The logic of inquiry in social sciences, the case of economics in particular

Social Science Information 48 (4):587-607 (2009)
The present-day epistemology of social science resembles a picture puzzle whose pieces are scattered to and fro across the vast domain of philosophical inquiry. This study attempts to assemble them in what appears to be a common thread of thinking for a necessary epistemic reconstruction, the historical specificity of social sciences. This understanding reveals itself as a method of validating truth in acknowledgement of three logical principles: (1) causality indeterminately becomes embedded in spatial—temporal distortions; (2) linear time is replaced by multiple, overlapping timescales, ‘multiple’ being a cultural rather than numerical concept; and (3) prediction remains associated with the least historical events, the particulars; that is, event-regularities normally specific for short periods of time.
Keywords economics  epistemology  historical systems
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/0539018409344781
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,479
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Chris Renwick (2014). Response to Stephen T. Casper and Steve Fuller. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 44 (4):515-521.
S. Mohun & R. Veneziani (2012). Reorienting Economics? Philosophy of the Social Sciences 42 (1):126-145.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

96 ( #49,301 of 1,925,592 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #308,517 of 1,925,592 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.