently defended by Bain [2014] and Klein [forthcoming]. In their view, one needs to care about one's body for pain (...)
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  33. Habeas Corpus: poczucie własności swojego ciała.Frederique de Vignemont - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T).
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
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  34. A Self for the Body.Frédérique de Vignemont - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.
    Abstract: What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? This article shows how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, it discusses how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber Hand Illusion), bodily disruptions (e.g., somatoparaphrenia), (...)
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  35. Habeas Corpus: The Sense of Ownership of One's Own Body.Frederique de Vignemont - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449.
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
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  36. Touch.Frédérique De Vignemont & Olivier Massin - 2013 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Since Aristotle, touch has been found especially hard to define. One of the few unchallenged intuition about touch, however, is that tactile awareness entertains some especially close relationship with bodily awareness. This article considers the relation between touch and bodily awareness from two different perspectives: the body template theory and the body map theory. According to the former, touch is defined by the fact that tactile content matches proprioceptive content. We raise some objections against such a bodily definition of touch (...)
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  37. Touch.Frédérique De Vignemont & Olivier Massin - 2013 - The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception.
    Since Aristotle, touch has been found especially hard to define. One of the few unchallenged intuitions about touch, however, is that tactile awareness entertains some close relationship with bodily awareness. This chapter considers the relation between touch and bodily awareness from two different perspectives: the body template theory and the body map theory. According to the former, touch is defined by the fact that tactile content matches proprioceptive content. We raise some objections against such a bodily definition of touch and (...)
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  38. Could Sensation Be a Bodily Act?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Hylomorphists claim that sensation is a bodily act. In this essay, I attempt to make sense of this notion but conclude that sensation is not a bodily act, but a mental one occurring in an intentional field of awareness.
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  39. Das Gefühl des Lebendigseins Als Einfache Form Phänomenalen Bewusstseins. Ein Aristotelischer Theorieansatz.Eva-Maria Engelen - 2012 - In Joerg Fingerhut & Sabine Marienberg (eds.), Feelings of Being Alive / Gefühle des Lebendigseins. De Gruyter.
    This paper works out which conceptual and theoretical preconditions have to be met, among others, in order for a living creature to be able to have a feeling of being alive beyond the mere capacity for sensation. For the emergence of such a feeling, which can be equated with a rudimentary phenomenal consciousness (1.), it is not enough for the organism to be alive (2. a.). Rather it has to be able to conceive its body as a unit and to (...)
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  40. Everyday Thinking About Bodily Sensations.Todd Ganson & Dorit Ganson - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):523-534.
    In the opening section of this paper we spell out an account of our na ve view of bodily sensations that is of historical and philosophical significance. This account of our shared view of bodily sensations captures common ground between Descartes, who endorses an error theory regarding our everyday thinking about bodily sensations, and Berkeley, who is more sympathetic with common sense. In the second part of the paper we develop an alternative to this account and discuss what is at (...)
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  41. Revisiting "The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm": The Female Orgasm in American Sexual Thought and Second Wave Feminism.Jane Gerhard - 2000 - Feminist Studies 26 (2):449-476.
  42. Shared Representations, Perceptual Symbols, and the Vehicles of Mental Concepts.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):102-124.
    The main aim of this article is to present and defend a thesis according to which conceptual representations of some types of mental states are encoded in the same neural structures that underlie the first-personal experience of those states. To support this proposal here, I will put forth a novel account of the cognitive function played by ‘shared representations’ of emotions and bodily sensations, i.e. neural structures that are active when one experiences a mental state of a certain type as (...)
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  43. Spatial Perception and the Sense of Touch.Patrick Haggard, Tony Cheng, Brianna Beck & Francesca Fardo - 2017 - In The Subject's Matter: Self-Consciousness and the Body. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 97-114.
    It remains controversial whether touch is a truly spatial sense or not. Many philosophers suggest that, if touch is indeed spatial, it is only through its alliances with exploratory movement, and with proprioception. Here we develop the notion that a minimal yet important form of spatial perception may occur in purely passive touch. We do this by showing that the array of tactile receptive fields in the skin, and appropriately relayed to the cortex, may contain the same basic informational building (...)
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  44. If It Itches, Scratch!Richard J. Hall - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):525 – 535.
    Many bodily sensations are connected quite closely with specific actions: itches with scratching, for example, and hunger with eating. Indeed, these connections have the feel of conceptual connections. With the exception of D. M. Armstrong, philosophers have largely neglected this aspect of bodily sensations. In this paper, I propose a theory of bodily sensations that explains these connections. The theory ascribes intentional content to bodily sensations but not, strictly speaking, representational content. Rather, the content of these sensations is an imperative: (...)
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  45. Body-Conscious Shakespeare: Sensory Disturbances in Troubled Characters.K. W. Heaton - 2011 - Medical Humanities 37 (2):97-102.
    It is widely accepted that Shakespeare was unique in the range of his insights into the human mind, but the way his characters reveal their mental states through bodily sensations has not been systematically explored. The author has searched for these phenomena in the 42 major works of Shakespeare and in 46 genre-matched works by his contemporaries, and in this paper the author focuses on sensory changes other than those involving vision, taste, the heart and the alimentary tract (all considered (...)
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  46. Emotions as Evaluative Feelings.Bennett W. Helm - 2009 - Emotion Review 1 (3):248--55.
    The phenomenology of emotions has traditionally been understood in terms of bodily sensations they involve. This is a mistake. We should instead understand their phenomenology in terms of their distinctively evaluative intentionality. Emotions are essentially affective modes of response to the ways our circumstances come to matter to us, and so they are ways of being pleased or pained by those circumstances. Making sense of the intentionality and phenomenology of emotions in this way requires rejecting traditional understandings of intentionality and (...)
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  47. Felt Evaluations: A Theory of Pleasure and Pain.Bennett W. Helm - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1):13-30.
    This paper argues that pleasure and pains are not qualia and they are not to be analyzed in terms of supposedly antecedently intelligible mental states like bodily sensation or desire. Rather, pleasure and pain are char- acteristic of a distinctive kind of evaluation that is common to emotions, desires, and (some) bodily sensations. These are felt evaluations: pas- sive responses to attend to and be motivated by the import of something impressing itself on us, responses that are nonetheless simultaneously con- (...)
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  48. Taylor on Pain Location.L. C. Holborow - 1966 - Philosophical Quarterly 16 (April):151-158.
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  49. The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency.Terry Horgan & John Tienson - unknown
    For the last 20 years or so, philosophers of mind have been using the term ‘qualia’, which is frequently glossed as standing for the “what-it-is-like” of experience. The examples of what-it-is-like that are typically given are feelings of pain or itches, and color and sound sensations. This suggests an identification of the experiential what-it-islike with such states. More recently, philosophers have begun speaking of the “phenomenology“ of experience, which they have also glossed as “what-it-is-like”. Many say, for example, that any (...)
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  50. Reply to Wyller.John Hyman - 2006 - Philosophy 81 (317):531-534.
    In my article ‘Pains and Places’ ), I argue, first, that sensations, such as aches and pains, are generally in the places where we say they are; and second, that sensations are states or modes of the sensitive parts of the bodies of sentient animals. Here I reply to Trus Wyller’s criticism of my views, in his article ‘The Place of Pain in Life’ ), and I comment on Kant’s claim, in his Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, that ‘I am as (...)
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