An offer you can't refuse: systematically exploiting utility-maximisers with malicious gambles

Abstract

Decision theory aims to provide mathematical analysis of which choice one should rationally make in a given situation. Our current decision theory norms have been very successful, however, several problems have proven vexing for standard decision theory. In this paper, I show that these problems all share a similar structure and identify a class of problems which decision theory overvalues. I demonstrate that agents who follow current standard decision theory can be exploited and have their preferences reordered if offered decision problems of this class. I show that preference reordering is a serious problem, which motivates my search for a decision theory which is immune to exploitation. I find Dr. Nick Smith’s theory of Rationally Negligible Probabilities cannot be exploited in this way and discuss why agents should adopt it.

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References found in this work

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Probability Theory. The Logic of Science.Edwin T. Jaynes - 2002 - Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Edited by G. Larry Bretthorst.
The Logic of Decision.Henry E. Kyberg - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (2):250.
Dutch Book Arguments.Alan Hájek - 2008 - In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.

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