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  1. Mystery and the Evidential Impact of Unexplainables.Matteo Colombo & Dominik Klein - 2018 - Episteme 15 (4):463-475.
    How should the information that a proposition p is a mystery impact your credence in p? To answer this question, we first provide a taxonomy of mysteries; then, we develop a test to distinguish two types of mysteries. When faced with mysteries of the first type, rational epistemic agents should lower their credence in p upon learning that p is a mystery. The same information should not impact agents’ credence in p, when they face mysteries of the second type. Our (...)
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  2. Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Synthese:1-20.
    I explore how rational belief and rational credence relate to evidence. I begin by looking at three cases where rational belief and credence seem to respond differently to evidence: cases of naked statistical evidence, lotteries, and hedged assertions. I consider an explanation for these cases, namely, that one ought not form beliefs on the basis of statistical evidence alone, and raise worries for this view. Then, I suggest another view that explains how belief and credence relate to evidence. My view (...)
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  3. Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.
    We often hear such casual accusations: you just believe that because you are a liberal, a Christian, an American, a woman… When such charges are made they are meant to sting—not just emotionally, but epistemically. But should they? It can be disturbing to learn that one's beliefs reflect the influence of such irrelevant factors. The pervasiveness of such influence has led some to worry that we are not justified in many of our beliefs. That same pervasiveness has led others to (...)
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  4. The Irreducibility of Iterated to Single Revision.Jake Chandler & Richard Booth - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (4):405-418.
    After a number of decades of research into the dynamics of rational belief, the belief revision theory community remains split on the appropriate handling of sequences of changes in view, the issue of so-called iterated revision. It has long been suggested that the matter is at least partly settled by facts pertaining to the results of various single revisions of one’s initial state of belief. Recent work has pushed this thesis further, offering various strong principles that ultimately result in a (...)
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  5. A Brief Remark on Non-Prioritized Belief Change and the Monotony Postulate.Gordian Haas - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):319-322.
    The AGM success postulates for belief expansions and revisions have been widely criticized. This has resulted in the development of a number of non-prioritized belief change theories that violate these postulates. It is shown that we must also discard the monotony postulate for belief expansions if we abandon the success postulates. Non-prioritized belief change theories should instead fulfill a weaker postulate, which we call Conditional Monotony.
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  6. Belief Update Methods and Rules—Some Comparisons.Leszek Wronski - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    We tackle two open questions from Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010b) regarding what the belief update framework described in that paper mandates as correct responses to two problems. One of them concerns credences in overlapping propositions and is known in the literature as the “simultaneous update problem”. The other is the well known “Judy Benjamin” problem concerning conditional credences. We argue that our results concerning the problems point to deficiencies of the framework. More generally, we observe that the method of minimizing (...)
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  7. Two Dogmas of Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (9):503.
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  8. On A Linear Representation For Quantitative Belief Revision.Akira Fusaoka & Satoshi Hiratsuka - 2003 - Transactions of the Japanese Society for Artificial Intelligence 18 (2):75-85.
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  9. The Neurophysiology of Post-Contraction.Michael J. Zigler - 1944 - Psychological Review 51 (5):315-325.
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  10. How Might Degrees of Belief Shift? On Action Conflicting with Professed Beliefs.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (5):732-742.
    People often act in ways that appear incompatible with their sincere assertions. But how might we explain such cases? On the shifting view, subjects’ degrees of belief may be highly sensitive to changes in context. This paper articulates and refines this view, after defending it against recent criticisms. It details two mechanisms by which degrees of beliefs may shift.
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  11. A Model of Dual Attitudes.Timothy D. Wilson, Samuel Lindsey & Tonya Y. Schooler - 2000 - Psychological Review 107 (1):101-126.
    When an attitude changes from A₁ to A₂, what happens to A₁? Most theories assume, at least implicitly, that the new attitude replaces the former one. The authors argue that a new attitude can override, but not replace, the old one, resulting in dual attitudes. Dual attitudes are defined as different evaluations of the same attitude object: an automatic, implicit attitude and an explicit attitude. The attitude that people endorse depends on whether they have the cognitive capacity to retrieve the (...)
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  12. Disputation and Change of Belief: Burley's Theory of Obligationes as a Theory of Belief Revision.Henrik Lagerlund & Erik J. Olsson - unknown
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  13. Rational Metabolic Revision Based on Core Beliefs.Yongfeng Yuan - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).
    When an agent can not recognize, immediately, the implausible part of new information received, she will usually first expand her belief state by the new information, and then she may encounter some belief conflicts, and find the implausible information based on her criteria to consolidate her belief state. This process indicates a new kind of non-prioritized multiple revision, called metabolic revision. I give some axiomatic postulates for metabolic revision and propose two functional constructions for it, namely kernel metabolic revision and (...)
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  14. Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision.Sven Ove Hansson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):93-108.
    A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, (...)
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  15. Postulates for Revising BDI Structures.John Grant, Sarit Kraus, Donald Perlis & Michael Wooldridge - 2010 - Synthese 175 (S1):39-62.
    The process of rationally revising beliefs in the light of new information is a topic of great importance and long-standing interest in artificial intelligence. Moreover, significant progress has been made in understanding the philosophical, logical, and computational foundations of belief revision. However, very little research has been reported with respect to the revision of other mental states, most notably propositional attitudes such as desires and intentions. In this paper, we present a first attempt to formulate a general framework for understanding (...)
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  16. A Simple Modal Logic for Belief Revision.Giacomo Bonanno - 2005 - Synthese 147 (2):193-228.
    We propose a modal logic based on three operators, representing intial beliefs, information and revised beliefs. Three simple axioms are used to provide a sound and complete axiomatization of the qualitative part of Bayes’ rule. Some theorems of this logic are derived concerning the interaction between current beliefs and future beliefs. Information flows and iterated revision are also discussed.
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  17. Iterated Belief Revision.Robert Stalnaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):189-209.
    This is a discussion of the problem of extending the basic AGM belief revision theory to iterated belief revision: the problem of formulating rules, not only for revising a basic belief state in response to potential new information, but also for revising one’s revision rules in response to potential new information. The emphasis in the paper is on foundational questions about the nature of and motivation for various constraints, and about the methodology of the evaluation of putative counterexamples to proposed (...)
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  18. The Stability Theory of Knowledge and Belief Revision: Comments on Rott.Lydia Mechtenberg - 2004 - Erkenntnis 61 (2-3):495-507.
    In this commentary on Rotts paper Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge, I discuss two problems of the stability theory of knowledge which are pointed out by Rott. I conclude that these problems offer no reason for rejecting the stability theory, but might be grounds for deviating from the standard AGM account of belief revision which Rott presupposes.
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  19. Reconstruction of Contraction Operators.Sven Ove Hansson - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):185-199.
    An operator of belief change is reconstructible as another such operator if and only if any outcome that can be obtained with the former can also be obtained with the latter. Two operators are mutually reconstructible if they generate exactly the same set of outcomes. The relations of reconstructibility among fifteen operators of contraction, including the common AGM contraction operators, are completely characterized. Furthermore, the additional such relations are characterized that arise if all belief sets are required to be finite-based (...)
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  20. Grounded Consequence for Defeasible Logic.Aldo Antonelli - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
    This is a title on the foundations of defeasible logic, which explores the formal properties of everyday reasoning patterns whereby people jump to conclusions, reserving the right to retract them in the light of further information. Although technical in nature the book contains sections that outline basic issues by means of intuitive and simple examples. This book is primarily targeted at philosophers interested in the foundations of defeasible logic, logicians, and specialists in artificial intelligence and theoretical computer science.
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  21. Epistemic Theories of Truth: The Justifiability Paradox Investigated.Vincent C. Müller & Christian Stein - 1996 - In C. Martínez Vidal, U. Rivas Monroy & L. Villegas Forero (eds.), Verdad: Lógica, Representatión y Mundo. Universidade de Santiago de Compostela. pp. 95-104.
    Epistemic theories of truth, such as those presumed to be typical for anti-realism, can be characterised as saying that what is true can be known in principle: p → ◊Kp. However, with statements of the form “p & ¬Kp”, a contradiction arises if they are both true and known. Analysis of the nature of the paradox shows that such statements refute epistemic theories of truth only if the the anti-realist motivation for epistemic theories of truth is not taken into account. (...)
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  22. Respecting All the Evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.
    Plausibly, you should believe what your total evidence supports. But cases of misleading higher-order evidence—evidence about what your evidence supports—present a challenge to this thought. In such cases, taking both first-order and higher-order evidence at face value leads to a seemingly irrational incoherence between one’s first-order and higher-order attitudes: you will believe P, but also believe that your evidence doesn’t support P. To avoid sanctioning tension between epistemic levels, some authors have abandoned the thought that both first-order and higher-order evidence (...)
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  23. Rational Evaluation in Belief Revision.Yongfeng Yuan & Shier Ju - 2015 - Synthese 192 (7):2311-2336.
    We introduce a new operator, called rational evaluation, in belief change. The operator evaluates new information according to the agent’s core beliefs, and then exports the plausible part of the new information. It belongs to the decision module in belief change. We characterize rational evaluation by axiomatic postulates and propose two functional constructions for it, based on the well-known constructions of kernel sets and remainder sets, respectively. The main results of the paper are two representation theorems with respect to the (...)
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  24. Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that revised beliefs (...)
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  25. 6 The Standard Theory of Belief Revision: AGM.Gordian Haas - 2015 - In Minimal Verificationism: On the Limits of Knowledge. De Gruyter. pp. 113-134.
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  26. Belief Merging with the Aim of Truthlikeness.Simon D'Alfonso - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7).
    The merging/fusion of belief/data collections in propositional logic form is a topic that has received due attention within the domains of database and AI research. A distinction can be made between two types of scenarios to which the process of merging can be applied. In the first type, the collections represent preferences, such as the voting choices of a group of people, that need to be aggregated so as to give a consistent result that in some way best represents the (...)
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  27. The Laws of Belief—Ranking Theory and its Philosophical Applications.F. Zenker - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):310-313.
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  28. Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Episternic States by Peter Gärdenfors. [REVIEW]Isaac Levi - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (8):437-444.
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  29. An Essay on Contraction.Andre Fuhrmann - 1996 - Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
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  30. A Unified Characterization of Belief-Revision Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - manuscript
    This paper characterizes several belief-revision rules in a unified framework: Bayesian revision upon learning some event, Jeffrey revision upon learning new probabilities of some events, Adams revision upon learning some new conditional probabilities, and 'dual-Jeffrey' revision upon learning a new conditional probability function. Despite their differences, these revision rules can be characterized in terms of the same two axioms: responsiveness, which requires that revised beliefs incorporate what has been learnt, and conservativeness, which requires that beliefs on which the learnt input (...)
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  31. Belief, Desire, and Revision, by John Collins. [REVIEW]A. Disentropic Ethic - 1988 - The Monist 71 (1).
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  32. Review of Hans Rott, Change, Choice and Inference: A Study of Belief Revision and Nonmonotonic Reasoning. [REVIEW]Sven Ove Hansson - 2004 - Studia Logica: An International Journal for Symbolic Logic 77:145-147.
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  33. Changing Beliefs Rationally: Some Puzzles.Dorothy Edgington - 1992 - In Jes Ezquerro (ed.), Cognition, Semantics and Philosophy. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 47--73.
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  34. Wolfgang Spohn and the Ranking Functions Theory.Stefano Bigliardi - 2010 - Rivista di Filosofia 101 (1):57-80.
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  35. A Structuralist Theory of Belief Revision.Holger Andreas - 2011 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (2):205-232.
    The present paper aims at a synthesis of belief revision theory with the Sneed formalism known as the structuralist theory of science. This synthesis is brought about by a dynamisation of classical structuralism, with an abductive inference rule and base generated revisions in the style of Rott (2001). The formalism of prioritised default logic (PDL) serves as the medium of the synthesis. Why seek to integrate the Sneed formalism into belief revision theory? With the hybrid system of the present investigation, (...)
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  36. Dynamic Update with Probabilities.Johan van Benthem, Jelle Gerbrandy & Barteld Kooi - 2009 - Studia Logica 93 (1):67 - 96.
    Current dynamic-epistemic logics model different types of information change in multi-agent scenarios. We generalize these logics to a probabilistic setting, obtaining a calculus for multi-agent update with three natural slots: prior probability on states, occurrence probabilities in the relevant process taking place, and observation probabilities of events. To match this update mechanism, we present a complete dynamic logic of information change with a probabilistic character. The completeness proof follows a compositional methodology that applies to a much larger class of dynamic-probabilistic (...)
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  37. Belief, Desire, and Revision.John Collins - 1988 - Mind 97 (387):333 - 342.
  38. Conditionals and Ranking Functions, Special Issue of Erkenntnis.J. Weisberg, F. Huber & E. Swanson (eds.) - 2009 - Springer.
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  39. The Laws of Belief by Wolfgang Spohn.Richard Baron - 2013 - Philosophy Now 94:42-43.
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  40. Exploitation of a Crisp Relation in a Ranking Problem.Philippe Vincke - 1992 - Theory and Decision 32 (3):221-240.
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  41. The Ranking Assumption.Robinson A. Grover - 1974 - Theory and Decision 4 (3-4):277-299.
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  42. Probability of Inconsistencies in Theory Revision.Sylvia Wenmackers, Danny E. P. Vanpoucke & Igor Douven - 2012 - European Physical Journal B 85 (1):44 (15).
    We present a model for studying communities of epistemically interacting agents who update their belief states by averaging the belief states of other agents in the community. The agents in our model have a rich belief state, involving multiple independent issues which are interrelated in such a way that they form a theory of the world. Our main goal is to calculate the probability for an agent to end up in an inconsistent belief state due to updating. To that end, (...)
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  43. Belief, Proportionality and Probability.George I. Mavrodes - 1981 - Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 3:58-68.
  44. Keep Changing Your Beliefs, Aiming for the Truth.Alexandru Baltag & Sonja Smets - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (2):255-270.
    We investigate the process of truth-seeking by iterated belief revision with higher-level doxastic information . We elaborate further on the main results in Baltag and Smets (Proceedings of TARK, 2009a , Proceedings of WOLLIC’09 LNAI 5514, 2009b ), applying them to the issue of convergence to truth . We study the conditions under which the belief revision induced by a series of truthful iterated upgrades eventually stabilizes on true beliefs. We give two different conditions ensuring that beliefs converge to “full” (...)
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  45. Value-Based Contraction: A Representation Result.Hailin Liu - unknown
    Sven-Ove Hansson and Erik Olsson studied in [7] the logical properties of an operation of contraction first proposed by Isaac Levi in [10]. They provided a completeness result for the simplest version of contraction that they call Levicontraction but left open the problem of characterizing axiomatically the more complex operation of value-based contraction or saturatable contraction. In this paper we propose an axiomatization for this operation and prove a completeness result for it. We argue that the resulting operation is better (...)
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  46. Social Norms, Rational Choice and Belief Change.Horacio Arlo-Costa & Arthur Paul Pedersen - unknown
    This article elaborates on foundational issues in the social sciences and their impact on the contemporary theory of belief revision. Recent work in the foundations of economics has focused on the role external social norms play in choice. Amartya Sen has argued in [Sen93] that the traditional rationalizability approach used in the theory of rational choice has serious problems accommodating the role of social norms. Sen's more recent work [Sen96, Sen97] proposes how one might represent social norms in the theory (...)
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  47. Inferring a Linear Ordering Over a Power Set.Ran Spiegler - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (1):31-49.
    An observer attempts to infer the unobserved ranking of two ideal objects, A and B, from observed rankings in which these objects are `accompanied' by `noise' components, C and D. In the first ranking, A is accompanied by C and B is accompanied by D, while in the second ranking, A is accompanied by D and B is accompanied by C. In both rankings, noisy-A is ranked above noisy-B. The observer infers that ideal-A is ranked above ideal-B. This commonly used (...)
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  48. Review: Mild Contraction: Evaluating Loss of Information Due to Loss of Belief. [REVIEW]Paul Weirich - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):753-757.
    This book review describes and evaluates Issac Levi's views about belief revision.
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  49. Belief Expansion, Contextual Fit and the Reliability of Information Sources.Stephan Hartmann & L. Bovens - 2001 - In AkmanV (ed.), Modeling and Using Context,. Springer.
    We develop a probabilistic criterion for belief expansion that is sensitive to the degree of contextual fit of the new information to our belief set as well as to the reliability of our information source. We contrast our approach with the success postulate in AGM-style belief revision and show how the idealizations in our approach can be relaxed by invoking Bayesian-Network models.
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  50. Handbook of Defeasible Reasoning and Uncertainty Management Systems, Vol 3.D. Gabbay & P. Smets (eds.) - 1998 - Kluwer Academic.
    HANDBOOK OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING AND UNCERTAINTY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS EDITORS: DOV M. ... and A. Hunter Volume 3: Belief Change Edited by D. Dubois and H. Prade HANDBOOK OF DEFEASIBLE REASONING AND ...
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