In Arif Ahmed (ed.), Newcomb's Problem. Cambridge University Press. pp. 115–137 (2018)
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Abstract |
The standard formulation of Newcomb's problem compares evidential and causal conceptions of
expected utility, with those maximizing evidential expected utility tending to end up far richer. Thus, in a
world in which agents face Newcomb problems, the evidential decision theorist might ask the causal
decision theorist: "if you're so smart, why ain’cha rich?” Ultimately, however, the expected riches of
evidential decision theorists in Newcomb problems do not vindicate their theory, because their success
does not generalize. Consider a theory that allows the agents who employ it to end up rich in worlds
containing Newcomb problems and continues to outperform in other cases. This type of theory, which I
call a “success-first” decision theory, is motivated by the desire to draw a tighter connection between
rationality and success, rather than to support any particular account of expected utility. The primary aim
of this paper is to provide a comprehensive justification of success-first decision theories as accounts of
rational decision. I locate this justification in an experimental approach to decision theory supported by the aims of methodological naturalism.
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Keywords | Newcomb's problem causal decision theory evidential decision theory realistic decision theory methodological naturalism Thomas Schelling David Gauthier Edward McClennen |
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Act Consequentialism Without Free Rides.Preston Greene & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2020 - Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1):88-116.
Riches and Rationality.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):114-129.
The Evidentialist's Wager.William MacAskill, Aron Vallinder, Caspar Oesterheld, Carl Shulman & Johannes Treutlein - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.
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