Brain death and personal existence: A reply to green and Wikler

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 8 (2):187-196 (1983)
It has been argued that neither the biological or the moral justifications commonly given for adoption of brain-death criteria are adequate; and that the only argument that succeeds is an ontological justification based on the fact that one's personal identity terminates with the death of one's brain. But a more satisfactory ontological approach analyzes brain death in terms of the existence of a person in connection with a body, not personal identity. The personal-existence justification does not supplant the usual biological and moral arguments, but acts in concert with them
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DOI 10.1093/jmp/8.2.187
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