Transparency, belief, intention

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85:201-21 (2011)
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Abstract

This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.

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10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00203.x

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Alex Byrne
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.
Transparency and reflection.Matthew Boyle - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):1012-1039.
II—Matthew Boyle: Transparent Self-Knowledge.Matthew Boyle - 2011 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):223-241.

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Thought.Gilbert Harman - 1973 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.

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