Abstract

The paper analyses the behaviour of French corporate executives towards the adoption of Internet voting at shareholders’ general meetings. The research extends the studies of legitimation strategies and institutional theory to a new topic and a new instrument of corporate governance. Taking a qualitative approach, the paper examines the particular case of a technology that is adopted by a company for the benefit of its shareholders. It contributes theoretically by showing how executives respond to institutional pressures when responding could affect their own interests. The findings illustrate the nature and extent of six legitimation strategies used by executives when confronted by Internet shareholder voting. Interestingly, the results highlight the prevalence of manipulation and coalition-building strategies. A typology of adoption behaviours is also proposed. Interestingly, the results show how executives worry about the risk that Internet voting may lead to a loss of control. Overall, the paper argues that the relationship between shareholders and executives with regard to corporate governance is partially reversed by the adoption of Internet voting. Some theoretical and managerial implications of the paper for the literature on corporate governance and business ethics are discussed.