Is the Indispensability Argument Dispensable?

Theoria 77 (2):139-158 (2011)
Abstract
When the indispensability argument for mathematical entities (IA) is spelled out, it would appear confirmational holism is needed for the argument to work. It has been argued that confirmational holism is a dispensable premise in the argument if a construal of naturalism, according to which it is denied that we can take different epistemic attitudes towards different parts of our scientific theories, is adopted. I argue that the suggested variety of naturalism will only appeal to a limited number of philosophers. I then suggest that if we allow for some degree of separation between different component parts of theories, IA can be formulated as an argument aimed at more than a limited number of philosophers, but in implementing this strategy the notion of indispensability needs spelling out. The best way of spelling out indispensability is in terms of theory contribution, but doing so requires adopting inference to the best explanation (IBE). IBE is however sufficient for establishing the conclusion that IA is supposed to establish. Thus, IA is a redundant argument.
Keywords scientific realism  explanatory virtues  indispensability argument for mathematical realism  naturalism  inference to the best explanation
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01093.x
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References found in this work BETA
Inference to the Best Explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1983 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
Scientific Realism and the Indispensability Argument for Mathematical Realism: A Marriage Made in Hell.Jacob Busch - 2011 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):307-325.
Defending the Indispensability Argument: Atoms, Infinity and the Continuum.Eduardo Castro - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):41-61.
Indispensability and Holism.Jacob Busch - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):47-59.

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