Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1477-1495 (2016)

Justin A. Capes
Flagler College
Arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility sometimes make use of various transfer of non-responsibility principles. These principles purport to specify conditions in which lack of moral responsibility is transmitted to the consequences of things for which people are not morally responsible. In this paper, after developing what I take to be the most serious objections to extant principles of this sort, I identify and defend a new transfer of non-responsibility principle that is immune to these and other objections. This new principle says, roughly, that if you are not morally responsible for any of the circumstances that led to a particular outcome, and if you are not morally responsible for those circumstances leading to that outcome, then you are not morally responsible for the outcome either. After defending this principle against a number of objections, I use it to argue for the conclusion that no one is even partly morally responsible for anything, if determinism is true
Keywords Moral responsibility  Determinism  Incompatibilism  Transfer of non-responsibility  The direct argument
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-015-0559-1
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,581
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):459-466.
Semi-Compatibilism and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility.Mark Ravizza - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):61-93.
Farewell to the Direct Argument.David Widerker - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (6):316.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A New Puppet Puzzle.Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (3):202-213.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Source Incompatibilism and its Alternatives.Kevin Timpe - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):143-155.
Incompatibilism.J. M. Ficsher - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (January):127-37.
The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism. [REVIEW]Eleonore Stump - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):459-466.
Incompatibilism Without the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.Robert Heinaman - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):266-76.
The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility.Helen Steward - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):241-271.
Understanding Source Incompatibilism.Neal A. Tognazzini - 2011 - Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):73-88.
Incompatibilism and the Logic of Transfer.Danilo šuster - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (33):45-54.
Agnosticism About Moral Responsibility.Jeremy Byrd - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-432.
Defending Direct Source Incompatibilism.Eric Yang - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (3):325-333.


Added to PP index

Total views
62 ( #176,236 of 2,461,407 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #448,382 of 2,461,407 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes