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  1. Implicit Attitudes Are (Probably) Beliefs.Joseph Bendana - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Andrea Onofri & Cristina Borgoni (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford, UK: pp. 1-377.
    Implicit biases help maintain disparities between social groups. Arguably, in order to understand how to combat the effects of implicit biases we need to know what kind of mental states the implicit attitudes that undergird them are. Moreover, whether or not you care about combatting the effects, we need to understand what implicit attitudes are to begin understanding human cognitive architecture. Accordingly, one question that a lot of recent research in philosophy and psychology has focused on is: how belief-like are (...)
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  2. Compositionality Meets Belief Revision: a Bayesian Model of Modification.Corina Strößner - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):859-880.
    The principle of compositionality claims that the content of a complex concept is determined by its constituent concepts and the way in which they are composed. However, for prototype concepts this principle is often too rigid. Blurring the division between conceptual composition and belief update has therefore been suggested. Inspired by this idea, we develop a normative account of how belief revision and meaning composition should interact in modifications such as “red apple” or “pet hamster”. We do this by combining (...)
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  3. Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.
    I explore how rational belief and rational credence relate to evidence. I begin by looking at three cases where rational belief and credence seem to respond differently to evidence: cases of naked statistical evidence, lotteries, and hedged assertions. I consider an explanation for these cases, namely, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of statistical evidence alone, and raise worries for this view. Then, I suggest another view that explains how belief and credence relate to evidence. My view (...)
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  4. Expert Deference as a Belief Revision Schema.Joe Roussos - 2020 - Synthese:1-28.
    When an agent learns of an expert's credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This is a popular thought about how agents ought to respond to (ideal) experts. In a Bayesian framework, it is often modelled by endowing the agent with a set of priors that achieves this result. But this model faces a number of challenges, especially when applied to non-ideal agents (who (...)
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  5. The Logic of Conditional Belief.Benjamin Eva - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):759-779.
    The logic of indicative conditionals remains the topic of deep and intractable philosophical disagreement. I show that two influential epistemic norms—the Lockean theory of belief and the Ramsey test for conditional belief—are jointly sufficient to ground a powerful new argument for a particular conception of the logic of indicative conditionals. Specifically, the argument demonstrates, contrary to the received historical narrative, that there is a real sense in which Stalnaker’s semantics for the indicative did succeed in capturing the logic of the (...)
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  6. Four Approaches to Supposition.Benjamin Eva, Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Suppositions can be introduced in either the indicative or subjunctive mood. The introduction of either type of supposition initiates judgments that may be either qualitative, binary judgments about whether a given proposition is acceptable or quantitative, numerical ones about how acceptable it is. As such, accounts of qualitative/quantitative judgment under indicative/subjunctive supposition have been developed in the literature. We explore these four different types of theories by systematically explicating the relationships canonical representatives of each. Our representative qualitative accounts of indicative (...)
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  7. Belief Revision for Growing Awareness.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - forthcoming - Mind.
    The Bayesian maxim for rational learning could be described as conservative change from one probabilistic belief or credence function to another in response to newinformation. Roughly: ‘Hold fixed any credences that are not directly affected by the learning experience.’ This is precisely articulated for the case when we learn that some proposition that we had previously entertained is indeed true (the rule of conditionalisation). But can this conservative-change maxim be extended to revising one’s credences in response to entertaining propositions or (...)
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  8. Bayesian Coherentism.Lisa Cassell - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    This paper considers a problem for Bayesian epistemology and proposes a solution to it. On the traditional Bayesian framework, an agent updates her beliefs by Bayesian conditioning, a rule that tells her how to revise her beliefs whenever she gets evidence that she holds with certainty. In order to extend the framework to a wider range of cases, Jeffrey (1965) proposed a more liberal version of this rule that has Bayesian conditioning as a special case. Jeffrey conditioning is a rule (...)
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  9. The Big Four - Their Interdependence and Limitations.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Four intuitions are recurrent and influential in theories about conditionals: the Ramsey’s test, the Adams’ Thesis, the Equation, and the robustness requirement. For simplicity’s sake, I call these intuitions ‘the big four’. My aim is to show that: (1) the big four are interdependent; (2) they express our inferential dispositions to employ a conditional on a modus ponens; (3) the disposition to employ conditionals on a modus ponens doesn’t have the epistemic significance that is usually attributed to it, since the (...)
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  10. Difference-Making Conditionals and the Relevant Ramsey Test.Hans Rott - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-39.
    This paper explores conditionals expressing that the antecedent makes a difference for the consequent. A 'relevantised' version of the Ramsey Test for conditionals is employed in the context of the classical theory of belief revision. The idea of this test is that the antecedent is relevant to the consequent in the following sense: a conditional is accepted just in case (i) the consequent is accepted if the belief state is revised by the antecedent and (ii) the consequent fails to be (...)
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  11. The Epistemology of Disagreement: Why Not Bayesianism?Thomas Mulligan - forthcoming - Episteme.
    Disagreement is a ubiquitous feature of human life, and philosophers have dutifully attended to it. One important question related to disagreement is epistemological: How does a rational person change her beliefs (if at all) in light of disagreement from others? The typical methodology for answering this question is to endorse a steadfast or conciliatory disagreement norm (and not both) on a priori grounds and selected intuitive cases. In this paper, I argue that this methodology is misguided. Instead, a thoroughgoingly Bayesian (...)
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  12. Probability, Coherent Belief and Coherent Belief Changes.John Cantwell & Hans Rott - 2019 - Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 87 (3):259-291.
    This paper is about the statics and dynamics of belief states that are represented by pairs consisting of an agent's credences (represented by a subjective probability measure) and her categorical beliefs (represented by a set of possible worlds). Regarding the static side, we argue that the latter proposition should be coherent with respect to the probability measure and that its probability should reach a certain threshold value. On the dynamic side, we advocate Jeffrey conditionalisation as the principal mode of changing (...)
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  13. Staying True with the Help of Others: Doxastic Self-Control Through Interpersonal Commitment.Leo Charles Townsend - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 22 (3):243-258.
    I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated “epistemic temptations”. The first way is through the avowal of belief, (...)
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  14. Epistemic Pluralism.Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 239 (60):337-353.
    The present paper wants to promote epistemic pluralism as an alternative view of non-classical logics. For this purpose, a bilateralist logic of acceptance and rejection is developed in order to make an important di erence between several concepts of epistemology, including information and justi cation. Moreover, the notion of disagreement corresponds to a set of epistemic oppositions between agents. The result is a non-standard theory of opposition for many-valued logics, rendering total and partial disagreement in terms of epistemic negation and (...)
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  15. Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.
    There is consensus among computer scientists, logicians, and philosophers that good reasoning with qualitative beliefs must have the structural property of cumulative transitivity or, for short, cut. This consensus is typically explicitly argued for partially on the basis of practical and mathematical considerations. But the consensus is also implicit in the approach philosophers take to almost every puzzle about reasoning that involves multiple steps: philosophers typically assume that if each step in reasoning is acceptable considered on its own, the whole (...)
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  16. Mystery and the Evidential Impact of Unexplainables.Matteo Colombo & Dominik Klein - 2018 - Episteme 15 (4):463-475.
    How should the information that a proposition p is a mystery impact your credence in p? To answer this question, we first provide a taxonomy of mysteries; then, we develop a test to distinguish two types of mysteries. When faced with mysteries of the first type, rational epistemic agents should lower their credence in p upon learning that p is a mystery. The same information should not impact agents’ credence in p, when they face mysteries of the second type. Our (...)
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  17. Introduction to the Special Issue “Beliefs in Groups” of Theory and Decision.Franz Dietrich & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):1-4.
    This symposium in the overlap of philosophy and decision theory is described well by its title “Beliefs in Groups”. Each word in the title matters, with one intended ambiguity. The symposium is about beliefs rather than other attitudes such as preferences; these beliefs take the form of probabilities in the first three contributions, binary yes/no beliefs (‘judgments’) in the fourth contribution, and qualitative probabilities (‘probability grades’) in the fifth contribution. The beliefs occur in groups, which is ambiguous between beliefs of (...)
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  18. Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.
    We often hear such casual accusations: you just believe that because you are a liberal, a Christian, an American, a woman… When such charges are made they are meant to sting—not just emotionally, but epistemically. But should they? It can be disturbing to learn that one's beliefs reflect the influence of such irrelevant factors. The pervasiveness of such influence has led some to worry that we are not justified in many of our beliefs. That same pervasiveness has led others to (...)
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  19. The Irreducibility of Iterated to Single Revision.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (4):405-418.
    After a number of decades of research into the dynamics of rational belief, the belief revision theory community remains split on the appropriate handling of sequences of changes in view, the issue of so-called iterated revision. It has long been suggested that the matter is at least partly settled by facts pertaining to the results of various single revisions of one’s initial state of belief. Recent work has pushed this thesis further, offering various strong principles that ultimately result in a (...)
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  20. The Logical Burdens of Proof. Assertion and Hypothesis.Daniele Chiffi & Fabien Schang - 2017 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 26 (4):1-22.
    The paper proposes two logical analyses of (the norms of) justification. In a first, realist-minded case, truth is logically independent from justification and leads to a pragmatic logic LP including two epistemic and pragmatic operators, namely, assertion and hypothesis. In a second, antirealist-minded case, truth is not logically independent from justification and results in two logical systems of information and justification: AR4 and AR4¢, respectively, provided with a question-answer semantics. The latter proposes many more epistemic agents, each corresponding to a (...)
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  21. Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Information Due to Loss of Belief.Paul Weirich - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):753-757.
    This book review describes and evaluates Issac Levi's views about belief revision.
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  22. Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Informational Value Due to Loss of Belief. [REVIEW]André Fuhrmann - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (11):587-591.
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  23. A Brief Remark on Non-Prioritized Belief Change and the Monotony Postulate.Gordian Haas - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):319-322.
    The AGM success postulates for belief expansions and revisions have been widely criticized. This has resulted in the development of a number of non-prioritized belief change theories that violate these postulates. It is shown that we must also discard the monotony postulate for belief expansions if we abandon the success postulates. Non-prioritized belief change theories should instead fulfill a weaker postulate, which we call Conditional Monotony.
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  24. Belief Update Methods and Rules—Some Comparisons.Leszek Wroński - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    We tackle two open questions from Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010b) regarding what the belief update framework described in that paper mandates as correct responses to two problems. One of them concerns credences in overlapping propositions and is known in the literature as the “simultaneous update problem”. The other is the well known “Judy Benjamin” problem concerning conditional credences. We argue that our results concerning the problems point to deficiencies of the framework. More generally, we observe that the method of minimizing (...)
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  25. Belief Merging with the Aim of Truthlikeness.Simon D’Alfonso - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2013-2034.
    The merging/fusion of belief/data collections in propositional logic form is a topic that has received due attention within the domains of database and AI research. A distinction can be made between two types of scenarios to which the process of merging can be applied. In the first type, the collections represent preferences, such as the voting choices of a group of people, that need to be aggregated so as to give a consistent result that in some way best represents the (...)
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  26. Mild Contraction.André Fuhrmann - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (11):587-591.
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  27. Two Dogmas of Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503.
    The paper attacks the widely held view that belief revision theories, as they have been studied in the past two decades, are founded on the Principle of Informational Economy. The principle comes in two versions. According to the first, an agent should, when accepting a new piece of information, aim at a minimal change of his previously held beliefs. If there are different ways to effect the belief change, then the agent should, according to he second version, give up those (...)
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  28. On A Linear Representation For Quantitative Belief Revision.Akira Fusaoka & Satoshi Hiratsuka - 2003 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 18 (2):75-85.
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  29. The Neurophysiology of Post-Contraction.Michael J. Zigler - 1944 - Psychological Review 51 (5):315-325.
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  30. How Might Degrees of Belief Shift? On Action Conflicting with Professed Beliefs.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742.
    People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions. But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.
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  31. A Model of Dual Attitudes.Timothy D. Wilson, Samuel Lindsey & Tonya Y. Schooler - 2000 - Psychological Review 107 (1):101-126.
    When an attitude changes from A₁ to A₂, what happens to A₁? Most theories assume, at least implicitly, that the new attitude replaces the former one. The authors argue that a new attitude can override, but not replace, the old one, resulting in dual attitudes. Dual attitudes are defined as different evaluations of the same attitude object: an automatic, implicit attitude and an explicit attitude. The attitude that people endorse depends on whether they have the cognitive capacity to retrieve the (...)
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  32. Disputation and Change of Belief: Burley's Theory of Obligationes as a Theory of Belief Revision.Henrik Lagerlund & Erik J. Olsson - unknown
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  33. Rational Metabolic Revision Based on Core Beliefs.Yongfeng Yuan - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).
    When an agent can not recognize, immediately, the implausible part of new information received, she will usually first expand her belief state by the new information, and then she may encounter some belief conflicts, and find the implausible information based on her criteria to consolidate her belief state. This process indicates a new kind of non-prioritized multiple revision, called metabolic revision. I give some axiomatic postulates for metabolic revision and propose two functional constructions for it, namely kernel metabolic revision and (...)
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  34. Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):93-108.
    A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, (...)
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  35. Postulates for Revising BDI Structures.John Grant, Sarit Kraus, Donald Perlis & Michael Wooldridge - 2010 - Synthese 175 (S1):39-62.
    The process of rationally revising beliefs in the light of new information is a topic of great importance and long-standing interest in artificial intelligence. Moreover, significant progress has been made in understanding the philosophical, logical, and computational foundations of belief revision. However, very little research has been reported with respect to the revision of other mental states, most notably propositional attitudes such as desires and intentions. In this paper, we present a first attempt to formulate a general framework for understanding (...)
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  36. A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision.Giacomo Bonanno - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):193-228.
    We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes’ rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision are also discussed.
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  37. Iterated Belief Revision.Robert Stalnaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):189-209.
    This is a discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new information, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new information. The emphasis in the paper is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples to proposed (...)
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  38. The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott.Lydia Mechtenberg - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):495-507.
    In this commentary on Rotts paper Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge, I discuss two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. I conclude that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.
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  39. Reconstruction of Contraction Operators.Sven Hansson - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):185-199.
    An operator of belief change is reconstructible as another such operator if and only if any outcome that can be obtained with the former can also be obtained with the latter. Two operators are mutually reconstructible if they generate exactly the same set of outcomes. The relations of reconstructibility among fifteen operators of contraction, including the common AGM contraction operators, are completely characterized. Furthermore, the additional such relations are characterized that arise if all belief sets are required to be finite-based (...)
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  40. Grounded Consequence for Defeasible Logic.Aldo Antonelli - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a title on the foundations of defeasible logic, which explores the formal properties of everyday reasoning patterns whereby people jump to conclusions, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further information. Although technical in nature the book contains sections that outline basic issues by means of intuitive and simple examples. This book is primarily targeted at philosophers interested in the foundations of defeasible logic, logicians, and specialists in artificial intelligence and theoretical computer science.
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  41. Respecting All the Evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.
    Plausibly, you should believe what your total evidence supports. But cases of misleading higher-order evidence—evidence about what your evidence supports—present a challenge to this thought. In such cases, taking both first-order and higher-order evidence at face value leads to a seemingly irrational incoherence between one’s first-order and higher-order attitudes: you will believe P, but also believe that your evidence doesn’t support P. To avoid sanctioning tension between epistemic levels, some authors have abandoned the thought that both first-order and higher-order evidence (...)
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  42. Rational Evaluation in Belief Revision.Yongfeng Yuan & Shier Ju - 2015 - Synthese 192 (7):2311-2336.
    We introduce a new operator, called rational evaluation, in belief change. The operator evaluates new information according to the agent’s core beliefs, and then exports the plausible part of the new information. It belongs to the decision module in belief change. We characterize rational evaluation by axiomatic postulates and propose two functional constructions for it, based on the well-known constructions of kernel sets and remainder sets, respectively. The main results of the paper are two representation theorems with respect to the (...)
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  43. Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
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  44. 6 The Standard Theory of Belief Revision: AGM.Gordian Haas - 2015 - In Minimal Verificationism: On the Limits of Knowledge. De Gruyter. pp. 113-134.
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  45. Belief Update Across Fission.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):659-682.
    When an agent undergoes fission, how should the beliefs of the fission results relate to the pre-fission beliefs? This question is important for the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, but it is of independent philosophical interest. Among other things, fission scenarios demonstrate that ‘self-locating’ information can affect the probability of uncentred propositions even if an agent has no essentially self-locating uncertainty. I present a general update rule for centred beliefs that gives sensible verdicts in cases of fission, without relying on (...)
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  46. The Laws of Belief—Ranking Theory and its Philosophical Applications.Frank Zenker - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):310-313.
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  47. Irrevocable Belief Revision and Epistemic Entrenchment.E. Fermé - 2000 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 8 (5):645-652.
    In recent papers [10, 11] Krister Segerberg introduced Irrevocable Belief Revision, as closely related to AGM revision [2]. In this paper we present irrevocable belief revision in terms of an epistemic entrenchment relation.
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  48. An Essay on Contraction.Andre Fuhrmann - 1996 - Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
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  49. Belief, Desire, and Revision, by John Collins. [REVIEW]A. Disentropic Ethic - 1988 - The Monist 71 (1).
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  50. Review of Hans Rott, Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. [REVIEW]Sven Ove Hansson - 2004 - Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 77:145-147.
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