Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1477-1495 (2016)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility sometimes make use of various transfer of non-responsibility principles. These principles purport to specify conditions in which lack of moral responsibility is transmitted to the consequences of things for which people are not morally responsible. In this paper, after developing what I take to be the most serious objections to extant principles of this sort, I identify and defend a new transfer of non-responsibility principle that is immune to these and other objections. This new principle says, roughly, that if you are not morally responsible for any of the circumstances that led to a particular outcome, and if you are not morally responsible for those circumstances leading to that outcome, then you are not morally responsible for the outcome either. After defending this principle against a number of objections, I use it to argue for the conclusion that no one is even partly morally responsible for anything, if determinism is true
|
Keywords | Moral responsibility Determinism Incompatibilism Transfer of non-responsibility The direct argument |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | |
DOI | 10.1007/s11098-015-0559-1 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):459-466.
Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility.Michael S. McKenna - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):37-51.
Semi-Compatibilism and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility.Mark Ravizza - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):61-93.
View all 16 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
A New Puppet Puzzle.Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (3):202-213.
Practical Decision and the Cognitive Requirements for Blameworthiness.E. J. Coffman - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):119-135.
Semicompatibilism and Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: In Defense of Symmetrical Requirements.Taylor W. Cyr - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-15.
Similar books and articles
Source Incompatibilism, Ultimacy, and the Transfer of Non-Responsibility.Michael S. McKenna - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):37-51.
The Fate of the Direct Argument and the Case for Incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):405-424.
Source Incompatibilism and its Alternatives.Kevin Timpe - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):143-155.
Farewell to Direct Source Incompatibilism.Joseph Keim Campbell - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):36 - 49.
The Direct Argument for Incompatibilism. [REVIEW]Eleonore Stump - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):459-466.
Incompatibilism Without the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.Robert Heinaman - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):266-76.
The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility.Helen Steward - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):241-271.
A Critique of Pereboom's 'Four-Case Argument' for Incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2005 - Analysis 65 (1):75-80.
Agnosticism About Moral Responsibility.Jeremy Byrd - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-432.
Source Incompatibilism and Alternative Possibilities.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - In Michael S. McKenna & David Widerker (eds.), Freedom, Responsibility, and Agency: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 184--199.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2015-09-05
Total views
59 ( #167,486 of 2,403,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #155,988 of 2,403,826 )
2015-09-05
Total views
59 ( #167,486 of 2,403,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #155,988 of 2,403,826 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads