Wittgenstein’s 1913 Objections To Russell’s Theory of Belief

The Paideia Archive: Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 32:14-18 (1998)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In what follows, I give a dialectical reading of his dismissal of metaphysics and of Wittgenstein's objections to Russell in 1913. I argue that Wittgenstein must be read as advocating no particular theory or doctrine — that is, philosophy is an activity and not a body of truths. Furthermore, this insistence is thoroughgoing. Put differently, a dialectical reading must be applied to one's own thought and talk. Characteristically, this sort of dialectical philosophy begins with the question, Is there any definiteness to what I am doing in my own thinking and speaking? Such a question undercuts the easy assumption that what we are doing may be expressed in a body of meaningful statements. In particular, I argue that Wittgenstein does not advocate any particular theory of language. A common reading of Wittgenstein is that he aims to prevent us from misusing language. This view assumes that, for Wittgenstein, the notion of a correct, acceptable or meaningful use of language may be taken for granted. In my view, Wittgenstein does not take the notions of use of language and grammar and its misuse for granted. For Wittgenstein grammar underdetermines what it is to use or misuse language. I argue that an ethical critique is implicit in Wittgenstein's objections to any attempt to speak a priori about language and thought.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,369

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Russell’s Misunderstanding of the Tractatus on Ordinary Language.Nadine Faulkner - 2008 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 28 (2):143-162.
On Misinterpreting Kripke’s Wittgenstein.Alex Byrne - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):339-343.
Wittgenstein's New Method and Russell's The Analysis of Mind.Mauro L. Engelmann - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Research 37:283-311.
Was wittgenstein a psychologist? (I).James Bogen - 1964 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 7 (1-4):374-378.
Russell's multiple relation theory of judgment.Nicholas Griffin - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 47 (2):213 - 247.
Wittgenstein's 'Grammar'.William Benjamin Russell - 1982 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-05-08

Downloads
8 (#1,324,279)

6 months
5 (#648,618)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Rosalind Carey
Lehman College (CUNY)

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references