Abstract

Paternalistic reasons for interfering with another's choices or actions are generally taken to be those which appeal exclusively to the welfare of the person interfered with. Paternalism of this sort is problematic because it involves an obvious and compelling conflict between two fundamental moral principles, one which prescribes interfering with another , and one which prescribes protection of another's well-being . My concern in this dissertation is to say when paternalistic interference with adults is justified. That is, my project is to understand under what conditions the concern for another adult's welfare justifiably issues in interfering with his self-regarding choices or his interest in deciding his own actions or treatment. ;In Chapter 1, I develop a principle of justified paternalistic interference with adults which I take to be rigorously protective of individual liberty, but which does not require unnecessary sacrifices of individual welfare. In Chapter II, I draw out the general implications of this principle for the defense of liberty-impinging legislation. The remaining three chapters are devoted to illuminating the major conditions of the principle , and to showing that the principle is manageable and useful in practice. The chapters are entitled: PATERNALISTIC INTERFERENCE, LEGAL PATERNALISM, LIBERTY, BENEFICENCE, AND INVOLUNTARY CONFINEMENT, COMPETENCE AND COMPETENTS, and V. PATERNALISM AND VOLUNTARINESS