Great Expectations. Part I: On the Customizability of Generalized Expected Utility [Book Review]

Theory and Decision 64 (1):1-36 (2008)
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Abstract

We propose a generalization of expected utility that we call generalized EU (GEU), where a decision maker’s beliefs are represented by plausibility measures and the decision maker’s tastes are represented by general (i.e., not necessarily real-valued) utility functions. We show that every agent, “rational” or not, can be modeled as a GEU maximizer. We then show that we can customize GEU by selectively imposing just the constraints we want. In particular, we show how each of Savage’s postulates corresponds to constraints on GEU.

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Joseph Y. Halpern
Cornell University

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