The "strong programme", normativity, and social causes

Authors
Chris Calvert-Minor
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater
Abstract
Barry Barnes and David Bloor of the Strong Programme of the sociology of knowledge advance a naturalized epistemology that reduces all accounts of normativity to social causes. I endorse their program of naturalizing one kind of normativity, but I argue that there is another kind they cannot naturalize. Within the context of sociological explanations of rationality, there are norms of rationality instantiated by scientists that Barnes and Bloor study, and Barnes and Bloor's own normative ascriptions of scientists as rational beings. I argue that Barnes and Bloor successfully justify their naturalization of the norms of rationality of the scientists they describe by a methodological caution and arguments from under-determination and finitism. But they inevitably fail to naturalize their own normative ascriptions of those scientists as rational
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-5914.2008.00355.x
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References found in this work BETA

Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge.Imre Lakatos & Alan Musgrave (eds.) - 1970 - Cambridge University Press.
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays.W. V. Quine - 1969 - Columbia University Press.
The Fate of Knowledge.Helen Longino - 2002 - Princeton University Press.
Knowledge and Social Imagery.David Bloor - 1991 - University of Chicago Press.

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