Abstract

If the specificity of liberal democracy, as a regime, is to base power on consent then political violence appears to contradict the typical self-understanding of the societies whose functioning it informs. A justification of the motives which may call for such violence thus becomes both a political and a philosophical problem when such a regime faces the necessity to resort to violent means of action. Reaching intellectual maturity during the 30’s and the 40’s, while democratic states were faltering in Europe, Raymond Aron had an acute understanding of this issue. An inquiry into Aron’s publications from that period will help us identify what kind of moral and cultural foundations they need to have if they are not to collapse during wartime. These texts also shed an original light on his post-war political thought and may lead us to reconsider some dominant contemporary interpretations of his work as revolving around the Kantian–Machiavellian antinomy. When compared to either element of this antinomy, Aron’s conception of agency, its emphasis on moral obligations, virtues and moral character, starts bearing more resemblance to the political science of Aristotle than to modern social or political science.