Non-Personal Minds

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:185-209 (2003)
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Abstract

Persons are creatures with a range of personal capacities. Most known to us are also people, though nothing in observation or biological theory demands that all and only people are persons, nor even that persons, any more than people, constitute a natural kind. My aim is to consider what non-personal minds are like. Darwin's Earthworms are sensitive, passionate and, in their degree, intelligent. They may even construct maps, embedded in the world they perceive around them, so as to be able to construct their tunnels. Other creatures may be able to perceive that world as also accessible to other minds, and structure it by locality and temporal relation, without having many personal qualities. Non-personal mind, on both modern materialist and Plotinian grounds, may be the more usual, and the less deluded, sort of mind.

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Stephen R. L. Clark
University of Liverpool

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
On Human Nature.Edward O. Wilson - 1978 - Harvard University Press.
Collected papers.Alfred Schutz - 1962 - The Hague,: M. Nijhoff. Edited by H. L. van Breda, Maurice Natanson, Arvid Brodersen, Ilse Schütz, Aron Gurwitsch, Helmut R. Wagner, George Psathas, Lester Embree, Michael D. Barber & Alfred Schutz.

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