Non-prioritized ranked belief change

Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (4):417-443 (2003)
Traditional accounts of belief change have been criticized for placing undue emphasis on the new belief provided as input. A recent proposal to address such issues is a framework for non-prioritized belief change based on default theories (Ghose and Goebel, 1998). A novel feature of this approach is the introduction of disbeliefs alongside beliefs which allows for a view of belief contraction as independently useful, instead of just being seen as an intermediate step in the process of belief revision. This approach is, however, restrictive in assuming a linear ordering of reliability on the received inputs. In this paper, we replace the linear ordering with a preference ranking on inputs from which a total preorder on inputs can be induced. This extension brings along with it the problem of dealing with inputs of equal rank. We provide a semantic solution to this problem which contains, as a special case, AGM belief change on closed theories
Keywords belief change  contraction  non-monotonic inference
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1024888511283
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References found in this work BETA
Reasoning About Knowledge.Ronald Fagin (ed.) - 2003 - MIT Press.
Two Modellings for Theory Change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
Theory Contraction Through Base Contraction.André Fuhrmann - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 20 (2):175 - 203.

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Citations of this work BETA
AGM 25 Years.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295-331.
AGM 25 Years: Twenty-Five Years of Research in Belief Change.Eduardo Fermé & Sven Ove Hansson - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):295 - 331.
Conditional Ranking Revision.Emil Weydert - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (1):237-271.

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