The aim of this note is to undermine structural realism by testing the soundness of its main claim. If scientific theories represent the structure of the world, structural realism needs a general account of representation. Representation is the crux of structural realism, because structure/ontology distinction collapses. Mathematical structures are ontologyladen. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n2p201
Keywords scientific representation  distinção estrutura/ontologia  representação científica  structure/ontology distinction  mecânica matricial e ondulatória  matrix and wave mechanics.  quantum theory  Structural realism  teoria quântica  realismo estrutural
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Reprint years 2011
DOI 10.5007/1808-1711.2010v14n2p201
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