Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):172-173 (1999)
Abstract
O'Brien & Opie defend a “vehicle” rather than a “process” theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is “explicit.” I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X99491794
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