Transparency, belief, intention

Authors
Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.
Keywords self-knowledge  intention  transparency
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00203.x
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Transparent Self-Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241.
Assertion and Transparent Self-Knowledge.Eric Marcus & John Schwenkler - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
Kant and the Transparency of the Mind.Alexandra M. Newton - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-26.
II—Matthew Boyle: Transparent Self-Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241.

View all 38 citations / Add more citations

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