Related categories

116 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 116
  1. added 2020-05-26
    Strong Representationalism and Bodily Sensations: Reliable Causal Covariance and Biological Function.Coninx Sabrina - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Bodily sensations, such as pain, hunger, itches, or sexual feelings, are commonly characterized in terms of their phenomenal character. In order to account for this phenomenal character, many philosophers adopt strong representationalism. According to this view, bodily sensations are essentially and entirely determined by an intentional content related to particular conditions of the body. For example, pain would be nothing more than the representation of actual or potential tissue damage. In order to motivate and justify their view, strong representationalists often (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. added 2019-09-23
    Merleau-Ponty Sonha com Ovelhas Elétricas? Ou Androides, ginóides, e a fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty.Sandro Rinaldi Feliciano - manuscript
    Este pequeno ensaio tem como objetivo verificar se, e como, a fenomenologia de Merleau-Ponty pode ser aplicada a androides. Androides são “autômatos com forma humana”, enquanto robôs são “aparelhos automáticos capazes de manipular objetos ou executar operações segundo um programa” (Larousse Do Brasil, 2009) assim podemos dizer que um androide é um robô, mas nem todo robô é um androide Devido à diversidade de gêneros, foi criado o termo ginóide, separando se assim os androides de aparência masculina (andros) da feminina (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-09-21
    Bodies in Transit: The Plastic Subject of Alphonso Lingis.Tom Sparrow - 2009 - Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):116-139.
    Alphonso Lingis is the author of many books and renowned for his translations of Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, and Klossowski. By combining a rich philosophical training with an extensive travel itinerary, Lingis has developed a distinctive brand of phenomenology that is only now beginning to gain critical attention. Lingis inhabits a ready-made language and conceptuality, but cultivates a style of thinking which disrupts and transforms the work of his predecessors, setting him apart from the rest of his field. This essay sketches Lingis’ (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-09-21
    Bodies in Transit: The Plastic Subject of Alphonso Lingis.Tom Sparrow - 2007 - Janus Head 10 (1):55-78.
    Alphonso Lingis is the author of many books and renowned for his translations of Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, and Klossowski. By combining a rich philosophical training with an extensive travel itinerary, Lingis has developed a distinctive brand of phenomenology that is only now beginning to gain critical attention. Lingis inhabits a ready-made language and conceptuality, but cultivates a style of thinking which disrupts and transforms the work of his predecessors, setting him apart from the rest of his field. This essay sketches Lingis’ (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  5. added 2019-09-02
    On the Alleged Evidence for Non-Unpleasant Pains.Thomas Park - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    ABSTRACTPains are unpleasant, universally unpleasant. What seems trivially true has been rejected by various pain scientists because of several phenomena which allegedly show that there can be pain...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. added 2019-08-29
    Pain, Perception, and the Appearance-Reality Distinction.Thomas Park - 2017 - Philosophical Analysis 2017 (38):205-237.
    I argue that pain sensations are perceptual states, namely states that represent (actual or potential) damage. I defend this position against the objection that pains, unlike standard perceptual states, do not allow for an appearance-reality distinction by arguing that in the case of pain as well as in standard perceptual experiences, cognitive penetration or malfunctions of the underlying sensory systems can lead to a dissociation between the sensation on the one hand, and what is represented on the other hand. Moreover, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2019-07-26
    On Sexual Lust as an Emotion.Larry A. Herzberg - 2019 - Humana Mente 35 (12):271-302.
    Sexual lust – understood as a feeling of sexual attraction towards another – has traditionally been viewed as a sort of desire or at least as an appetite akin to hunger. I argue here that this view is, at best, significantly incomplete. Further insights can be gained into certain occurrences of lust by noticing how strongly they resemble occurrences of “attitudinal” (“object-directed”) emotion. At least in humans, the analogy between the object-directed appetites and attitudinal emotions goes well beyond their psychological (...)
    No categories
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. added 2019-06-05
    Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):677-708.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the transparency datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the transparency datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some other (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  9. added 2019-04-11
    More of Me! Less of Me!: Reflexive Imperativism About Affective Phenomenal Character.Luca Barlassina & Max Khan Hayward - 2019 - Mind 128 (512):1013-1044.
    Experiences like pains, pleasures, and emotions have affective phenomenal character: they feel pleasant or unpleasant. Imperativism proposes to explain affective phenomenal character by appeal to imperative content, a kind of intentional content that directs rather than describes. We argue that imperativism is on the right track, but has been developed in the wrong way. There are two varieties of imperativism on the market: first-order and higher-order. We show that neither is successful, and offer in their place a new theory: reflexive (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. added 2018-11-23
    The Site of Affect in Husserl’s Phenomenology: Sensations and the Constitution of the Lived Body.Alia Al-Saji - 2000 - Philosophy Today 44 (Supplement):51-59.
    To discover affects within Husserl’s texts designates a difficult investigation; it points to a theme of which these texts were forced to speak, even as they were explicitly speaking of regional ontologies and the foundations of sciences. For we may at first wonder: where can affection find a positive role in the rigor of a pure philosophy that seeks to account for its phenomena from within the immanence of consciousness? Does this not mean that the very passivity and foreignness of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  11. added 2018-04-28
    The Recurrent Model of Bodily Spatial Phenomenology.Tony Cheng & Patrick Haggard - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (3-4):55-70.
    In this paper, we introduce and defend the recurrent model for understanding bodily spatial phenomenology. While Longo, Azañón and Haggard (2010) propose a bottom-up model, Bermúdez (2017) emphasizes the top-down aspect of the information processing loop. We argue that both are only half of the story. Section 1 intro- duces what the issues are. Section 2 starts by explaining why the top- down, descending direction is necessary with the illustration from the ‘body-based tactile rescaling’ paradigm (de Vignemont, Ehrsson and Haggard, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. added 2018-04-28
    Spatial Perception and the Sense of Touch.Patrick Haggard, Tony Cheng, Brianna Beck & Francesca Fardo - 2017 - In The Subject's Matter: Self-Consciousness and the Body. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 97-114.
    It remains controversial whether touch is a truly spatial sense or not. Many philosophers suggest that, if touch is indeed spatial, it is only through its alliances with exploratory movement, and with proprioception. Here we develop the notion that a minimal yet important form of spatial perception may occur in purely passive touch. We do this by showing that the array of tactile receptive fields in the skin, and appropriately relayed to the cortex, may contain the same basic informational building (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. added 2018-04-02
    Could Sensation Be a Bodily Act?Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Hylomorphists claim that sensation is a bodily act. In this essay, I attempt to make sense of this notion but conclude that sensation is not a bodily act, but a mental one occurring in an intentional field of awareness.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2018-04-02
    Explaining the Felt Location of Bodily Sensations Through Body Representations.Luis Alejandro Murillo Lara - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 60:17-24.
  15. added 2018-04-02
    Where is Your Pain? A Cross-Cultural Comparison of the Concept of Pain in Americans and South Korea.Hyo-eun Kim, Nina Poth, Kevin Reuter & Justin Sytsma - unknown
    Philosophical orthodoxy holds that pains are mental states, taking this to reflect the ordinary conception of pain. Despite this, evidence is mounting that English speakers do not tend to conceptualize pains in this way; rather, they tend to treat pains as being bodily states. We hypothesize that this is driven by two primary factors—the phenomenology of feeling pains and the surface grammar of pain reports. There is reason to expect that neither of these factors is culturally specific, however, and thus (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  16. added 2018-04-02
    Pain and Bodily Care: Whose Body Matters?Frederique de Vignemont - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (3):542-560.
    Pain is unpleasant. It is something that one avoids as much as possible. One might then claim that one wants to avoid pain because one cares about one's body. On this view, individuals who do not experience pain as unpleasant and to be avoided, like patients with pain asymbolia, do not care about their body. This conception of pain has been recently defended by Bain [2014] and Klein [forthcoming]. In their view, one needs to care about one's body for pain (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  17. added 2018-04-02
    Attenuated Self-Tickle Sensation Even Under Trajectory Perturbation.George Van Doorn, Bryan Paton, Jacqui Howell & Jakob Hohwy - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:147-153.
  18. added 2018-04-02
    Pain and Body Awareness. An Exploration of the Bodily Experience of Persons Suffering From Fibromyalgia.C. Valenzuela-Moguillansky - 2013 - Constructivist Foundations 8 (3):339-350.
    Context: Despite the fact that pain and body awareness are by definition subjective experiences, most studies assessing these phenomena and the relationship between them have done so from a “third-person” perspective, meaning that they have used methods whose aim is to try to objectify the phenomena under study. Problem: This article assesses the question of what is the impact of a widespread chronic pain condition in the bodily experience of persons suffering from fibromyalgia. Method: I used an interview methodology stemming (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  19. added 2018-04-02
    The Objects of Bodily Awareness.John Schwenkler - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):465-472.
    Is it possible to misidentify the object of an episode of bodily awareness? I argue that it is, on the grounds that a person can reasonably be unsure or mistaken as to which part of his or her body he or she is aware of at a given moment. This requires discussing the phenomenon of body ownership, and defending the claim that the proper parts of one’s body are at least no less ‘principal’ among the objects of bodily awareness than (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  20. added 2018-04-02
    A Phantom Body As Bodily Self-consciousness.Przemyslaw Nowakowski - 2010 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (1):225-252.
    According to Peter Halligan, […] it is important to consider that the experience of our body is largely the product of a continuously updated „phantom” generated by the brain.. Next, he adds: I will argue that the prevalent common sense assumption of phantom experience as pathological is wrongheaded and largely based on a long-standing and pernicious folk assumption that the physical body is necessary for experience of a body..These two remarks can serve as a backdrop for a discussion of the (...)
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. added 2018-04-02
    A Phenomenological Analysis of Bodily Self-Awareness in the Experience of Pain and Pleasure: On Dys-Appearance and Eu-Appearance. [REVIEW]Kristin Zeiler - 2010 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 13 (4):333-342.
    The aim of this article is to explore nuances within the field of bodily self-awareness. My starting-point is phenomenological. I focus on how the subject experiences her or his body, i.e. how the body stands forth to the subject. I build on the phenomenologist Drew Leder’s distinction between bodily dis-appearance and dys-appearance. In bodily dis-appearance, I am only prereflectively aware of my body. My body is not a thematic object of my experience. Bodily dys-appearance takes place when the body appears (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  22. added 2018-04-02
    Bodily Experience and Bodily Self Knowledge: Feeling and Knowing Oneself as a Physical Agent.Adrian John Tetteh Smith - unknown
    I tend to think of myself as bodily. Probably, so do you. Philosophically this takes some explaining. A candidate explanation is this: The bodily self is a physical agent. Knowledge of oneself as bodily is fundamentally knowledge of oneself as agentive; such knowledge is grounded in both experience of oneself as instantiating a bodily structure that affords a limited range of actions; and experience of oneself as a physical agent that tries to perform a limited range of actions over time. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2018-04-02
    The Location of Pains.David Bain - 2007 - Philosophical Papers 36 (2):171-205.
    Perceptualists say that having a pain in a body part consists in perceiving the part as instantiating some property. I argue that perceptualism makes better sense of the connections between pain location and the experiences undergone by people in pain than three alternative accounts that dispense with perception. Turning to fellow perceptualists, I also reject ways in which David Armstrong and Michael Tye understand and motivate perceptualism, and I propose an alternative interpretation, one that vitiates a pair of objections—due to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  24. added 2018-04-02
    The Bodily Self: The Sensori-Motor Roots of Pre-Reflective Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW]Dorothée Legrand - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):89-118.
    A bodily self is characterized by pre-reflective bodily self-consciousness that is.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  25. added 2018-04-02
    On the Location of a Pain.M. Tye - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):150-153.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  26. added 2018-04-02
    The Pain Problem.Terry Dartnall - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):95-102.
    How can a pain wake you up? You were not dreaming, nor did any bodily stimuli filter into your consciousness. You did not just wake up and realize you were in pain, as you might wake up and realize it is Saturday. You were deeply, dreamlessly asleep, and suddenly you were awake, and in pain. How is this possible? If pain exists only inasmuch as it is experienced, it seems that the pain did not exist when you were asleep, and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. added 2018-04-02
    Revisiting "The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm": The Female Orgasm in American Sexual Thought and Second Wave Feminism.Jane Gerhard - 2000 - Feminist Studies 26 (2):449-476.
  28. added 2018-04-02
    The Location of Pain: A Reply to Mr Holborow.Daniel M. Taylor - 1966 - Philosophical Quarterly 16 (October):359-360.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. added 2018-04-02
    Taylor on Pain Location.L. C. Holborow - 1966 - Philosophical Quarterly 16 (April):151-158.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2018-04-02
    The Location of Pain.Daniel M. Taylor - 1965 - Philosophical Quarterly 15 (January):53-62.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. added 2018-04-02
    Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage.Walter B. Cannon - 1917 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (3):79-80.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  32. added 2018-04-02
    Cannon's Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage.Margaret Floy Washburn - 1917 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 14 (3):79.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. added 2018-04-02
    Recent Studies of Bodily Effects of Fear, Rage, and Pain.W. B. Cannon - 1914 - Journal of Philosophy 11 (6):162.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. added 2018-04-02
    Recent Studies of Bodily Effects of Fear, Rage, and Pain.W. B. Cannon - 1914 - Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 11 (6):162-165.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. added 2018-01-17
    Predictive Brains, Dreaming Selves, Sleeping Bodies: How the Analysis of Dream Movement Can Inform a Theory of Self- and World-Simulation in Dreams.Jennifer Windt - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2577-2625.
    In this paper, I discuss the relationship between bodily experiences in dreams and the sleeping, physical body. I question the popular view that dreaming is a naturally and frequently occurring real-world example of cranial envatment. This view states that dreams are functionally disembodied states: in a majority of dreams, phenomenal experience, including the phenomenology of embodied selfhood, unfolds completely independently of external and peripheral stimuli and outward movement. I advance an alternative and more empirically plausible view of dreams as weakly (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  36. added 2018-01-17
    Pain and Touch.Frédérique de Vignemont - 2017 - The Monist 100 (4):465-477.
    When one contrasts pain with the classic five senses, discussions generally focus on vision, which is taken as the paradigmatic example of perception. An intentionalist might argue that if the phenomenal difference between feeling and seeing bodily disturbances cannot be explained at the level of the content, it can be so at the level of the mode of presentation, and more particularly at the level of the structure of the spatial phenomenology of pain. Here I will argue that the spatial (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  37. added 2018-01-17
    What the Body Commands : The Imperative Theory of Pain.Colin Klein - unknown
    In What the Body Commands, Colin Klein proposes and defends a novel theory of pain. Klein argues that pains are imperative; they are sensations with a content, and that content is a command to protect the injured part of the body. He terms this view "imperativism about pain," and argues that imperativism can account for two puzzling features of pain: its strong motivating power and its uninformative nature. Klein argues that the biological purpose of pain is homeostatic; like hunger and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  38. added 2018-01-17
    Understanding Medical Symptoms: A Conceptual Review and Analysis.Kirsti Malterud, Ann Dorrit Guassora, Anette Hauskov Graungaard & Susanne Reventlow - 2015 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 36 (6):411-424.
    The aim of this article is to present a conceptual review and analysis of symptom understanding. Subjective bodily sensations occur abundantly in the normal population and dialogues about symptoms take place in a broad range of contexts, not only in the doctor’s office. Our review of symptom understanding proceeds from an initial subliminal awareness by way of attribution of meaning and subsequent management, with and without professional involvement. We introduce theoretical perspectives from phenomenology, semiotics, social interactionism, and discourse analysis. Drew (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. added 2018-01-17
    More of Myself: Manipulating Interoceptive Awareness by Heightened Attention to Bodily and Narrative Aspects of the Self.Vivien Ainley, Lara Maister, Jana Brokfeld, Harry Farmer & Manos Tsakiris - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (4):1231-1238.
    Psychology distinguishes between a bodily and a narrative self. Within neuroscience, models of the bodily self are based on exteroceptive sensorimotor processes or on the integration of interoceptive sensations. Recent research has revealed interactions between interoceptive and exteroceptive processing of self-related information, for example that mirror self-observation can improve interoceptive awareness. Using heartbeat perception, we measured the effect on interoceptive awareness of two experimental manipulations, designed to heighten attention to bodily and narrative aspects of the self. Participants gazed at a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  40. added 2018-01-17
    Touch.Frédérique De Vignemont & Olivier Massin - 2013 - The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception.
    Since Aristotle, touch has been found especially hard to define. One of the few unchallenged intuitions about touch, however, is that tactile awareness entertains some close relationship with bodily awareness. This chapter considers the relation between touch and bodily awareness from two different perspectives: the body template theory and the body map theory. According to the former, touch is defined by the fact that tactile content matches proprioceptive content. We raise some objections against such a bodily definition of touch and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  41. added 2018-01-17
    Touch.Frédérique De Vignemont & Olivier Massin - 2013 - In Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Since Aristotle, touch has been found especially hard to define. One of the few unchallenged intuition about touch, however, is that tactile awareness entertains some especially close relationship with bodily awareness. This article considers the relation between touch and bodily awareness from two different perspectives: the body template theory and the body map theory. According to the former, touch is defined by the fact that tactile content matches proprioceptive content. We raise some objections against such a bodily definition of touch (...)
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  42. added 2018-01-17
    Shared Representations, Perceptual Symbols, and the Vehicles of Mental Concepts.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (3-4):102-124.
    The main aim of this article is to present and defend a thesis according to which conceptual representations of some types of mental states are encoded in the same neural structures that underlie the first-personal experience of those states. To support this proposal here, I will put forth a novel account of the cognitive function played by ‘shared representations’ of emotions and bodily sensations, i.e. neural structures that are active when one experiences a mental state of a certain type as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. added 2018-01-17
    A Qualitative Analysis of Sensory Phenomena Induced by Perceptual Deprivation.Donna M. Lloyd, Elizabeth Lewis, Jacob Payne & Lindsay Wilson - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (1):95-112.
    Previous studies have shown that misperceptions and illusory experiences can occur if sensory stimulation is withdrawn or becomes invariant even for short periods of time. Using a perceptual deprivation paradigm, we created a monotonous audiovisual environment and asked participants to verbally report any auditory, visual or body-related phenomena they experienced. The data (analysed using a variant of interpretative phenomenological analysis) revealed two main themes: (1) reported sensory phenomena have different spatial characteristics ranging from simple percepts to the feeling of immersion (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. added 2018-01-17
    What Do We Say When We Say How or What We Feel?Berit Brogaard - 2012 - Philosophers' Imprint 12.
    Discourse containing the verb ‘feel’, almost without exception, purports to describe inner experience. Though this much is evident, the question remains what exactly is conveyed when we talk about what and how we feel? Does discourse containing the word ‘feel’ actually succeed in describing the content and phenomenology of inner experience? If so, how does it reflect the phenomenology and content of the experience it describes? Here I offer a linguistic analysis of ‘feels’ reports and argue that a subset of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  45. added 2018-01-17
    Movement for Movement's Sake? On the Relationship Between Kinaesthesia and Aesthetics.Mark Paterson - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (2):7.
    Movement and, more particularly, kinesthesia as a modality and as a metaphor has become of interest at the intersection of phenomenology and cognitive science. In this paper I wish to combine three historically related strands, aisthêsis, kinesthesis and aesthetics, to advance an argument concerning the aesthetic value of certain somatic sensations. Firstly, by capitalizing on a recent regard for somatic or inner bodily senses, including kinesthesia, proprioception and the vestibular system by drawing lines of historical continuity from earlier philosophical investigations (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  46. added 2018-01-17
    Habeas Corpus: Poczucie Własności Swojego Ciała.Frederique de Vignemont - 2012 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 3 (T).
    What grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. added 2018-01-17
    The Deep Bodily Roots of Emotion.Albert A. Johnstone - 2012 - Husserl Studies 28 (3):179-200.
    This article explores emotions and their relationship to ‘somatic responses’, i.e., one’s automatic responses to sensations of pain, cold, warmth, sudden intensity. To this end, it undertakes a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of the first-hand experience of eight basic emotions, briefly exploring their essential aspects: their holistic nature, their identifying dynamic transformation of the lived body, their two-layered intentionality, their involuntary initiation and voluntary espousal. The fact that the involuntary tensional shifts initiating emotions are irreplicatable voluntarily, is taken to show that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  48. added 2018-01-17
    Imperatives, Phantom Pains, and Hallucination by Presupposition.Colin Klein - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):917-928.
    Several authors have recently argued that the content of pains (and bodily sensations more generally) is imperative rather than descriptive. I show that such an account can help resolve competing intuitions about phantom limb pain. As imperatives, phantom pains are neither true nor false. However, phantom limb pains presuppose falsehoods, in the same way that any imperative which demands something impossible presupposes a falsehood. Phantom pains, like many chronic pains, are thus commands that cannot be satisfied. I conclude by showing (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  49. added 2018-01-17
    A Self for the Body.Frédérique de Vignemont - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (3):230-247.
    Abstract: What grounds the experience of our body as our own? Can we rationally doubt that this is our own body when we feel sensations in it? This article shows how recent empirical evidence can shed light on issues on the body and the self, such as the grounds of the sense of body ownership and the immunity to error through misidentification of bodily self-ascriptions. In particular, it discusses how bodily illusions (e.g., the Rubber Hand Illusion), bodily disruptions (e.g., somatoparaphrenia), (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  50. added 2018-01-17
    Body-Conscious Shakespeare: Sensory Disturbances in Troubled Characters.K. W. Heaton - 2011 - Medical Humanities 37 (2):97-102.
    It is widely accepted that Shakespeare was unique in the range of his insights into the human mind, but the way his characters reveal their mental states through bodily sensations has not been systematically explored. The author has searched for these phenomena in the 42 major works of Shakespeare and in 46 genre-matched works by his contemporaries, and in this paper the author focuses on sensory changes other than those involving vision, taste, the heart and the alimentary tract (all considered (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 116