Consciousness and agency: Explaining what and explaining who

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):148-149 (1999)
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Abstract

The target article offers an intriguing hypothesis relating the content of phenomenal experience to a qualitative characteristic of information processing. This hypothesis, however, offers only an explanation of the of consciousness, not the – the experiencing agent remains mysterious. Their hypothesis about the unity of consciousness can be linked to an informational account of the agency or subjectivity of consciousness

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