Order:
Disambiguations
Amy Kind [66]Amy L. Kind [1]
See also
Amy Kind
Claremont McKenna College
  1. The Heterogeneity of the Imagination.Amy Kind - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):141-159.
    Imagination has been assigned an important explanatory role in a multitude of philosophical contexts. This paper examines four such contexts: mindreading, pretense, our engagement with fiction, and modal epistemology. Close attention to each of these contexts suggests that the mental activity of imagining is considerably more heterogeneous than previously realized. In short, no single mental activity can do all the explanatory work that has been assigned to imagining.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   56 citations  
  2. Knowledge Through Imagination.Amy Kind & Peter Kung (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Imagination is celebrated as our vehicle for escape from the mundane here and now. It transports us to distant lands of magic and make-believe, and provides us with diversions during boring meetings or long bus rides. Yet the focus on imagination as a means of escape from the real world minimizes the fact that imagination seems also to furnish us with knowledge about it. Imagination seems an essential component in our endeavor to learn about the world in which we live--whether (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  3. What’s so Transparent About Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.
    Intuitions about the transparency of experience have recently begun to play a key role in the debate about qualia. Specifically, such intuitions have been used by representationalists to support their view that the phenomenal character of our experience can be wholly explained in terms of its intentional content.[i] But what exactly does it mean to say that experience is transparent? In my view, recent discussions of transparency leave matters considerably murkier than one would like. As I will suggest, there is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   102 citations  
  4. What Imagination Teaches.Amy Kind - 2020 - In John Schwenkler & Enoch Lambert (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change.
    David Lewis has argued that “having an experience is the best way or perhaps the only way, of coming to know what that experience is like”; when an experience is of a sufficiently new sort, mere science lessons are not enough. Developing this Lewisian line, L.A. Paul has suggested that some experiences are epistemically transformative. Until an individual has such an experience it remains epistemically inaccessible to her. No amount of stories and theories and testimony from others can teach her (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  5. Learning to Imagine.Amy Kind - 2022 - British Journal of Aesthetics 62 (1):33-48.
    Underlying much current work in philosophy of imagination is the assumption that imagination is a skill. This assumption seems to entail not only that facility with imagining will vary from one person to another, but also that people can improve their own imaginative capacities and learn to be better imaginers. This paper takes up this issue. After showing why this is properly understood as a philosophical question, I discuss what it means to say that one imagining is better than another (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  6. The Skill of Imagination.Amy Kind - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise. Routledge. pp. 335-346.
    We often talk of people as being more or less imaginative than one another – as being better or worse at imagining – and we also compare various feats of imagination to one another in terms of how easy or hard they are. Facts such as these might be taken to suggest that imagination is often implicitly understood as a skill. This implicit understanding, however, has rarely (if ever) been made explicit in the philosophical literature. Such is the task of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  7. The Puzzle of Imaginative Desire.Amy Kind - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):421-439.
    The puzzle of imaginative desire arises from the difficulty of accounting for the surprising behaviour of desire in imaginative activities such as our engagement with fiction and our games of pretend. Several philosophers have recently attempted to solve this puzzle by introducing a class of novel mental states?what they call desire-like imaginings or i-desires. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the i-desire solution to the puzzle of imaginative desire. The introduction of i-desires is both ontologically profligate and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  8. The Case Against Representationalism About Moods.Amy Kind - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
    According to representationalism, the phenomenal character of a mental state reduces to its intentional content. Although representationalism seems plausible with respect to ordinary perceptual states, it seems considerably less plausible for states like moods. Here the problem for representationalism arises largely because moods seem to lack intentional content altogether. In this paper, I explore several possible options for identifying the intentional content of moods and suggest that none of them is wholly satisfactory. Importantly, however, I go on to argue that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  9. Putting the Image Back in Imagination.Amy Kind - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):85-110.
    Despite their intuitive appeal and a long philosophical history, imagery-based accounts of the imagination have fallen into disfavor in contemporary discussions. The philosophical pressure to reject such accounts seems to derive from two distinct sources. First, the fact that mental images have proved difficult to accommodate within a scientific conception of mind has led to numerous attempts to explain away their existence, and this in turn has led to attempts to explain the phenomenon of imagining without reference to such ontologically (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   83 citations  
  10. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination.Amy Kind (ed.) - 2016 - Routledge.
    Imagination occupies a central place in philosophy, going back to Aristotle. However, following a period of relative neglect there has been an explosion of interest in imagination in the past two decades as philosophers examine the role of imagination in debates about the mind and cognition, aesthetics and ethics, as well as epistemology, science and mathematics. This outstanding _Handbook_ contains over thirty specially commissioned chapters by leading philosophers organised into six clear sections examining the most important aspects of the philosophy (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  11.  32
    Epistemic Uses of Imagination.Amy Kind & Christopher Badura (eds.) - 2021 - Routledge.
    Contents: 1) Peter Kung, Why We Need Something Like Imagery; 2) Derek Lam, An Imaginative Person’s Guide to Objective Modality; 3) Rebecca Hanrahan, Crossing Rivers: Imagination and Real Possibilities; 4) Michael Omoge, Imagination, Metaphysical Modality, and Modal Psychology; 5) Joshua Myers, Reasoning with Imagination; 6) Franz Berto, Equivalence in Imagination; 7) Christopher Badura, How Imagination Can Justify; 8) Antonella Mallozzi, Imagination, Inference, and Apriority; 9) Margherita Arcangeli, Narratives and Thought Experiments: Restoring the Role of Imagination; 10) Margot Strohminger, Two Ways (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. Imaginative Experience.Amy Kind - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    In this essay, the focus is not on what imagination is but rather on what it is like. Rather than exploring the various accounts of imagination on offer in the philosophical literature, we will instead be exploring the various accounts of imaginative experience on offer in that literature. In particular, our focus in what follows will be on three different sorts of accounts that have played an especially prominent role in philosophical thinking about these issues: the impoverishment view (often associated (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13.  97
    Bridging the Divide: Imagining Across Experiential Perspectives.Amy Kind - 2021 - In Christopher Badura & Amy Kind (eds.), Epistemic Uses of Imagination. Routledge. pp. 237-259.
    Can one have imaginative access to experiential perspectives vastly different from one’s own? Can one successfully imagine what it’s like to live a life very different from one’s own? These questions are particularly pressing in contemporary society as we try to bridge racial, ethnic, and gender divides. Yet philosophers have often expressed considerable pessimism in this regard. It is often thought that the gulf between vastly different experiential perspectives cannot be bridged. This chapter explores the case for this pessimism. Though (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. Can Imagination Be Unconscious?Amy Kind - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13121-13141.
    Our ordinary conception of imagination takes it to be essentially a conscious phenomenon, and traditionally that’s how it had been treated in the philosophical literature. In fact, this claim had often been taken to be so obvious as not to need any argumentative support. But lately in the philosophical literature on imagination we see increasing support for the view that imagining need not occur consciously. In this paper, I examine the case for unconscious imagination. I’ll consider four different arguments that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  15. Persons and Personal Identity.Amy Kind - 2015 - Polity.
    As persons, we are importantly different from all other creatures in the universe. But in what, exactly, does this difference consist? What kinds of entities are we, and what makes each of us the same person today that we were yesterday? Could we survive having all of our memories erased and replaced with false ones? What about if our bodies were destroyed and our brains were transplanted into android bodies, or if instead our minds were simply uploaded to computers? -/- (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  16. Restrictions on Representationalism.Amy Kind - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):405-427.
    According to representationalism, the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states supervenes on the intentional content of such states. Strong representationalism makes a further claim: the qualitative character of our phenomenal mental states _consists in_ the intentional content of such states. Although strong representationalism has greatly increased in popularity over the last decade, I find the view deeply implausible. In what follows, I will attempt to argue against strong representationalism by a two-step argument. First, I suggest that strong representationalism must (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  17. Pessimism About Russellian Monism.Amy Kind - 2015 - In Torin Alter & Yujin Nagasawa (eds.), Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism. pp. 401-421.
    From the perspective of many philosophers of mind in these early years of the 21st Century, the debate between dualism and physicalism has seemed to have stalled, if not to have come to a complete standstill. There seems to be no way to settle the basic clash of intuitions that underlies it. Recently however, a growing number of proponents of Russellian monism have suggested that their view promises to show us a new way forward. Insofar as Russellian monism might allow (...)
    Direct download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  18. How to Believe in Qualia.Amy Kind - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The Case for Qualia. MIT Press. pp. 285--298.
    in The Case for Qualia,ed. by Edmond Wright , MIT Press (2008), pp. 285-298.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  19. Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness.Amy Kind - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):902-913.
  20.  31
    Imagination Minimalized.Amy Kind - 2019 - British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (2):215-218.
    In Only Imagine, Kathleen Stock defends a theory of fictional content she calls extreme intentionalism. Roughly put, this view holds that the fictional content of a text is determined solely by its author’s intention. What is true in a given work of fiction gets fixed by what the author of that fiction intends a reader to imagine.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21. Mary's Powers of Imagination.Amy Kind - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. Cambridge University Press. pp. 161-179.
    One common response to the knowledge argument is the ability hypothesis. Proponents of the ability hypothesis accept that Mary learns what seeing red is like when she exits her black-and-white room, but they deny that the kind of knowledge she gains is propositional in nature. Rather, she acquires a cluster of abilities that she previously lacked, in particular, the abilities to recognize, remember, and imagine the color red. For proponents of the ability hypothesis, knowing what an experience is like simply (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  22. Shoemaker, Self-Blindness and Moore's Paradox.Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):39-48.
    I show how the 'innersense' (quasiperceptual) view of introspection can be defended against Shoemaker's influential 'argument from selfblindness'. If introspection and perception are analogous, the relationship between beliefs and introspective knowledge of them is merely contingent. Shoemaker argues that this implies the possibility that agents could be selfblind, i.e., could lack any introspective awareness of their own mental states. By invoking Moore's paradox, he rejects this possibility. But because Shoemaker's discussion conflates introspective awareness and selfknowledge, he cannot establish his conclusion. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  23. Love in the Time of AI.Amy Kind - 2021 - In Barry Dainton, Attila Tanyi & Will Slocombe (eds.), Minding the Future: Artificial Intelligence, Philosophical Visions and Science Fiction. pp. 89-106.
    As we await the increasingly likely advent of genuinely intelligent artificial systems, a fair amount of consideration has been given to how we humans will interact with them. Less consideration has been given to how—indeed if—we humans will love them. What would human-AI romantic relationships look like? What do such relationships tell us about the nature of love? This chapter explores these questions via consideration of several works of science fiction, focusing especially on the Black Mirror episode “Be Right Back” (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24.  96
    The Feeling of Familiarity.Amy Kind - 2022 - Acta Scientiarum 43 (3):1-10.
    The relationship between the phenomenology of imagination and the phenomenology of memory is an interestingly complicated one. On the one hand, there seem to be important similarities between the two, and there are even occasions in which we mistake an imagining for a memory or vice versa. On the other hand, there seem to be important differences between the two, and we can typically tell them apart. This paper explores various attempts to delineate a phenomenological marker differentiating imagination and memory, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25.  95
    Biometrics and the Metaphysics of Personal Identity.Amy Kind - forthcoming - IET Biometrics.
    The vast advances in biometrics over the past several decades have brought with them a host of pressing concerns. Philosophical scrutiny has already been devoted to many of the relevant ethical and political issues, especially ones arising from matters of privacy, bias, and security in data collection. But philosophers have devoted surprisingly little attention to the relevant metaphysical issues, in particular, ones concerning matters of personal identity. This paper aims to take some initial steps to correct this oversight. After discussing (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Qualia Realism.Amy Kind - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (2):143 - 162.
  27.  26
    Introduction: exploring the limits of imagination.Amy Kind - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-14.
  28. Imagery and Imagination.Amy Kind - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Both imagery and imagination play an important part in our mental lives. This article, which has three main sections, discusses both of these phenomena, and the connection between them. The first part discusses mental images and, in particular, the dispute about their representational nature that has become known as the _imagery debate_ . The second part turns to the faculty of the imagination, discussing the long philosophical tradition linking mental imagery and the imagination—a tradition that came under attack in the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  29.  45
    Only Imagine: Fiction, Interpretation, and Imagination, by Kathleen Stock.Amy Kind - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):601-608.
    Only Imagine: Fiction, Interpretation, and Imagination, by StockKathleen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. ix + 222.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. The Metaphysics of Personal Identity and Our Special Concern for the Future.Amy Kind - 2004 - Metaphilosophy 35 (4):536-553.
    Philosophers have long suggested that our attitude of special concern for the future is problematic for a reductionist view of personal identity, such as the one developed by Derek Parfit in Reasons and Persons. Specifically, it is often claimed that reductionism cannot provide justification for this attitude. In this paper, I argue that much of the debate in this arena involves a misconception of the connection between metaphysical theories of personal identity and our special concern. A proper understanding of this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31.  11
    Old.Amy Kind - 2022 - The Philosophers' Magazine 96:117-118.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  41
    Computing Machinery and Sexual Difference: The Sexed Presuppositions Underlying the Turing Test.Amy Kind - forthcoming - In Jennifer McWeeny & Keya Maitra (eds.), Feminist Philosophy of Mind.
    In his 1950 paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Alan Turing proposed that we can determine whether a machine thinks by considering whether it can win at a simple imitation game. A neutral questioner communicates with two different systems – one a machine and a human being – without knowing which is which. If after some reasonable amount of time the machine is able to fool the questioner into identifying it as the human, the machine wins the game, and we should (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33.  82
    Introspection.Amy Kind - 2005 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Introspection is the process by which someone comes to form beliefs about her own mental states. We might form the belief that someone else is happy on the basis of perception – for example, by perceiving her behavior. But a person typically does not have to observe her own behavior in order to determine whether she is happy. Rather, one makes this determination by introspecting.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34. Panexperientialism, Cognition, and the Nature of Experience.Amy Kind - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    i>: This paper explores the plausibility of panexperientialism by an examination of Gregg Rosenberg.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  35.  27
    The Snowman's Imagination.Amy Kind - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):341-348.
    Not all imaginings are successful; sometimes when an imaginer sets out to imagine some target, her imagining involves some kind of mistake. The error can be diagnosed in two ways: the imaginer imagines her target in a way that mischaracterizes it, or the imaginer fails to imagine her target at all and rather imagines something else that is similar in some ways to that target. In ordinary day-to-day imaginings, explanations of type seem most natural, but in discussions of philosophical imaginings, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36.  28
    The Possibility of Imagining Pain.Amy Kind - 2021 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (2):183-189.
    : In Imagined and delusional pain Jennifer Radden aims to show that experiences of pain – and in particular, the pain associated with depression – cannot be merely delusional. Her reasoning relies crucially on the claim that the feeling of pain is imaginatively beyond our reach. Though she thinks that there are many ways that one can imagine scenarios involving oneself being in pain, she argues that one cannot imagine the feeling of pain itself. In this commentary, I target this (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Philosophical Perspectives on Imagination in the Western Tradition.Amy Kind - forthcoming - In Anna Abraham (ed.), Cambridge Handbook of Imagination.
    Philosophers in the Western tradition have both theorized about imagination and used imagination in their theorizing about other matters. In this chapter, I first provide a brief overview of philosophical theorizing about imagination with a special focus on its relation to other mental states such as belief and perception. I then turn to a discussion of the methodological role that imagination has played in philosophy. I here focus on the imaginability principle, i.e., the claim that the imaginability of a given (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Not Easily Available 109–114.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Are Question–Begging, Amy Kind, Qualia Realism, Patricia Marino, Moral Dilemmas & Moral Progress - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104:337-338.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  39.  46
    Sticking to One’s Diet: Commentary on “Quining Diet Qualia” by Keith Frankish.Amy Kind - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):677-678.
  40. Nagel's "What is It Like to Be a Bat" Argument Against Physicalism.Amy Kind - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
  41. Chalmers' Zombie Argument.Amy Kind - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
  42.  48
    The Life of Imagination: Revealing and Making the World.Amy Kind - 2020 - British Journal of Aesthetics 60 (2):234-237.
    The Life of Imagination: Revealing and Making the WorldJennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei Columbia University Press. 2018. pp. 352. £50.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. The Irreducibility of Consciousness.Amy Kind - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (19):1-18.
    In this paper, by analyzing the Chalmers-Searle debate about Chalmers’ zombie thought experiment, I attempt to determine the implications that the irreducibility of consciousness has for the truth of materialism. While Chalmers claims that the irreducibility of consciousness forces us to embrace dualism, Searle claims that it has no deep metaphysical import and, in particular, that it is fully consistent with his materialist theory of mind. I argue that this disagreement hinges on the notion of physical identity in play in (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Review of Consciousness, Color, and Content. [REVIEW]Amy Kind - 2001 - Disputatio 1 (11):52-56.
  45.  25
    Unlimited Imagination.Amy Kind - 2020 - The Philosophers' Magazine 88:83-89.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  53
    Knowledge and Mind: A Philosophical Introduction. [REVIEW]Amy Kind - 2002 - Teaching Philosophy 25 (1):98-101.
  47.  35
    Imagination and the Imaginary, by Kathleen Lennon. [REVIEW]Amy Kind - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1244-1251.
    Imagination and the Imaginary, by LennonKathleen. London : Routledge, 2015. Pp. viii + 145.
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  30
    Cryogenics.Amy Kind, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon & A. M. Ferner - 2017 - The Philosophers' Magazine 76:66-69.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  31
    Imaginative Phenomenology and Existential Status.Amy Kind - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):273-278.
    __: In this essay I explore the account of imaginative phenomenology developed by Uriah Kriegel in _The Varieties of Consciousness_. On his view, the difference between perceptual phenomenology and imaginative phenomenology arises from the way that they present the existential status of their object: While perceptual experience presents its object as existent, imaginative experience presents its object as non-existent. While I agree with Kriegel that it’s likely that the difference between imaginative phenomenology and perceptual phenomenology is one not just of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50.  27
    Captain Fantastic. [REVIEW]Amy Kind - 2016 - The Philosophers' Magazine 75:112-113.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 65